Managing multiple interdependencies in large scale software development projects by Staudenmayer, Nancy A. (Nancy Ann)
MANAGING MULTIPLE INTERDEPENDENCIES IN
LARGE SCALE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMEN'f PROJECTS
by
NANCY A. STAUDENMAYER
B.A., MathematicslEconomics
Wellesley College
(1986)
M.A., Statistics
University of California, Berkeley
(1988)
Submitted to the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
at the
MASSACHUSETIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 1997
© Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1997)
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Signature of Author ----------.--..~----------,rI-------­g' .MIT Sl('an SchG~l·ofManagement
June 2, 1997
Certified by -------.jl~f--~.........- -----."- ~_.Ii·..._..r__.,---- .......o-------_---_---
Michael A. Cusumano
Professor of Management
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by _
Birger Wemerfelt
~"ASSACHUS~TTS\NST~ '; u,'Chairman, Ph.D. Program, Sloan School of Management
OF TECHN()lOGV
jUN 041997
LIBRARiES
ARCHIVES
I
I
IlJi
MANAGING MULTIPLE INTERDEPENDENCIES IN
LARGE SCALE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROJECfS
by
NANCY A. STAUDENMAYER
Submitted to the Alfred P. Sloan School of Management
on June 2, 1997, in partial fulfillment of the requirenlents for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
ABSTRACf
The concept of interdependency is central to our thinking about organizations. It appears in
theories of organizational design (Galbraith, 1973; Nadler & Tushman, 1983), organizational
process (Van de Ven & Poole, 1989), and product development (Wheelwright & Clark, 1992;
Cusumano & Selby, 1995). It is implicit in classic metaphors of organizations as "systems"
(Katz & Kahn, 1966) as well as more contemporary portrayals of organizations as "networks"
(Rockart & Short, 1989) or '1azz ensembles" (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Yet despite this
centrality, interdependence itself has been under-explored both conceptually and empirically
(Weick, 1974; Malone & Crowstoo, 1994). In particular, the structure and underlying
contingencies which drive interdependency remain unclear. For example, pioneering research by
Thompson (1967) defined interdependency as a varying degree of contingency among tasks
inherent in the nature of the technology; more recent research has focused on the role of resource
allocation (Malone & CrowstoD, 1994) and product strategy (Cusumano & Selby, 1995) as
possible sources of interdependence. These variations suggest that there may be several types or
categories of relationships among tasks, yet a comprehensiYe framework has yet to be developed.
Furthennore, prior research largely focuses on the organizing implications of single types of
interdependency in isolation from one another whereas in reality managers of organizations face
a "complex web" of multiple interdependencies that they need to manage simultaneously.
This dissertation addresses the above points within the context of large scale software
development projects. It uses this phenomenon to inductively derive a taxonomy of different
types of irlterdependency and then explores the consequences of multiple interdependencies for
project strategy, structure, and performance. The results suggest that interdependencies among
tasks on a given project are largely driven by fOUf sets of forces: the product technology, external
product environment, internal work unit environment, and organizational structure and resource
policy in the firm. Teams develop different strategies for confronting this hierarchical systetn of
evolving task relationships. The data further suggest that the choice of these strategies has
important implications for project perfonnance.
The dissertation research is structured as three papers, each of which explores a specific
component of the interdependence-structure-perfonnance relationship. The first paper,
"Interdependency: Conceptual, Empirical, and Practical Issues, tI surveys the literature on
interdependency across three distinct theoretical paradigms, information processing theories,
resource-based tlleories, and theories of sense-making, and develops a conceptual framework that
places these com.peting paradigms in perspective. It also documents how researchers have
measured and evaluated interdependence and notes a decided uniformity in past empirical
approaches to the topic.
The second paper, "An Empirically-Derived Taxonomy of Multiple Interdependencies," attempts
to open up the "black box" of task relationships. Drawing upon a large sample of examples of
interdependency, it develops, via affinity diagram techniques, a taxonomy of multiple
interdependencies.
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IGiven that model, the third paper, entitled "Webs of Interdependency: Strategies for Managing
Multiple Interdependencies in New Product Development, II examines the strategies teams use to
manage multiple interdependencies and proposes implications for project performance, which are
supported by internal and external project evaluation data. The analysis revealed three basic
strategies: systemic manipulation, constrained systemic manipulation, and local reaction. In this
study, the highest performi~gprojects adopted a systemic manipulation approach in which they
focused on the pattern of interdependencies as a design variable. These teams made critical up
front design decisiollS in order to simplify task coordination, prioritized interdependencies,
gained leverage off of central tasks, and were a\vare of the path dependent nature of their
choices. Results suggested that interdependency management can be viewed as a strategic
process variable insofar ali interdependencies are manipulatable through strategy and
organization design. This flexibility is constrained, however, due to the existence of certain
technical and organizational legacy factors, which tend to embed tasks and task relationships in a
prior history of structure.
The research ,design of this study is that of multiple case studies (Yin, 1984) of six large scale
software development projects at two leading companies, Microsoft and Lucent Technologies
(formerly AT&T). Large scale product development projects represent an ideal setting in which
to examine this concept in that interdependencies are ubiquitous and critical to project success
(Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Cusumano & Selby, 1995). Utilizing a multi-method approach, the
study draws upon a combination of qualitative and quantitative data including 71 interviews with
project team members, on-site observation at both firms, and various forms of project
documentation SUCII as schedules, design documents, and memos. The outcome variable (project
perfonnance) was assessed via a brief questionnaire administered to experts and upper
management in each finn. Because the study was designed to be an inductive investigation, the
above hypotheses await future testing.
Thesis Committee: Michael A. Cusumano (Chair)
Professor of Management
Alfred P .. Sloan School of Management, MIT
Deborah Ancona
Associate Professor of Management
Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, 1vfIT
Steven Eppinger
Associate Professor of Managenlent Science
Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, MIT
Michael A. Tushman
Professor of Management
Columbia University
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This chapter serves as an introduction and overvie\v of the dissertation. It begins
by describing the overall motivation for the work and provides an organizing
framework which links the next three chapters together. It also highlights and explains
three important aspects of the research agenda: the distinction between the concept and
the phenomellon used to explore it, the choice of an inductive analytical approach, and
the unit(s} of analysis. The chapter closes with a summary figure describing the
research questions, design, and deliverables, which define each of the subsequellt
chapters.
1.1 Re§earch Motivation
An organization can be defined as a set of interacting elements that acquires
inputs from the environment, transforms them, and discharges outputs to the external
environment. The need for inputs and outputs reflects dependency on the
environment. Interacting elements mean that people and departments depend UpOl1
one another and must work together (Daft, 1983b). lhe concept of interdependency
therefore lies at the very heart of what an organization is and why organizations exist.
Understanding interdependency is also crucial to addressing a myriad of problems in
firms, as evident in recent work on new forms of organizing (Baker, 1992), alliances
(Roth, 1995), and process engineering and improvement (Adler, Mandelbaum, Nguyen,
& Schwerer, March 1995).
Yet despite this centrality, interdependence itself has been under-explored both
conceptually and empirically (Malone & Crowston, March 1994; Weick, March 1976).
We lack a clear, integrated understanding of the structure and underlying contingencies
which drive relationships among tasks. The lack of a comprehensive framework in tum
constrains Otlr knowledge of the interplay between interdependency and organizational
str~cture,strateg}'I and performance.
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For example, prior research largely focuses on the implications of single types of
interdependen~!in isolation from one another whei'eas in reality managers of
organizations face a "complex web" of multiple interdependencies that they need to
nlanage simultaneously. How does a team define a coherent 3trategy that enables it to
meet its goals of customer needs and schedule while simultaneously interacting with
and depending on other tear~s? How do managers d~velop an organizational structure
and strategy to simultaneously coordinate multiple tasks? In other words, ho\v do we
encourage both independence of action and initiative, ownership, and flexibility (at the
team and individual levels) and coordination and integration (Lawrence & Lorsch,
1967)?
The paradox is particularly evident in large scale product development efforts.
Although interdependency has long been a central issue in research on new product
developmellt (Allen, 1977; Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992),
cer.l1in trends hI. technology, markets, and organizations are raising the level of
corltingency III work processes and c.ctivities. For example, the very nature of malty
technological products is changing. More and more products combine hardware with
software Of, in the case of multi-media products, technical and artistic content, implying
interd~pendellCYover ever more diverse and varied disciplines. Products are also
becoming increasingly complex and componentized and, therefore, beyond the
capabilities of one or even a few individuals to produce. Similarly, many companies are
beginning to use product portfolios or platforms tc compete and adapt in fast changing
environments (Nobeoka & Cusumano, November 1995), raising cOlnplicated issues of
cross team coordination. Finally, we are seeing experiments with new organizational
forms such as cross-functional teams (Ancona, 1990) and networked organizations
(Baker, 1992).
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At the same time, technical and market environments on many of these large
scale development efforts demand ever quicker response time and flexibility. As a
result, we have seen a profusion of research and ideas about ne\v vvays of structuring
(Clark, Chew, & Fujimoto, 1987; Cusumano, 1992; Cusumallo & Nobeoka, 1992; Meyer
& Lehnerd, 1997; Meyer & Utterback, Spring 1993; Nonaka, 1990), leading (Ancona &
Caldwell, 1987; Clark & Fujimoto, 1989; Clark & Wheelwright, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989),
strategizing (Cusumano & Nobeoka, 1992; Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Nobeoka &
Cusumano, November 1995), producing (Adler, et al., March 1995; Brown & Eisenhardt,
March 1995; Smith & Cusumano, September 1993), and learning (Imai, Nonaka, &
Takeuchi, 1985; Sitkin, 1996). This research study argues that before prapo: :g such
ne\v solutions, we need to develop an understanding of the underlying
interdependencies, one that reflects the more complicated structure of work in
organizations today.
Informal observations and conversations with managers and engineers working
on large scale product development projects support the initial conjecture that
interdependency is both important and not well understood. For example, people
frequently cite "managing interdependencies" as one of their biggest challenges
(Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Perry, Staudenmayer, & Votta, July 1994; Sabbagh, 1995).
On the Boeing 777 development effort, engineers referred to "interferences" when
two pieces overlap in space:
You have five thousand engineers designing the airplane... It's very difficult
for those engineers to coordinate ... and it's very costly. You end up with an
airplane that's very difficult to build. The first time that parts come together
... they don't fit. (Sabbagh, p. 52)
As we go through the process of designing, day in and day out, people
continue to change their designs and they will interfere with oUler parts....
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You may have checked against somebody else's part the day before, and
when you check against it today he's changed his part and it goes right
through your part.... And designers j~st have to deal with the fact that parts
are changing, and they have to coordinate with each other as best they can.
But at the end of each of these six stages we go through what we call a
freeze. I say, 10K, no more designs. Now go work out all the remaining fit
problems. I So you get a few days where nobody is designing any more; all
they're doing is comparing their designs with everybody else's design to
make sure they have no more interferences. (Sabbagh, pp. 56-57)
I saw one of our senior str1.lctures people going up and do'h~ the 10-18
building the other day looking for a hydraulic guy. He wanted to put a
bracket on his floor beam, and they had not come to an agreement on wllere
the bracket was going to go and ... whether it was going to create an
interference. And he stopped me in the hall and he was so mad because he
couldn't find the hydraulics engineer. And he said, 'What do they look like?
Do they have tubes in their pockets? Do they have tubes coming out of ttleir
heads? What do those people look like?' (Sabbagh, p. 57)
Such development efforts are obviously highly precarious. Seemingly minor
schedule or design changes in one part of the project can have major and catastrophic
implications for the project as a whole. Ripple effects can also start to extend across
projects in a firm as products share technical components a.nd designs. Finally,
evidence in a prior study of large scale software development (Perry, et aL, July 1994)
and supported by other studies (Curtis, Krasner, & Iscoe, November 1988; Perlow, 1995)
suggests that product engineers spent the vast majority of their time coordinating and
communicating with others, in other words, managing interdependencies.
1.2 Research Questions and Organizing FrantelVork
The specific empirical questions addressed ill this research are: (1) What types of
interdependency are encountered in large scale software development efforts? (2) What
are the implications of multiple interdependencies for project strategy and structure?
That is, how do teams approach the manageir'ent of multiple interdependencies? and
(3) What impact does the combination of multiple interdependencies and solution
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strategies have on project performance? Figure 1 presents a framework depicting the
relationships among the key constructs which emerged from the analysis. This figure
also maps parts of the framework to the chapters which address them.
1.3 What This Dissertation Is (and What It Is Not)
Several factors define this dissertation. First, note that the study examines both
an empirical phenomenon (large scale software product development) and a theoretical
concept (interdependency). It uses the former to increase our understanding of the
latter; at the same time, integrating theory with practice should yield ideas for better
management of large scale product development efforts. This research is also
distinguished by its inductive approach. It seeks to generate new theory and ideas
about interdependency and organization design. The results of the study are, therefore,
hypotheses which await future testing. Because these characteristics, as well as the
units of analysis, represent potential sources of confusion or criticism, they are
highlighted below.
:the Concept versus Ihe Phenomenon
Scholars who study the research process often distinguish between the
theoretical and empirical planes of analysis (Bailyn, 1977; Cook & Campbell, 1979).
Concepts or theoretical ideas reside in a conceptual plane and data in an empirical one.
This distinction is important because it enables us to differentiate between different
types of research. "Theorizing" research concentrates within the conceptual plane. At
the other extreme, empirical investigations involve manipulations that stay entirely (or
largely) within the empirical domain (Bailyn, 1977). This research study endeavors to
work both within and across these two planes of analysis. It explores a general and
important theoretical concept, interdependency, while simultaneously seeking to
improve the management of large scale product development efforts.
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As noted by Bailyn, attempting to exploit the obvious connection between theory
an::! practice improves value and validity (Bailyn, 1977). Yet maintaining these dual
planes of analysis also presents certain complications in terms of conducting, framing,
and ultimately writing up tIle research. Does one lead with the phenomenon or the
more general concept, and what is the appropriate balance between the two? Some
readers may be less familiar with (and less interested in) the details of large scale
product development. How much background on the phenomenon is necessary? How
does one make use of the complexity inherent in the real world phellomenoll while
simultaneously achieving the simplicity and parsimony that are characteristic of good
theory? How does one make it clear what results apply to the phenomenon versus
those that are more generalizable? Such dilemmas are partly resolved here by breaking
the research apart into three chapters.
The Analytical Approach
This research is also distinguished by its inductive approach. It represents
research as a cognitive as opposed to validation process in that it involved developing
conceptual understanding as the study progressed via the continuous interplay between
concepts and data (Bailyn, 1977; Van Maanen, 1997). The study was guided bilt not
govem.ed by existing theoretical paradigms and was designed to generate new theory
about interdependency, to be exploratory and theory building, not to test existing
theory or refute old models. This approach was not without its costs, however. In
particular, it limits the generalizability of the results and involves exploring,
documenting, and positing linkages among variables as opposed to testing hypotheses.
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The Unit(s) of Analysis
Finally, as a point of clarification, this research was primarily conducted at two
levels of analysis. The taxonomy in chapter 3 focuses on task interdependency as the
unit of analysis. The subsequent analysis in chapter 4 compares strategy, structure, and
performance across projects at two firms and adopts the project as the level of analysis.
The rationale and appropriateness behind this s\vitch in level are discussed in chapter 5.
1.4 Dissertation Structure
Finally, note that the structure of this dissertation departs from the typjt::al format
of ten or so (linear) chapter~. This dissertation was actually written as three papers,
each of which explores a specific part of the organizing framework shown in Figure 1.
The first paper (chapter 2) surveys the literature on interdependency across three
distinct paradigms and develops a conceptual framework which places these competing
paradigms in perspective. The su.rvey suggests that there are significant theoretical and
empirical gaps and overlaps in our understanding of this key concept and that as a
community of organizational scholars we have gotten fairly sloppy in our use of the
term. Building on this survey, the second paper (chapter 3) uses examples of
interdependencies in six case study projects to inductively derive a taxonomy of
multiple interdependencies. Given that model, a third paper (chapter 4) proposes
linkages hetween the strategies and structures teams use to manage multiple
interdependencies and project performance. Table 1 summarizes the primary researcll
questions, design, data, analytical method, and deliverables in each of the papers
(chapters).
Thus, taken together/ the papers mirror the evolution of this investigation of
interdependency. Although there exists some overlap, repetition is minimized such
that each paper can stand on its own. Ideally, howe'ver, the papers (chapters) should be
19
read together (in order) insofar as they tell a story about interdependency in
organizations today.
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TABLEt
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS & DELIVERABLES
CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 3 CHAfTER 4
RESEARCH What are the What types of What are the
QUESTION alternative ways interdependency implications of
scholars have exist in large scale multiple kinds of
conceptualized and software interdependency for
empirically studied development project strategy,
interdependency? efforts? structure and
perfonnance?
RESEARCH An integrative A taxonomy of Identification of
DELIVERABLES model of multiple kinds of distinct strategies forinterdependency interdependency managing multiple
across three interdependencies
theoretical and hypotheses
paradigms; An about their
agenda for implications for
interdependency project performilnce
research
UNIT OF Not applicable Interdependency, Software
ANALYSIS defined as a development
contingent projects
relationship among
tasks
DESIGN & Prior theoretical and A large sample of A comparative study
DATA empirical studies examples of of 6 case smdyinvolving interdependency projects at 2 firms;
interdependency derived from Interviews and
interviews project
documentation
PRINCIPLE Analytical framing The Language Coding of interviews
ANALYTICAL and analysis Processing™ and project
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CHAPTER II: INTERDEPENDENCY: CONCEPTUAL, EMPIRICAL, &
PRACTICAL ISSUES
This chapter surveys the literature on interdependency, defined as a contingent
relationship among tasks or activities. It identifies three distinct theoretical paradigms
about interdependence (information processing theories, resource-based theories, and
theories of sense-making) and develops a multi-dimensional conceptual framework that
places these competing paradigms in perspective. It also documents how researchers
have measured and evaluated interdependence. The chapter concludes with an overall
assessment of the current state of interdependency theory and some suggestions for a
new research agenda on this fundamental concept.
2.1 Introduction
Many scholars have identified interdependence as a critical valiable for
understanding organizations. Overall, this body of research has progressed from some
early ideas to a vast spectrum of work by various authors. One unfortunate outcome of
this rich history, however, is a confusing multitude of conceptualizations and
operationalizations. Most organization theorists adopt Thompson's basic definition of
interdependency as a contingent relationship among tasks or activities (Thompson,
1967). Yet March and Simon describe interdependence as a "felt need for joint decision-
making" (March & Simon, 1958)/ while others depict it in terms of individuals
(Granovetter, 1973)/ departments (Gresov & Stephens, 1993)/ and even firms (Roth,
1995). Mitchell and Silver examined the role of goal interdependence in team
cooperation (Mitchell & Silver, 1990); Ancona and Caldwell focused on the importance
of external environment Ltlterdependencies for successful product development
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1990). Interdependence is both a process, something "that
happens to X over time," but it can also be viewed as a variable (tasks can be more or
less interdependent) (Selznick, 1957). Interdependence sometimes appears as a task
dimension (Hrebiniak, 1974; Lynch, 1974; Van de Yen & Ferry, 1980), but other times it
is a variable ("task interdependence") in its own right (Allen, November 1986; Tushman,
1976; Tushman, 1978). In fact, this variety is not that surprising given that
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interdependence is a very difficult concept to define both theoretically and
operationally (Pennings, September 1975). Furthermore, the very centrality of the
concept implies that interdependence will appear in many different organizational
models, thus accounting for some diversity of the definition.
But as scholars we are also left with a high degree of ambiguity and confounding
with respect to the concept of interdependenc}·. Often, a single label is used to refer to a
broad spectrum of interaction (e.g., Thompson's definition of internal interdependence,
which includes the "exchange of resources, information and products as well as
contingencies of action") (Thompson, 1967). A variety of different terms also appear,
even though they conceivably refer to conceptually and empirically similar concepts
(e.g., component interdependency (Dellarocas, 1995), subsystem interdependence
(Allen, November 1986), and technical interdependence (Eppinger, Whitney, Smith, &
Gebala, 1994); coordination tasks (Hauptman, 1986) and interdepartment
interdependence (Adler, March-April 1995».
Even when authors use the same terminology, they often take very different
perspectives on the concept, which reflect fundamentally different assumptions about
the nature of technology, organizations, and people. For example, Thompson, March
and Simon, and Weick all write about "task interdependence." But whereas Thompson
views it as inherent in the technology or task (Thompson, 1967), March and Simon
depict interdependence as a characteristic of the way people behave and make decisions
while executing their work (March & Simon, 1958). Karl Weick rejects the very notion
that task interdependencies are completely apprehensible, arguing that some
relationships are too complex, ephemeral, or subtle to be completely understood via
rational analysis (Weick, 1974; Weick, 1990; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Clearly, further use
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of the interdependency concept would benefit from an attempt to reconcile and
understand this diversity.
A primary purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to review the literature on
interdependency in such a way as to place competing paradigms in perspective. The
contribution here is a syl'lthesis of theory, which recollciles existing conceptualizations
and identifies some assumptions taken-for-granted as well as gaps in our
understanding. Figure 2.1 outlines a metatheoretical schema for classifying the major
schools of thought about interdependency. The schema is based on three analytical
dimensions: (1) the primary driver of the interdependency, (2) the structure of the task
relationship, and (3) the nature (content) of the tasks.
A second purpose is to suggest new questions and opportunities in the study of
interdependency. The survey reveals that the information processing perspective
originating with Thompson has heavily influenced our current knowledge of
interdependence, a narrowness perpetrated by a decidedly limited range of empirical
approaches to the topic. Furthernlore, although much progress has been made in our
knowledge of interdependency, this existing knowledge is currently fragmented,
unreconciled, and relatively simplistic. It primarily focuses on one type of
interdependency at a time, embracing single elements more than tile conflicts or
complements among those elements. Now, therefore, represents an opportune time for
new kinds of studies of interdependence in that the real world of work and organizing
is getting more complicated than our existing theories acknowledge. The second
contribution of this chapter is thus a research agenda. In particular, it proposes creating
more realistic views of interdependency through the application of more grounded
methods, which enable us to move beyond current simplistic conceprnalizations and
begin to think about interdependence as a more multi-dimensional construct. Building
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a firmer foundation for this central organizational variable should, in tum, lead to its
better application in normative or causal modeling efforts.
The chapter begins below by outlining the overall approach to the survey, which
included both a theoretical analysis and a simple quantitative analysi~of citation rates
(reported on in Appendix A). It then describes the principal analytical dimensions of
the framework before proceeding to examine how representative authors from three
different perspectives have studied interdependency. Each review concludes with a
brief summary and assessment of th~ strengths and weaknesses of the perspective.
Section 2.4 critiques the literature and offers suggestions about how we might achieve a
more integrated framework. This chapter also reviews the various definitions and
operationalizations of lllterdependence used by the scholars. The latter forms the basis
for an assessment of the empirical study of interdependency in Section 2.5. The chapter
concludes in Sections 2.6 and 2.7 with a summary and some suggestions for future
research.
·2.2 Overall ...t\.pproach to the Survey
2.2.1 Constructing the Analytical Framework
This theoretical review draws upon analytical frameworks developed by (Astley
& Van de Yen, 1983; Burrell & Morgan, 1979; Markus & Robey, 1988; Orlikowski &
Baroudi, 1991) ~d follows the approach taken by (Allison, September 1969; Eisenhardt
& Zbaracki, 1992; Kogut, 1988; Markus, June 1983). For example, Burrell and Morgan
categorized theories as functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, or radical
structuralist according to their assumptions about the nature of science and society
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Orlikowski and Baroudi propose alternative
conceptualizations of technology as a key method of distinguishing among theories
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Kogut compares three perspectives (transaction cost
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economics, strategic behavior, and organizational learning) on the motivation to joint
venture (Kogut, 1988). Eisenhardt and Zbaracki compare and contrast dominate
paradigms (rationality, bounded rationality; politics and power, and the garbage can
model) on strategic decision-lnaking (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). These frameworks
and analyses served as a starting point for examining different theories of
interdependence. Appendix B outlines the dimensions used for this comparison. The
results yielded the multi-dimensional metatheoretical schema presented in Figure 2.1.
2.3 A Framework for Understanding Interdependency
2.3.1 Three Analytical Dimensions
As indicated above, the interdependency literature is vast, ranging from case
study illustrations to quantitative surveys, all of which span many types of technology,
firms, and industries. Despite an initial appearance of randomness, a more thorough
SCnItiny of the literature suggests three main theoretical perspectives (infonnation
processing theories, resource-based theories, and sense-making theories), which vary
along the following analytical dimensions: (1) the primary driver of interdependency
(internal technology, internal firm environment, external firm environment), (2) the
structure of task relationships (sequential, pooled, reciprocal), and (3) the nature or
content of tasks (loose versus tight coupling). This review was shaped around these
perspectives and dimensions for the following reasons.
Each of the three theoretical perspectives represents a relatively coherent and
distinct body of research, and yet taken together they seem to capture the cumulative
aspect of interdependency research to date. For instance, the notion that tasks are
related for a variety of different factors is well established in the organization theory
literature (Bowditch & Buono, 1985; Daft, 1983b). Likewise, scholars increasingly
acknowledge the importance of considering theories of structure and content (Van de
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Yen, May 1986). Moreover, these three research streams imply starkly different
recommendations for the rn.anagerrtent of interdependence. Although in some sense all
research on interdependency begins with Thompson (1967), resource-based views of the
firm, as well as more recent research on tile problems associated with sense-making
under conditions of comr'l.exity, challenge some of information processing's basic
assumptions.
For example, the information processing perspective portrays interdependence
as clearly visible, recognizable, and stable dyadic interactions which are, therefore,
amenable to integration and decision-making mechanisms that can be set up in
advance. The resource-based viewpoint focuses on controlling resource allocatiol1 as
the solution to issues of interdependence. The description of interdependency ari~h'g
from the sense-making stream, in contrast, emphasizes our inability to comprehend a11d
reason about the structure of certain forms of \vork and thus calls for Irtore dynamic,
real-time solution strategies.
Table 2.1 summarizes the three theoretical perspectives along some key
dimensions. The next section reviews how they each relate to one aspect of
organizational life, interdependency. Each paradigm review begins by describing the
basic underlying model and then discusses its variants and implications. Each
concludes with a summary and critique of research. in that domain.
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FIGURE 2.1
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TABLE 2.1
OVERVIEW OF THREE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
RESOURCE-BASED
THEORIES
30
SENSE-MAKING
THEORIES
with performing complex tasks in a given environmental context. The nlost basic
assumption underlying this perspective is that organizations are open systems that
must process information (to accomplish internal tasks, coordinate diverse activities,
and interpret an external environment) but h~ve limited capacity to do so (Galbraith,
1973). Uncertainty is defined as "tlle difference betwpen the amount of u\formation
required to perform the task and tile amount of information already possessed"
(Galbraith, 1973), and the technology (task) and environment are seen as the major
sources of that uncertainty. Strength of interdependence between tasks, along with
other task characteristics such as complexity and unpredictability, are conceived as
major influellces on uncertainty and hence the need for information processing. The
basic underlying model of interdependency according to the information processing
perspective is therefore:
I
I
I
I
i
I 2.3.2 The Information Processing Perspective
Basic Underlying Model
The information processing perspe(~tiveemphasizes the uncertainty associated
Interdependency Among ---> Uncertainty ---> Infonnation Processing
Internal or External Tasks
Table 2.2 displays work representative of the information processing perspective
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TABLE 2.2
INFORMATION PROCESSING PERSPECTIVE, SELECTED STUDIES
Authons) KeyWord(s) Method Sample Description
Thompson, internal theoretical not applicable classifies ll\terdependency
1967 interdependence according to its logical
(pooled or structure
generalized,
serial or
sequelltial,
reciprocal)
VandeVen, task survey 197 work units classifies alternative
Delbecq& interdependency in a large state mechanisms for coordinating
Koenig, 1976 within work employment work activities
units security agency
Tushman,1979 task survey and 44 R&D relates sub-unit structure and
interdependence communicat- projects performance with work
within and across ion records characteristics
sub..units
Kmetz, 1984 maintenance descriptive 7 sites in U.S. analyzes work flow problems
workflow case study Naval Air and informal adjustments
Systems
Allen, 1986 subsystem theoretical not applicable inieraction of project
interdependence characteristics guides decision
about organizational form
Gresov, 1990 external (work survey 230 work units explores effect of external
unit) database in employment dependency on work unit
interdependence security offices design and efficiency
Eppinger, technical matrix 2 cases from links structure of complex
Whitney, Smith relations among analysis auto industry products and projects with
& Gebala, 1994 design tasks coordination and cycle time
(serial, coupled,
parallel)
Wagerman, outcome, goal intervention ISO teams in examines differential effect of
1995 and reward large task design and reward
interdependenc~ corporation system on group effectiveness
Yariants
Internal Technical Interdependency
Early theorizing by Thompson is particularly influential within this research
stream (Thompson, 1967). Thompson characterized an organization as "a complex set of
interdependent parts which together make up a whole because each contributes
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something and receives something from the whole t which in turn is interdependent
with some larger environment (p. 6)." Holding the environment constant, he defined
internal interdependence as "the extent to which a task requires organizational units to
engage in work flow exchanges of products, information and/or resources and where
actions in one unit affect the actions and work outcomes in another unit" (p. 54). When
interdependence is high, frequent and unexpected adjustments are needed, and
uncertainty increases in the form of "constraints and contingencies;" when
interdependence is low, organizational units experience greater autonomy, stability,
and certainty \\-ith respect to their coordination.
According to Thompson, internal interdependence stems from the task
requirements and can be classified according to its form or logical structure. Pooled Of
generalized (internal) interdependence exists when "each part renders a discrete
contribution to the whole and each is supported by the whole although the parts do not
interact in any direct way.... They are interdependent in the sense that unless each
performs adequately, the total organization is jeopardized" (p. 54). One example
provided is the relationship between corporate headquarters and each of the product
divisions of a multidivisional firm, which are mutually dependent in terms of viability.
Interdependence may also take a serial or sequential form in which the output of one
part is the input to another. Here "direct interdependence can be pinpointed between
them, the order of that interdependence can be specified... and it is not symmetrical" (p.
54). A cited example is the relationship between production departments in a
manufacturing plant. A third form of internal interdependence, labeled reciprocal,
refers to situations in which the outputs of each part become inputs for the other. An
example is the relationship between R&D and manufacturing in product innovation.
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According to Thompson, the three forms of interdependence represent different
degrees of contingency, which translate into varying degrees of coordination difficulty.
With pooled interdependence, contingency is non-existent or minimal. Action in each
position can proceed without regard to action in the other positions as long as the
overall organization remains viable. With sequential interdependence, however, there
is always:m element of potential contingency since each task in the set must be
readjusted if another departs from expectations. With reciprocal interdependence, such
contingencies are not merely potential but actual.
In summary, Thompson conceptualized interdependence as a dyad of tasks \'vith
a definite, visible, and stable structure. That pattern arises from the nature of the tasks,
and the implied level of an.alysis is work unit relationships (i.e., tasks are defined at the
level of work units). Thompson's definition of interdependency is also one predicated
on literal action; unless tasks "interact in a direct way," interdependence is assumed to
be minimal. Thus, mutual or pooled relationships are depicted as lowest in the
hierarchy of contingency. As described below, subsequent scholars have taken issue
with this viewpoint, arguing that tasks can be highly interdependent even if they
involve little or no direct interaction.
Thompson's research is purely theoretical; he includes no empirical verification
of his ideas other than some general illustrative examplesfO However, a line of
subsequent empirical research and additional theorizing lends some credence to this
early work. For example, Eppinger et ale focus on the form or pattern of task
relationships in complex design projects, contrasting interdependent (cQupled) tasks
("when task A needs information from task B, and task B also requires knowledge of A's
results"), dependent (serial) tasks ("if task B simply requires the output of task A"), and
independent (parallel) tasks ("if tasks A and B could be performed simultaneously with
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no interaction between the designers") (Eppinger, et a1., 1994). Other studies support a
positive relationship between task characteristics such as difficulty, variability, and
nonroutineness indicative of high uncertainty and interdependence and the amount of
information pro.-:essing within units (Daft & Lengel, May 1986; Gerstberger, 1971;
Gerstenfeld, 1967; Tushman, 1976; Van de Yen & Delbecq, June 1974). Van de Yen et ale
found that commwlication increased as intra-unit task interdependency among
participants increased (Van de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976). Kmetz applied an
information processing perspective in a detailed qualitative study of the repair process
and maintenance work flow aboard u.s. navy aircraft carriers (Kmetz, 1984).
The above group of authors and others have followed closely in the "Thompson
tradition, gradually translating Thompson's term 'internal interdependence' into the
more general label of task interdependence or simply interdependence but making few
modifications to the basic conceptual idea in Thompson's thesis. Another common term
is work flow interdependence (e.g., "the extent to which individuals are dependent on
other personnel in the perfonnance of their jobsU ) (Van de Ven, et al., 1976). Vaughan
defines it as informational interdependencies (Vaughan, 1990). Note how we are
beginning to see diversity not only in the terminology used to describe interdependency
but also in the level of analysis (i.e., tasks are associated witlI work units or individuals).
Another group of scholars, while still remaining in the Thompson tradition,
portray tasks in terms of the architecture of a problem or product. For example, Allen
defines 511bsystem interdependence as the extent to which work on one subsystem
depends upon progress on another subsystem area and argues that the degree of
interdependence is detennined by the complexity of the interface requirements among
the different areas (Allen, November 1986). Pimmler and Eppinger studied product
component interdependencies varying along four different dimensions: spatial
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interaction (the need for adjacency or orientation), energy interaction (the need for
energy transfer), information interaction (the need for infonnation or signal exchange),
and material interaction (the need for actual physical material transfer) (Pimmler &
Eppinger, 1994). Each component interaction was operationalized as a vector of four
scores. Other work explores the implications of alternative product architecture on
interdependency (Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Dellarocas, 1995; Henderson & Clark, 1990;
Iansiti, 1994; Ulrich & Eppinger, 1995).
A search of the literature revealed a final category of information processing
scholars who have sought to refine the definition of task interdependency. For
example, Wagerman argues that outcome interdependency is used synonymously with
task interdependency when they are in face conceptually and often empirically
distinguishable (Wagerman, 1995). Outcome interdependence, which can be further
differentiated into goal interdependence and reward interdependence, can exist witho'ut
any interdependence in the means of accomplishing the work (e.g., a room full of
telemarketers may be held accountable for a collective goal, but they complete
independent tasks) (Wagerman, 1995) and vice versa (Mitchell & Silver, 1990).
Pennings proposes four distinct bases of interconnectedness: task
interdependence. rooted at the task level, refers to the inter-relationship of a set of
discrete operations such that each operation may have consequences for the completion
of some others; role or positional interdependence is the interconnectedness of a set of
role players, reflecting the position of actors engaged in a concerted action; skill Of
knowledge interdependence arises from the differentiated expertise of actors due to
education, training, and expertise; social (goal Of need) interdependen.ce is defined in
terms of the reward system and its impact on individual motivation (Pennings, 1975).
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Empirical research supports making these kinds of distinction. For example,
studies suggest that group members experience task and outcome interdependency
differently such that changes in one form influence the experience of the other and
consequentially change the way people approach their work (Berkowitz, 1957; Guzzo &
Shea, 1987). Andres tested the differential effect of task and goal interdependence on
software project success (Andres, August 25-27, 1995).
External Environment Interdependency
The focus on internal (task) interdependence yielded a rich stream of research
but also provoked a countersurgence of studies stressing the importance of external
forms of interdependency. (In fact, Thompson (1967) Inentioned organizatiQn-
environment interdependence but was less specific about it relative to his treatment of
internal interdependencies.) Gresov points out that the bulk of the research has been
directed at documenting task-design linkages to the neglect of other important context
factors (Gresov, 1990). He defines external interdependence Of work unit
interdependence as existing "when task performance is related to (and thus dependent
on) the actions and outcomes occurring outside the unit," operationalized as the exteIlt
to which resources or information from outside sources are deemed necessary inputs to
a work process (Gresov, 1989). Ancona and Caldwell define a similar concept at the
group level describing external interdependence as "the external activities groups
undertake in dealing with others in the organization" (Ancona & Caldwell, 1990).
Gresov argues that although work unit and task interdependency are obviously
related, they are distinct concepts; work unit interdependence generally arises in
connection with a unit's position in the organizational work flow whereas task
interdependence arises from the content of the work flow in a particular focal unit
(Gresov,1989). Empirical research tends to substantiate this claim. Van de Yen and
37
Ferry performed correlation and regression tests between dependency, external
communication, and efficiency in a sample of employment security agencies (Van de
Yen & Ferry, 1980). The results indicated that the effects of external dependency and
communication varied depending on the task. In a study of R&D projects, Tushman
found tl1at both task predictors and department dependency were significantly related
to stnlcture (Tushman, 1979). Other similar work is (Adler, March-April 1995; Ito &
Peterson, 1986).
Just as we saw in the case of technical (task) interdependency, scholars have
sought to refine the external interdependency concept. Some authors differentiate
between different types of external interdependence depending on the hierarchical
relationship of the work units involved: horizontal dependency (other units inside or
outside the organization) versus vertical interdependency (higher levels within the
organization) (Gresov, 1990)& Tushman (Tushman, 1976) and Gerstberger (Gerstberger,
1971) use a more subjective categorization, distinguishing between organizationally
"~" (outside the R&D project but within the same departnlent) and organizationally
"gistant" (outside the department but within the organization) relationships. Others
have suggested that there exist two layers of unit context: organizational context
(composed of factors that describe or affect the state of the organization as a whole and
its interface with its environment) and inter-unit relatione. (the more immediate context
of the unit) (Gresov & Stephens, 1993).
ImplicatioDs of the Model
The primary goal of the information processing paradigm is to match the
organization's capacity to process information with the information requirements of the
task. This line of reasoning began with Galbraith who integrated work by others (Bums
& Stalker, 1968; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Woodward,
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1965) to explain the variation in organizational form as stemming from the amount of
information needed to reduce task-related uncertainty and attain an acceptable level of
performance (Galbraith, 1973). The focus of the perspective is, therefore, on finding or
"matching" information processing mechanisms, which are capable of coping with the
level of task contingency.
For example, Thompson (1967) proposed parallels between his three types of
internal interdependence and three types of coordination. Standardization, involving
the establishment of routines or rules, which constrain the action of each unit into paths
consistent with those taken by other interdependent units, is appropriate for pooled
interdependence. Plans, involving the establishment of coordinated schedules, address
the needs of serial interdependence. Coordination by mutual adjustment, analogous to
March and Simon's term "coordination by feedback" (March & Simon, 1958) transmits
new information during the process of action and is thus best suited for cases of
reciprocal interdependence.
Van de Yen "et ale show how impersonal, personal, and group modes of
coordination vary with increased task interdependency (Van de Yen, et al., 1976).
Research in the auto industry also tends to support the contingency hypothesis in that
teams which adopt mechanisms of "integrated problem solving" (e.g., overlapping
problem solving phases, frequent and continuous communication, cross-functional
structures) SilOW improved performance (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Clark & Wheelwright,
1992).
Galbraith integrated Thompson's ideas with his own and identified two general
classes of solution strategies (Galbraith, 1973). Provided the interdependency is
relatively simple (as is presumably the case with pooled and sequential forms), rules,
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programs, hierarchy, and targets or goals are usually adequate. As complexity
increases, however, (e.g., reciprocal interdependence) additional mechanisms are
needed to handle the information overload. For example, one can seek to reduce the
need for information processing by lowering performance standards, utilizing slack
resources, or creating self contained tasks. A second category of solutions is to increase
the organization's capacity to handle more information by investing in vertical
information systems or lateral roles. That is, one increases the amount of information
flowing across the interdependency in order to make coordination more efficient.
The large body of research on task partitioning adheres to the reductionist
approach (Alexander, 1964; Eppinger, et al., 1994; Simon, December 1962; Von Hippel,
1990). These theorists propose that organizational work can be divided up (partitioned)
into a number of sub-tasks in such a way as to reduce the problem solving
interdependencies among them. Simon theorized that partitioning work into
hierarchical systems, defined as subsystems that in turn have their own subsystems,
represented one such solution:
Hierarchies have the property of near decomposibility. Intra compClnent
linkages are generally stronger than inter component linkages. This fact
has the effect of separating the high frequency dynamics of a hierarchy--
involving the internal structure of the components-- from the low
frequency dynamics involving interaction among components (Simon,
December 1962).
Von Hippel argues that interdependence can be reduced via alternate
specifications of the task- in other words, task partitioning is a manipulatable variable
(Von Hippel, 1990). (Though he later notes that such partitioning changes will not
necessarily reduce the total amount of interdependency; they simply affect how it gets
distributed.)
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Other researchers hav~ taken a more nlodel-based approach. Btiilding on work
by Steward (Steward, August 1981), Pimmler and Eppinger describe a technique called
the Design Structure Matrix (DSM) for analyzing the complex interactions between
components of a product design (Pimmler & Eppinger, 1994). (See also (Eppinger, et al.,
1994; McCord & Eppinger, August 1993; Morelli, Eppinger, & Gulati, August 1995;
Smith & Eppinger, December 1994).) Dellarocas developed a programming language,
which analyzes software component interactions and semi-automatically generates
"coordination software" to glue them together, an extension of object-oriented
programming techniques (Dellarocas, 1995).
Examples of the capacity-increasing approach are increasing the r;apacity of
existing channels of communication, creating new channels, introducing new decision-
making mechanisms, or utilizing direct contact, liaison roles, task forces, teams,
integrating roles, and matrix designs (Galbraith, 1973). For example, when task
nonroutineness or interdependence is high, information processing tends to shift from
impersonal rules to personal exchanges including face-to-face and group meetings such
as task forces and committees (Van de Ven, et al., 1976). Daft and Macintosh found that
managers favor rich communication media such as face-ta-face meetings and telephone
conversations for difficult and equivocal messages over other forms of communication
such as impersonal memos and documents because the former allowed for greater
feedback, cues, and language variety (Daft & Macintosh, 1981). Examples of full-time
integrators are product and brand managers (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) and
gatekeepers (Allen, 1977). Ancona and Caldwell identified five sets of boundary
spanning activities that new product development teanlS rely on to interact with their
environment (ambassador, task coordinator, scout, sentry, and guard) (Ancona &
Caldwell, 1987; Ancona & Caldwell, 1990). Task coordinator involved coordinating
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technical and design issues, scouting consisted of general bcanning for useful
information, and guard activities were those intended to avoid the extenlal release of
proprietary information. Adler presents a taxonomy of design-maIlufactlJrulg
mechanisms which distinguishes four modes of interdepartmental interaction
(standard~,schedules, mutual adaptation, and teams) in each of three temporal pllases
(pre-project, product and process design, and manufacturing) (Adler, Mar.:.h-April
1995).
Summary and Critique
In summary, we can identify two main branches of research stemming from the
classic information processing model. One branch of sub-theories has kept relatively'
close to the tradition of Thompson (1967), viewing task interdependence as a
relationship among internal tasks stemming from the nature of the work, and simply
applied tasks to different levels of analysis (e.g., individuals, work groups,
departments) or clarified the basis of connection (e.g., pure task, goal, reward, outcome,
role, skill or knolvledge). A second branch of research expanded the definition of task
to include internal and external (environment) activities.! The common thread uniting
this work is (1) a focus on the pattern or flow of work between entities, (2) an
assumption that the nature of the task (i.e., form and content of the work flow) or the
environment are the sources of that contingency pattern, and (3) the identification of the
degree of direct contingency between tasks as a critical dimension effecting
coordination difficulty. In particular, activities that are tightly and directly linked are
viewed as being the most difficult to coordinate.
1 This splintering of theory potentially stems from (and llas surely contributee to) confusion over
Thompson's original use of the word "task." Scholars have subsequently interpreted the label as
referencing any or all of the following: a relationship between tasks, the Eource of tile contingency, or tlle
direct (literal) interaction of tdsks.
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This perspective is heavily rooted in the economic paradigm of a deterministic
world and reflects the nineteenth century physical science belief that dynamics always
yield unique and predictable outcomes (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). The
recommendations stemming from this research stream rest on the key assumptions of
determinism, objectivity, and stability. Information processing theorists look at
interdependence from an outsider's objective perspective; tasks are assumed "to be"
reciprocal or sequential. Other research suggests that subjective jtldgments about
interdependency may vary considerably within a firm due to ttle differentiation process
(Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Lorschl 1977; March & Simon, 1958). Because department')
differ in terms of their degree of structure, leadership style, tolerance for ambiguity, etc.,
members of each unit will tend to see interdependencies that involve them with other
units primarily from their own point of view (Larsch, 1977). Not only does such
variance in perception mean that members may perceive the same interdependency
differently. They also may deem different interdependencies as being more or less
important.2
A second major characteristic (and limitation) of research in this category is its
focus on predictable, static tasks, thereby ignoring situations where tasks cannot be
fully specified in advance as well as unpredictable aspects of timing. For example, one
could imagine having a very routine, serial interdependency, but when and how the
sequential actions take place could depend on certain lmpredictable stimuli. March and
Simon define contingent interdependencies as those for which timing is a major
uncertainty (March & Simon, 1958).
2 Some scholars get around this problem by defining interdependency as existing only when
relationships are "consensually validated" (Gresov & Stephens, 1993).
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2.3.3 The Resource..Based Perspective
Basic Underlying Model
Like the information processing perspective, resource-based theories start with
the observation that organizations exist in an uncertain task and external environment,
but this view shifts the emphasis from information processing to the resources
organizations need to remain viable and compete. The resource-based perspective
conceptualizes firms as unique bundles of accumulated tangible and intangible
resources, defined broadly as assets, capabilities, processes, routines, and knowledge
(Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). Interdependence is the pattern of task relationships
resulting from the flow and control of critical and valued resources, which reduce task
or environmental uncertainty. Thus, according to this perspective, interdependencies
are the outcome of trying to cope with uncertainty, not its source:
Task or Environment---> Flow & Control of Resources----> Interdependence
Uncertainty
Table 2.3 summarizes selected studies within the resource-based perspective.
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TABLE 2.3
RESOURCE-BASED PERSPECTIVE, SELECTED STUDIES
Author(s) KeyWord(s) Method Sample Description
Salancik & dependency ratings and 29 university shows how departmellt po\ver
I Pfeffer, 1974 rankings from departments results from acquisition ofinterviews external grants and contractsClark & problem solving questionnaire, 24 automobile studies effect of product andi Fujimoto, cycles among in-depth development project characteristics on
I 1989;1991 activities interviews and projects development lead time
I documents
I Ancona & external questiolUlaire 45 new product identifies four strategies teamsCaldwell, interdependency development use toward their environment
1990 teams in 3
industries
Ancona & external activities interviews, log new product links type of external activity
Caldwell, data and team managers and group strategy to
1992a questioIUlai!'e in high performance
technology
companies
Iansiti & intemaland questionnaire 29 automobile illustrates dynamic processes
Clark, 1994 external and case development used to build and integrate
integration studies projects, 27 knowledge and solve
computer problems
development
projects
Malone & dependencies theoretical not applicable reviews coordination process
Crowston, among activities survey across disciplines
1994
Roth, 1995 international regression 74CEOsin show how influence of locus
interdependence analysis global of control, information
companies evaluation style and
international expansion on
finn performance vary with
interdependency
I Miller & property-based regression 7 Hollywood relates different kinds ofShamsie, 1996 and knowledge- analysis film studios resource-based activities tobased activities performance in differeltt
environments
Variant~
Resource Flow Interdependency
One variant of the resource-based perspective on interdependency focuses on the
implications of flows of resources within and across organizational boundaries. This
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varia.~t can be further sub-divided into a stream of research emphasizing power and
politics and a more recently emerging set of strategy literature.
The power and politics stream can be traced back to Crozier who, in a study of a
French factory, observed that power accrued to the plant's maintenance engineers
because they possessed the wII and knowledge relevant to the repair of equipment, an
area of uncertainty affecting plant operations (Crozier, 1964). Based on this finding,
Crozier proposed that uncertainty critical to the organization's technology determined
the pattern of dependency (and power) across the organizational groups.
Salancik and Pfeffer made a substantial theoretical contribution to this line of
reasoning by identifying the control of critical and valued resources as an intervening
variable between uncertainty and interdependence (Salancik, 1987; Salancik & Pfeffer,
1974; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1988). Although their thesis focused on the power
implications, these authors describe interdependence among and within departments as
reflecting the historical flow of resources into an organization and the role those
resources play in its functioning. Salancik and Pfeffer tested their theol)' in the context
of a large university where they reasoned that ensuring an adequate flow of grant
money addresses an important type of uncertainty. They found that to the extent that
departments contributed more funding, they were relatively more powerful (Salancik &
Pfeffer, 1974).3
The power view is also reflected in research on new product development
projects, which emphasizes that frequent political communication (typically external)
3 Other significant findings coming out of this research were that departments receiving resources are in
a lower power position than those providing them, and the number and strength of dependencies are
important. A department that depends on many other departments is in a low power position; a
department that supplies resources to many departments is in a strong power position (Salancik &
Pfeffer, 1974).
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leads to higher performing development projects by increasing the resources (e.g.,
budget. personnel. equipment) available to the team (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Brown
& Eisenhardt, April 1995). For eXC\n\ple, the ambassador role in Ancona an1 Caldwell's
typology consisted of activities such as lobbying for support and resources.
A resource-based view of the firm has also recently emerged in the strategy
literature.4 This stream articulates the relationships among firm resources, capabilities,
and competitive advantage, arguing that the flow anc')ntrol of valuable, costly to copy
resQurceund capabilities represent the key sources of sustainable competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Rumelt, Schendel, &
Teece, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). For example, Roth portrays international firms as a
collection of interdependent resources in different locations that must be connected or
integrated to some degree (Roth, 1995). See also (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991; Iansiti &
Clark, 1994; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992).
Several points are worth emphasizing about the resource-power and reSQurce-
strategy lines of research. First, it is often not clear whether these theories are referring
to internal or external interdependencies. Some scholars interpret this research as
primarily emphasizing external interdependency (Brown & Eisenhardt, Apri11995).
Others argue that one of the advantages of a resource-based perspective is that it
integrates false debates about the relative importance of internal versus external factors
(Hart, 1995). We also see, as was the case in information processing theories,
considerable variance in the level of interdependent units.
4 The resource-power perspective articulated by Salancik & Pfeffer is sometimes referred to as strategic
contingency theory.
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The concept of resources also remains an amorphous one ~Mi\ler &: Shamsie,
1996). For example, the early work by Crozier emphasized skill and kno\Alledge
resources, a theme carried through in more recent research (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen,
1990). Other scholars distinguish between property-based and knowledge-based
resources (Miller & Shamsie, 1996). They argue that the former are likely to contribute
most to performance in stable and predictable settings whereas the latter will be of the
greatest utility in uncertain (changing, unpred;ctable) environments. Another weakness
of this literature is its lack of explication of the interdependenC}r consequences of
resource flows. Most of the researchers cite interdependency as a key intervening
variable but primarily focus on the power or competitive performance implications of
those linkages (Hart, 1995; Salancik, 1987).
Resource Sharing Interdependency
The above research depicted interdependency as existing when materials,
money, or knowledge flow between organizational units in one direction, a form of
sequential interdependency (Thompson, 1967). Another variant of the resource-based
perspective has explored the mutual interdependency relationships resulting from
resource sharing.
This line of reasoning can be traced back to March and Simon, who refer to
interdependence as a "felt need for joint decision making" and note that "the greater the
mutual dependence on a limited resource, the greater the felt need to coordinate"
(March & Simon, 1958). Malone and Crowston likewise propose that, whenever
multiple activities share some limited resource (e.g., money, storage space or an actor's
lime), a resource allocation process is needed to manage the subsequent
interdependencies (Malone & Crowston, March 1994). Note that in contrast to the
resource flow literature, this variant of research tends to emphasize primarily internal
48
interdependency. The portrayal of resources is also slightly different with less of an
emphasis on knowledge associated capabilities in favor of physical or capital-based
assets.
Impli!;;atiQDS of the Model
The management implications coming out of the resource-based perspective are
relatively straightforward. In general, they suggest that one should assess one's
interdependencies and attempt to influence or even control decisions about critical
resource allocation. The ultimate goal, according to this viewpoint, is to minimize
interdependencies as much as possible, discretion being the ultimate and most
important resource (Salancik, 1987).
For example, the resource-strategy literature emphasizes control (ownership) of
rare, specific, non substitutable resources that are difficult to imitate (Teece, et al., 1990).
Ancona and Caldwell propose different product development team roles for controlling
resource flows (i.e., ambassador, scout) (Ancona & Caldwell, 1990). March and Simon
contrast solutions involving coordination by plan (i.e., preset schedules) and
coordination by feedback (i.e., mutual adjustment) and propose that the more stable
and predictable the context, the greater the reliance on plans and preset schedules
(March & Simon, 1958).
In a survey of coordination processes, Malone et ale identified rules such as "first
come/first served," priority ordering, budgets, managerial decisions, and market-like
bidding as alternative ways of managing shared resource interdependency (Malone,
Crowston, Lee, & Pentland, 1993). Malone and Crowstol1. report specifically on the use
of various forms of information technology including cooperative work tools to
coordinate activities (Malone & Crowston, March 1994).
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Summary and Critique
In summary, we can again identify several variants of the resource-based
perspective on interdependency. One stream of research depicts interdependencies as
arising from the flow of resources between a supplier and consumer (activity) and
focuses on the implications of that interdependency for either the distribution of power
within an organization or the strategic advarltage of a firm. A second branch of tlleories
portrays interdependencies as stemming from shared access and/or use of a common
stock of resot!rces. \JVhat unites this work is an assumption that there are three
necessary and sufficient conditions for the creation of interdependency: (1) resource
demand, (2) limited availability, and (3) unequal allocation.
Note how this conceptualization of interdependency both resembles and differs
from that in information processing. According to both viewpoints, interdependence
exists among the tasks or activiti~s in an organization and is evident in the ability (or
inability) of a sub-unit to take (or not take) actions that are desired by others. Studies
within each perspective are also quite inconsistent with respect to the level of task
execution (i.e., individual, group, department, firm). But, in the resource-based
perspective, interdependency is not rooted in the task or environment as information
processing theories suggest. Rather, it is situational and varies depending upon the
demand, supply, and value of a particular resource.
In other words, resource-based interdependency is an attribute of a relationship
within a particular context, not a task. This is consistent with work from sociology,
which defines dependency as a property of a social relationship as opposed to an
attribute of a person (Emerson, 1962). Also reflecting a sociology perspective is the
implicit note of conflict that runs through many of these theories but is largely absent in
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the more objective information processing lens. For example, Deutsch suggests
distinguishing promotive interdependence in which units depend on one another in
positive and negative ways from contrient interdependence or pure conflict of interest
(Deutsch, 1973). Pfeffer and Salancik make a similar distinction,labeled symbiotic
versus competitive interdependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
2.3.4 The SenseaMaking Perspective
Basic Underlying Model
Like the previous two perspectives, the sense-making paradigm acknowledges
the complexity and uncertainty of organizational work. But rather than examining
dyadic interdependencies (information processing) or resource linkages among
common units (resource-based), scholars within this line of research attempt to relate
micro-level interactions to macro-level patterns and, therefore, bridge the two levels of
theory. These researchers argue that one cannot simply extrapolate from the local to the
aggregate because individual incentives and motives ar~ rarely attuned to some
collective accolflplishment (Schelling, 1978).
A central concept in this perspective is that of equivoque; technical and
organizational systems are equivocal insofar as they are amenable to several possible or
plausible interpretations (Weick, 1990). Theories of sense-making suggest that the
transformation and interaction of local (micro) relationships results in lllterdependency
relationships that are so complex that people have limited and variable ability to reason
about and understand the macro stntcture of their work. Note how, according to this
model, complexity is an output of interdependency, not its source:
Micro Task < -->Macro Level Patterns---> Complexity & Equivocality
Interdependency
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Table 2.4 contains some of the key sense-making references.
TABLE 2.4
SENSE-MAKING PERSPECTIVE, SELECTED STUDIES
Author(s) KeyWord(s) Method Sample Description
Granovetter, small scale theoretical not applicable proposes links between
1973 interactions strength of dyadic ties and
macros sociological theories
Weick, 1976 loose coupling descriptive educational proposes that loose couplings
case study organizations are ubiquitous and functional
Schelling, contingent theoretical not applicable explores the relationship
1978 behavior between behavior of
individuals and social
aggregate
Perrow, 1984 interactive case study nuclear power proposes that coincidence of
complexity plants tight coupling and technical
complexity create normal
accident failures
Hutchins, activities descriptive navigation illustrates how real-time
1990;1991 case study team adaptations are essential to
flexible system deployment
Resnick, 1992 actions and computer students probes how people think
interactions simulation about decentralized systems
Weick & cognitive descriptive flight suggests that continuous, high
Roberts, 1993 interdependence case study operations on reliability situations require
aircraft carriers 'heedful inter-relating'
Variants
As this research stream is the newest and least fully developed of the three
paradigms, clearly identifiable variants have yet to fully emerge. Instead, this section
begins by noting some mainly descriptive studies illustrative of this perspective and
then describes two of the central concepts in this literature having to do with the nature
of the interdependent tie.
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Descriptions ofl1zteracting Syste1ns ofInterdependency
Schelling presents one of the best introductions to this perspective in a book
entitled MicroIDotiyes and MacrobehayioT (Schelling, 1978). Drawing upon a series of
mundane yet compelling examples (e.g., ant colonies, people waiting in line, Christmas
card exchanges, traffic jams), he explores the relationship between the behavior of
individual actors who compose some social aggregate and the characteristics of the
aggregate and notes how the motives of individuals can sometimes lead to striking and
unexpected outcomes:
These situations, in which people's behavior or people's choices depend
on the behavior and choices of other people, are the ones that usually
don't permit any simple summation or extrapolation to the aggregate. To
make the connection we usually have to look at the system of
interrelationships between individuals ancl their environments, that is,
between individuals and other individuals or between individuals and the
collectivity (Schelling, 1978).
Examples of other rich descriptive research are work on the processes teams use
to navigate a large ship (Hutchins, 1990; Hutchins, February 1991}, the interdependent
know how of flight operations on aircraft carriers (Weick & Roberts, 1993), the different
forms of interdependence leading to the space shuttle Challenger disaster (Vaughan,
1990), and experiments with arl interpersonal computer game (Resnick, 1992).
Strong versus Weak Interdependency
In an early precursor of network theory, Granovetter considered the macro
implications of one aspect of small scale interaction, the strength of dyadic ties
(Granovetter,1973). Defining the strength of a tie as a (probably linear) combination of
the amount of time, emotional intensity, intimacy, and reciprocal services flowing
between two points, he proposes that the stronger the tie between A and B, the larger
the overlap in their friendship networks (defined as the proportion of individuals to
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whom they will both be tied out of the set of people with ties to either or both A and B).5
One possible interpretation of this is that the stronger one type of interdependency ties
two units together, the greater the overlap in the set of their other interdependencies.
The flip side of strong ties are weak ties, one example of which is a brid~ or line
in a network, which serves as the only path between two points (Granovetter, 1973).
Weak ties are, therefore, more likely to link members of different small groups than are
strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within groups. Granovetter stresses the
cohesive power of such weak ties by showing hO\4l information can reach a larger
number of people and traverse greater social distance when passed through weak ties
rather than strong. Recent research by Krackhardt has explored the strength of strong
ties (Krackhardt, June, 1996).
Loose versus Tight Interdependency
Closely related to the above distinction is Weick's concept of loose versus tight
coupling, which he first explored in the context of educational organizations (Weick,
March 1976). Weick defines loose coupling as connoting "things that are tied together
either weakly or infrequently or slowly or with minimal interdependence ... such things
are somehow attached, but each retains some identity and separateness and their
attachment may be circumscribed, infrequent, weak in its mutual affects, unimportant,
and/or slow to respond" (Weick, March 1976). Note how, whereas Granovetter defined
ties in terms of the strength of the social relationship, Weick's definition adds a
temporal element (i.e., "infrequently," "slowly"). Weick goes on to suggest seven
potential functions of loosely coupled systems.
5 Granovetter suggests two possible factors accounting for this result: time and similarity. Stronger ties
tend to involve larger tin\e commitments, Lld since time and attention are liIrtited resources, this implies
less time and attention for other relationships. Empirical evidence also suggests that the stronger the tie
connecting two individuals, the more similar they are in various ways.
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For example, loose coupling may serve as a fonn of buffering by lowering the
probability that the organization will have to respond to each change in its
environment. Loosely coupled systems may also serve as sensitive sensing
mechanisms, which localize the effects of adaptation and trouble. They potentially
support a greater number o! mutations and novel solutions than would be the case with
a tightly coupled system. FinallYI Weick proposes that a loosely coupled system should
be relatively inexpensive to run because it takes time to coordinate people. The
reduction in the necessity for coordination implies fewer conflicts, inconsistencies, and
discrepancies.
Subsequent empirical research supports some of these propositions. For
example, whereas Weick emphasizes the functions and benefits of loose coupling,
Perrow stresses the disadvantages and malfunctions associated with tightly coupled
relationships (Perrow, 1984). Perrow categorized organizations on tile basis of their
complexity (linear or complex) and coupling (loose or tight) and foun,i that tightly
coupled systems were more vulnerable to breakdown. Hutchins shows that a loosely
coupled work group was remarkably adaptive in the face of a change in its
informational environment (Hutchins, February 1991).
Implications of the Model
The sense-making perspective is strikingly different from the previous two
paradignls both in its implications for work processes as well as its prescriptions for
management. Theorists working in this stream have, in particular, emphasized the
difficulty of sense-making in highly complex, interdependent situations. For example,
they point out that more and more work today is occurring inside machines or minds,
suggesting that many newer technologies are no longer dominated by physical or even
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visible determinism (Perrow, 1984; Weick, 1990). But as tasks becolne more automated,
abstract, continuous, flexible, and complex, they also become less analyzable via
traditional (rational) means such as inference or problem solving.
Weick notes that the combination of increased cognitive demands, complexity,
and dense ffiterdependence over large areas increases the incidence of unexpected
outcomes that can ramify in unexpected wayf). As a result, people increasingly operate
in a work environment characterized by seemingly random, unpredictable events and
in which they cannot analyze interdependencies or are not even aware that they exist.
He proposes that such systems make both limited sense (because so little is visible and
so much is transient) and many different kinds of sense (because the dense and complex
interactions they embody can be modeled in so many different ways), in other words,
they are equivocal (Weick, 1990). Perrow likewise points out that under conditions of
interactive complexity events are minimally buffered, and people tend to lose sight and
comprehension of cause and effect relations (Perrow, 1984).
The sense-making perspective questions the notion that managers and scholars
can identify interdependencies by a priori analyzing task or resource structures and,
therefore, differs from the two previous paradigms in terms of its implications for
organization design. VVhile all three perspectives agree that structure matters in terms
of interdependency management, tiley offer different opinions as to the feasibility and
desirability of organization design itself.
More rational theories based on information processing or resources presume
that the design of structure can and should be planned in advance. In particular, we can
rationally determine the appropriate structure for an organization by looking a priori at
its tasks or resources. Many (although not all) proponents of sense-making argue that
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the idea of pre-planned design assumes a foreknowledge of objectives, constraints and
possibilities when in fact rationality and information are often limited, goals and
preferences conflicting. According to these authors, organizations are often ftot
planned, and in fact, it may be impos3ible to rationally and forthrightly design
stntctures to address certain kinds of interdependence.
This debate between organization design as a process of managemeIlt reflectiorl
and intervention versus organization design as self-organization ~trongly resembles
classic debates benveen design and evolution (Alexander, 1964). Design refers to a
process conducted by an outsider or representative of the system, as in infornlation
processing or resource-based solutions. In evolution, the search for design is conducted
by the system itself in terms of itself via a series of local adaptations. For example,
Hutchins followed a work group's response to a change in its informational
environment and found that the resulting reorganization of work could not be
attributed to the conscious reflection of its members or an outside manager (Hutchins,
February 1991). Rather, it arose through local design and a.daptation by individuals to
what appeared to them as local task demands. Furthermore, and surprisingly, the
solution reached was the one recognized in retrospect as being the "ideal design."6
The sense-making perspective is not entirely lacking in recommendations,
however. For example, some network theorists largely reject the notion of a self-
designing organization and argue that effective structure does not occur naturally but
must be designed consciously atld carefully (Krackhardt, 1994; Krackhardt & Stem,
1988; White, Boorman, & Breiger, 1976). They propose using computation tools and
graph theory techniques to do so. Granovetter's research suggests placing individuals
6 Some sense-making theorists take the more extreme view that people often assume centralized control
when none exists or impose centralized control when none is needed (Resnick, 1992).
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with many weak ties such as liaisons iIl key information diffusion spots since many of
the ties are likely to be local bridges (Granovetter, 1973). Schelling's work highlights the
fact that a divergence often exists between perceived individual lllterest and some
collective goal (Schelling, 1978). What people are individually motivated to do and
what they might like to accomplish together are often not aligned, suggesting the
importance of incentive mechanisms.7
Hutchins' research on team navigation suggests that system robustness and
flexibility depend on a certain level of redundancy in the distribution of knowledge and
ability (Hutchins, 1990). His work also illustrates how raising the visibility of tasks
linkages, by, for example, altering the physical arrangement of tools and work stations,
irlcreases people's awareness of their interdependency and need to interact. Other
researchers propose that the more 'heed' reflected in the pattern of inter-relations in a
system, the greater the capability to comprehend and respond to unexpected events that
evolve rapidly (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Heed refers to "a disposition to act with
attentiveness, alertness and care" as opposed to being focused on local situations and
events. Possible promoters of heed suggested by these authors include the use of vivid
stories, common language, apprentice-mentor roles, and careful socialization of
newcomers.
Summary and Critiqu~
7 Note the need for two forms of incentive structure. Sometimes the problem is to get people to abstain
from something that imposes costs on others (Le., incent not to do something; raise awareness of impact
interdependency has on others). Other times, the problem is to get them to take the trouble to do
something of no benefit to themselves but great benefit to others (i.e., incent to do something) (Schelling,
1978).
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In summary, sense-making theories explore the relationship between nlicro-Ievel
linkages and l)igher-level patterns and, therefore, constitute a multi-level perspective on
interdependency (Rollsseau, 1985), although the precise units are often only vaguely
specified. Whereas information processing and resource-based theories tend to focus
on the structural or process dimensions of interdependency, sense-making emphasizes
the content or nature of the relationship, itl particular its strength and
comprehensibility. This perspective is also decidedly less rational and more dynamic
than the other mro, highlighting the lack of visibility and determinism governing many
task relationships. Finally, sense-making assumes that interdependencies are
subjectively defined. For example! these writers portray people as "responding to an
environment that consists of other people responding to their environment" (Schelling,
1978), implying that the very definition of environment and interdependency depends
on a subjective experience. The management implications arising from this theory
largely reflect th~se very different assumptions.
In many ways the sense-making viewpoint represents the most contemporary
and realistic paradigm of interdependency in organizations precisely because it
challenges some of our most basic and simplifj.'ing assumptions (i.e., that organizations
are rational with static and uniform tasks). It suggests instead that.. although parts of
work may be rational or amenable to rational analysis, other parts could prove more
intractable. By emphasizing the need to find ways of working, coordinating and
structuring that are more dynamic and flexible, sense-making theories also converge
with observations made by other scholars (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995).
One major limitation of this category, however, is its lack of empirical validation.
Precisely because it drops such simplifications, sense-making theories tend to be
somewhat abstract, relying on purely theoretical arguments illustrated by carefully
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chosen anecdotes (Granovetter, 1973; Schelling, 1978; Weick, March 1976) or highly
descriptive studies in a single setting (Hutchins, 1990; Hutchins, February 1991; Weick
& Roberts, 1993).
2.4 Critique: Toward An Integrative Model of Interdependency
The previous section reviewed three ways in which interdependency has been
studied in organizations. The perspectives tend to conceptualize task relationships
very differently and offer complementary and sometimes overlapping insights. This
raises an important question: Are these perspectives talking about the same
interdependencies, and thus merely alternative conceptualizations, or do they address
conceptually and empirically distinct phenomena? In other words, how can we develop
a more integrated model of interdependency?
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, there appears to be some degree of overlap between
information processing (external) interdependencies which involve the transfer of
information and those parts of the resource-based perspective which describe flows of
knowledge. Wagerman has suggested the need to distinguish cases of pure reSQurce-
based interdependency (when each member can complete his part of the whole but
resources such as skills and information are distributed among members) such as exists
on a design team from those of l2ure task-based interdependency (where task
accomplishment requires collective action) as represented by a basketball team
(Wagerman, 1995).
Pennings points out a similar lack of distinction between technical and
environmental interdependencies due to varying (and unclear) conceptual and
operational definitions, which tend to emphasize a single variable (usually uncertainty)
or a cluster of conceptually similar variables (Pennings, September 1975). For example,
60
he identifies a large number of cases where authors equate dimensions of environment
with diInensions of technology and cite references to studies of technical
interdependence in support of their thesis on environmental contingencies (or vice
versa). The present survey revealed a similar confusion among concepts of
environment; some scholars portray environment as referencing internal firm unit
relations (external to a focal unit), while others define environment as strictly outside
the organization.
Finally, there is a general lack of clarity and distinction among four \'ariables:
technology, environment, internal, and external. For example, are technical
interdependencies and internal interdependencies always the same thing? Some
authors appear to interpret internal/external as referencing the source of contingency,
while for others it refers to the structure of the organization.
On the other hand, opportunities to integrate complementary viewpoints also
abound. This survey suggests three in particular. First, we need to study the
relationstiip between interdependency process and content. Process descriptions of
interdependency focus on the pattern or form of the task relationship; they emphasize
~ tasks are contingent, the best illustration being Thompson's (1967) categorization of
pooled, sequential, and reciprocal. Content-based approaches to classification address
the nature of the tasks and connection.
For example, referring again to Figure 2.1, we see that information processing
theories explore many kinds of structures, while the resource-based perspective has
primarily concentrated on sequential and pooled forms. We might combine
Thompson's three forms with Karl Weick's notion of loose and tight coupling, and ask
which forms tend to be more tightly coupled. Are there examples of reciprocal
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interdependencies that are loosely coupled and others that are tight? Another possible
con\bination of content and proce~swould link the source or primary driver of the
interdependency (technology and internal or external environment) with its structure4
Do technical interdependencies tend to be more reciprocal? Are there greater lags in
sequential interdependencies driven by the environment? Can we identify certain
ubiquitous process types?
A second possible integration woule. Jook for evidence of expected and
unexpected outcomes in both micro-level dyadic relationships alld higher-level
patterns. Although sense-making theorists attempt to link the two levels, their work
primarily focuses on the "unexpected and surprising" macro-level outcomes. Ample
and compelling evidence exists from information processing and resource-based
research studies that at least some task relationships are predictable, rational, and
stable. How do the latter sometimes get transformed into unexpected outcomes?
Where and when do they remain stable?
Finally, we need to better integrate knowledge about interdependencies with
theories of organizational design and structure. Theorists have long promoted so-called
congruence 0:( contingency models of organization behavior, which focus on the degree
of fit between features of context and design and its relation to efficiency and
effectiveness (Bailetti & Callahan, 1995; Burns & Stalker, 1968; Lawrence & Larsch, 1967;
Nadler & Tushman, 1983). Although most theoretical formu.lations include multiple
features of context (Burns & Stalker, 1968; Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967),
empirical research has usually tested single contingency factors and therefore failed to
fully test the fit hypothesis.
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Some theorists are beginning to question the basic congruence approach and
assumptions (Andres, August 25-27, 1995; Drazin & Van de Yen, 1985; Gresov, 1989;
Miller, 1981; Miller, May 1992; Scott, 1990). Among other things, these scholars argue
that designing to several contingencies at once involves tradeoffs that prohibit overall
fit.
This viewpoint is supported by classic theories of design. For example, in Notes
on the Synthesis of Form, an extensive treatise on the process of design, Alexander
writes:
Our con\liction that there is such a thing as fit to be achieved is C1.~riously
flimsy and insubstantial. We are searching for some kind of harmony
between two intangibles: a form which we have not yet designed and a
context which we cannot properly describe. The only reason we have for
thinking that there must be some kind of fit to be achieved between them
is that we can detect incongruities or negative instances of it.
He con~illues:
In practice, we see good fit only from a negative point of view... Even in
everyday life, the concept of good fit, though positive in meaning, seems
very largely to feed on negative instances; it is the aspects of our lives
which are obsolete, incongruous, or out of tune that catch our
attention...Misfits are the forces which must shape [design, and there is no
mistaking them. Because they are expressed in negative form they are
specific and tangible enough to talk about...
I should like to recommend that we should always expect to see the
process of achieving good fit between two elltities as a negative process of
neutralizing the incongruities or irritants and forces which cause misfit
(Alexander, 1964).
The focus on single dyadic task relationships in interdependency research,
.particularly in the case of information processing and resource-based studies, has
tended to promote very localized management recommendations. There may be
opporn.mities for synergy if we can identify certain solutions which involve managing
63
clusters of like interdependencies. Orgarrizations must also perform many tasks
simultaneously, suggesting the possibility of coordination conflicts (Andres, August 25-
27, 1995; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1983) and coordination costs and overload (Malone,
February 1988; March & Simon, 1958), prospects largely ignored in early theorizing.8
We need to document frequently occurring design conflicts and identify
structures and processes organizations can use to surmount them. One example of this
approach is Allen's work, which examined the tension between various types of
organization design and the information needs in R&D organizations (Allen, November
1986). We also need to develop theories of how to manage and coordinate multiple
interdependencies sLTI\ultaneously and efficiently.
Another potential integration is between task interdependency and pre-existing
structures. Most theoretical studies focus on logically prior decisions of how to
organize and group tasks into departments (Galbraith, 1973). Empirical work, almost
by definition, looks at how established departments coordinate. We need to develop a
better understanding of how existing structures and processes shape and perhaps
dictate relationsltips among tasks.
Gathering and analyzing data about interdependencies may, therefore, enable us
to extend our thinking about some of the existirig organizational design theories. Tile
above comments suggest, in particular, an alternative approach to achieving
congruence, one focused on identifying and minimizing instances of misfit not seeking
8 Thompson does propose that different types of internal interdependence form a Guttman-type scale.
For example, all organizations have pooled interdependence, more complicated organizations have
sequential as well as pooled, and the most complex organizations exhibit all three types. But he never
considers the implications of this heterogeneity nor how one type of interdependence relates to another.
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fit. They also raise questions such as do there exist multiple kinds of fit (Drazin & Van
de Yen, 1985), and which interdependency misfits are most crucial.
2.5 Measuring and Assessing Interdependency
One of the most striking revelations coming out of this survey is the narrowness
of the methodologi~aland empirical approaches ta~ken to investigate interdependence.
As indicated by a quick glance at Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 and supported by further more
detailed review, the vast majority of the research is either completely conceptual, case
descriptive, or replicates early operational definitions (usually some variant of
(Thompson, 1967) or (Van de Yen & Ferry, 1980». There are ,tirtually no inductive or
qualitative studies of interdependence where, for example, a researcher attempted to
understand interdependence as people experience it within an organization. This
method bias has no doubt contributed to our narrow understanding of the concept and
its implications. In other words, it is entirely possible that our definitions and
understanding of interdependence are nothing more than a testimonial to our methods,
in effect an artifact of using time and context independent measures (Weick, 1974).
For example, relying on questions such as "While doing your assigned tasks, how
much do you have to depend on outside deparhnents?" or "Please indicate how much of
your work flows in an independent, sequential, and reciprocal manner" (Vande Yen &
Ferry, 1980) to assess aspects of interdependency assumes that people know when they
come across an interdependency and can reliably assess it (Weick, 1974). Such
measures, therefore, obscure important details of work which have as one of their
distinguishing properties the fact that people often do not even realize that problem.s
exist for which they need solutions. Thus, to ask people about the pattern or level of
interdependency can miss or mislead us about key aspects of interdependence
associated with newer, more complex work arrangements.
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For instance, Weick notes that if one goes into an organization and watches
which parts affect which other parts, one will predominately see the tightly coupled
parts. Those parts that are interdependent slightly, infrequently or aperiodically,
however, will, almost by definition, be less visible. Similarly, many organizational
processes could exhibit a mixed quality of interdependence if, for example, they follow
a reciprocal pattern earl}' on but sequential pattern later. But that aspect will be
altogether missed (and inappropriate coordination mechanisms invoked) if the observer
extrapolates from early stages of the relationship (Weick, March 1976).
Relying on self-reports or survey responses also presents possible biases.
Research in social psychology suggests that people tend to over-rationalize their
activities and attribute greater meaning, predictability, and coupling among them than
in fact exist (Katz & Kahn, 1966). People are also prone to report unilateral causation as
opposed to mutual causation insofar as the former supports a positive self concept. The
tendency to describe situations in terms of causal arcs rather than loops may also reflect
high levels of mobility or a variance in perce-ption within firms (Weick, 1974). The fact
that people are highly mobile (both within and across organizations) implies that they
may not stay in a situation long enough to appreciate the feedback consequences of
their actions. Companies and individuals can also differ widely with respect to their
perception of the time span involved (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). For example, a
marketer who operates in the fast-paced commercial 'world may define reciprocal
interdependence as a loop occurring within a one week time frame; someone working
in a research organization, on the other hand, would probably have a longer time
horizon.
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Researchers also represent a potential source of bias through their modeling
efforts (Athey & Stern, 1996). For example, most existing research has focused on ttle
implications of interdependency. Yet because we lack an adequate understanding of
the interdependency ,,·ariable itself, we risk confounding its impact with other factors.
Ttrls in turn can result in over-representing instances of rriutual causation insofar as
coarse effects will undoubtedly appear to feed back on earlier causes (Weick, 1974).
2.6 A New Research Agenda
The previous sections looked to the past in describing three major
interdependency perspecti\7es. These paradigms represent continued areas of active
research as indicated by the large number of sub-stream theories and variants generated
within each category. However, this section sketches out some ideas coming out of this
survey for a bolder agenda for interdependency research.
First, the agenda should begin by closely examining the concept of
interdependency itself before proceeding to investigate and Tl'leaSUre its impact on
organizational outcomes. Most authors lllcluded in this review are not really studying
interdependence, but rather how interdependence impacts something else, usually
performance. The fact that they fail to adequately develop and operationalize the
variable is, therefore, perhaps not too surprising since it is likely to be heavily
influenced by the particular objectives of their study. We need a richer, more unified
understanding of the interdependence variable itself before we proceed to build such
models.
Second, while it is clear that each perspective on interde?endency has its
shortcomings, each also offers important insights. New research should, therefore,
build upon this past work, guided by a goal of increased integration. The classic
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debates about determinism versus voluntarism or internal versus external are not very
controversial anymore. Most scholars recognize (albeit perhaps reluctantly) that
relationships are sometimes deterministic but often not and that organizations represent
complex, evolving entities. It is likely that interdependencies are sometimes predictable
in advance but often more emergent and that some forms of interdependency are
harder to manage than others. It is equally apparent, however, that our understanding
of the concept rests on isolated viewpoints, which tend to constrain the realism of
interdependency research.
Third, as suggested in Section 2.5, future research on interdependency must
exploit new methodological approa~ches. In particular, rather than starting with a pre-
conceived definition (and re-operationalizing it yet again), we need to go in and observe
interdependency in action. Researcllers studying interdependency need to apply
methods that both highlight and preserve rich details of context (Weick, March 1976)
and enable us to make tractable theoretical and normative statements abollt variations.
In fact, we may need to invent (or at IE-'ast agree upon) a language or grammar about
interdependence before further theoretical progress can be made (Salancik & Leblebici,
1988).
Yet certain pervasive shortcomings "Iso become apparent as a result of this
survey. In particular, although the sense....making perspective has a dynamic element to
it, there is a general lack of consideration of the role of time in all of this research,
undoubtedly due to the cross sectional nature of most of the work. (An exception is
work by Adler (Adler, March-April 1995).) Theorists tend to portray firms as starting
with a clean slate of interdependent tasks waiting to be structured and coordinated, yet
we know that organizations structure and restructure themselves continually over time
and that their technology and environments change vely rapidly. Tllis suggests that
68
interdependency patterns and designs will also evolve and perhaps be constrained by
their past form.
Finally, we need to develop a clearer thesis about the relationship between tasks
and organizational design or structure. This survey revealed a considerable amount of
confounding surrounding these two concepts.9 The traditional viewpoint says that,
given the existence of an interdependency, we can design organizational solutions to
manage it. Recently, however, scholars have begun to modify this simple determinate
model by depicting organizational structure as an intervening variable between tasks
and interdependency (Eccles & Noluia/ 1992). That is, interdependency is not inherent
in the task (or environment) but rather an outcome of the organizational design and
differentiation processes.
For example, Wagerman defines task interdependence as existing when "each
member must take action for any other member to do any part of their work," but
locates the source of such interdependence not in the task itself but rather in the
"organizational structure, work instructions and materials" (Wagennan, 1995).
According to this interpretation, the same tasks could conceivably exhibit different
types or degrees of interdependence in different organizational structures.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter builds upon a long history of research on interdependency. In
particular, it presents a conceptual framework, which integrates interdependeI\cy
research from three separate streams of theorizing in an attempt to develop a clearer
9 One possible source of this confusion, revealed in this survey, is the considerable variation across
studies in all three paradigms as to the level of task execution. For example, we saw numerous cases
where one author's 'interdependency' was conceptualized as a form of structure in other studies. Some
micro-level researchers view gro'up-Ievel interdependencies as a stnlctural variable whereas group
scholars portray inter-group relations as a type of interdependency.
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understanding of both the similarities and important distinctions in theorists' approach
to the concept.
The survey suggests that our understanding of L'lterdependency is actually quite
limited and dated. We are still primarily drawing upon the Thompsonian notions of
pooled, sequential, and reciprocal forms of contingency. While that work contains some
fundarnental insights, it ignores some of the more recent approaches to theorizing abol1t
the nature of \vork in organizations and largely fails to reflect the complexity of work
and work relationships i.n organizations today. On the one hand, we need to broaden
our view of interdependence beyond that of simply a structured pattern of task
relationships. More content-based viewpoints likewise need to incorporate the
importaI1Ce of stnlcture and pattern in their models. Although much additional
theoretical and empirical work remain to be done, this survey represents an important
first step in opening up a dialogue about a fundamental concept that has not been
adequately developed in recent years.
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CHAPTER III: AN EMPIRICALLY-DERIVED TAXONOMY OF
MULTIPLE INTERDEPENDENCIES
This chapter seeks to refine our understanding of halv and why tasks are rela~ed
in organizations. Analysis of interdependency in six personal computer and
telecommunications software development projects suggested that product
development teams face fOUf types of interdependency that need to be managed
simultaneously: Product Definition and Architecture Interdependencies, System of Use
Interdependencies, Technology Sharing Interdependencies, and Resource Sharing
Interdependencies. TIlese interdependency types can b~ traced back to the product
technology, external product environment, internal work unit environment, and
organizational structures and resource policies in each firm and are further shown to
vary along two dimensions, task structure and predictability. Some implications of a
multiple interdependency perspective for strategy and organization design are also
discussed.
3.1 Introduction
The concept of interdependency is central to our thinking about organizations. It
appears in theories of organizational design (Galbraith, 1973; Nadler & Tushman, 1983),
organizational process (Van de Yen & Poole, 1989), and product development
(Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). It is implicit in classic
metaphors of organizations as "systems" (Katz & Kahn, 1966) as well as more
contemporary portrayals of organizations as networks (Rockart & Short, 1989) or "jazz
ensembles" (Eisenhard,= & Tabrizi, 1995).
Yet despite this centrality, the structure and underlyulg contingencies whicl\
drive interdependency remain unclear. For example, pioneering work by Thompson
defined interdependency as a varying degree of contingency among tasks h'lherent in
the nature of technology (Thompson, 1967); more recent research has focused on the
role of a firm's external environment (Ancona & Caldwell, 1990; Christensen &
Rosenbloom, 1995; Gresov, 1990) and its strategy (Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Iansiti &
Clark, 1994) as possible sources of interdependence.
71
These variations suggest that there may be several types or categories of
interdependence, yet a comprehensive framework has yet to be developed. A major
initial research question is therefore, simply, what does a map of interdependencies
within an organization look like (Weick, March 1976)? Such a mapping, in which we
identify and systematically analyze a ,vide variety of interdependency relations and
their associated management implications, would contribute greatly to our knowledge
and understanding of organizations (Malone & Crowston, March 1994).
A multiple interdependency perspective aLt;o raises new research questions in
terms of strategic organization design and potentiaily lends insight into some core
organizational problems. For example, what are the challenges associated with trying
to manage multiple interdependencies simultaneously? Is it possible to design
organizational solutions to meet the needs of multiple interdependencies, and if not,
how do managers choose which interdependencies to concentrate on? Are multiple
interdependencies one potential source of the organizational design "dilemmas" cited by
Pfeffer and Salancik (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1983), and if so, can we document their
existence and design new coordination solutions to overcome them?
Developing a multiple interdependency paradigm which addresses such issues
will take time. The process is begun here by focusing on interdependency in large scale
software de'fJ'elopment projects. The next section describes the overall empirical
approacll of the study, and the sample, data, and analytical technique used to derive a
taxonomy of different interdependency types. Section 3.3 presents the qualitative
results in terms of the types and their variations and discusses how they are linked to
current literature. Section 3.4 contains a quantitative analysis of the distribution of
types across projects, firms, and functions. rne final two sections Sllmmarize tlle study
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and discuss how it both builds upon and enriches our current understanding of the
relationsl\ip between interdependency and organizational strategy and structure.
3.2 Identifying and Classifying Interdependencies
This study is distinct from most research on interdependency in its inductive,
qualitative analytical approach. In particular, it draws upon descriptions and examples
from interviews and project documentation to record, often in team member's own
words, what interdependencies exist and the problems they present on six case study
software development projects. These examples are then analyzed using language
processing techniques (described in Appendix C), yielding a taxonomy of multiple
interdependency types. The result is a rich, grounded view of interdependency in new
product development efforts.
3.2.1 Overview of the Analytical Approach: Classification
Classification schemes have been highly influential in developing analytical
frameworks to understand how firms operate and compete (Burns & Stalker, 1968;
Lawre:lce & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965). lhere are two general
approaches to classification: conceptually-derived typologies and empirically-based
taxonomies (Bailey, 1994). That is, one can impose a pre-existing framework on
empirical data (typology) or allow patterns in the data to emerge from an examination
and comparison of cases (taxonomy).
The emergent approach examines the raw data and relies on intuition and
(increasingly) specialized analytical techniques to organize and intelpret the resulting
patterns. One problem associated with the taxonomy approach is that it can become
unwieldy when large databases must be assessed; the mass of detail makes it difficult to
tease out patterns in the data that represent true empirical variations as opposed to
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random fluctuations. As a result, researchers are often forced to examine a limited
numb~rof cases, which makes the generalizability of their conclusions suspect.
Taxonomies are also criticized for their lack of theoretical significance, arbitrary nature,
and unreliable results (McKelvey, September 1978). Typologies, on the other hand,
because they involve imposing a framework to organize the data, create an artificial
sense of orderliness in what may actually be a lughly chaotic process. Compared to
typologies, therefore, taxonomies tend to be more firmly based on facts and can disclose
important empirical regularities. to
A second distinction that can be made is between special and general
classification schema (McKelvey, September 1978). Special typologies are based on one
or two organizational attributes, such as those proposed by Burns and Stalker (Burns &
Stalker, 1968), Perrow (Perrow, 1967), Thompson (Thompson, 1967), and Weber (Weber,
1978). While the above are exemplary, many special classifications tend to be "tIlin and
arbitrary" insofar as they pertain to only lirrlited aspects of organizational life (Miller,
1996). In consequence, they have high predictive validity but within a limited slice of
the total behavior of an organization. A general classification, in contrast, groups
objects together according to all (or most of) their attributes, altholtgh some attributes
may be weighted more than others. Since many attributes are taken into consideration,
a general classification allows one to make broad predictions about the form and total
behavior of members of a given class (McKelvey, September 1978).
The present analysis can be summarized as a general taxonomy. By adopting an
emergent approach it avoids the disadvantage of imposing prior theoretical biases Ofl
the data and increases the chances of discovering the unanticipatable. Rather than
10 Both approaches suffer from a lack of testing. Many typologies are never tested empirically; those that
are often fail to be validated (Miller, 1996). Taxonomies usually yield interesting and evocative empirical
hypotheses, which the authors all too often subsequently fail to develop into coherent integrated theories.
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identifying one or two types of interdependency, it is a multidimensional classification,
reflective of the systemic nature of task relationships.
3.2.2 Th~ Research Domain ~'d Sample
"ihe complexity of both the technology and process in large scale product
development suggested that it would be an ideal and exciting phenomenon within
which to explore interdependen!-y and begirt to construct a taxJnomy. Building and
maintaining software systems represents an extremely com~~lexactivity (Brooks, 1975).
This complexity arises not only from the inherent comr~exitiesof the teclmology, but
also due to the difficulties in managing the software development process.
Software systems typically consist of millions of lines of code grouped into
hundreds or thousands of files; those lines execute hundreds of different functions. For
example, the first version of Microsoft Windows NT consisted of 5.6 million lines of
code organized into 40,000 files; at the peak of the development cycle, approximately
200 people were on the tean.1. (Zachary, 1994). One successful real-time
telecpmm.uniciitions switching system currently in its eighth version of release is
approximately 10 million lines of non-eommented code divided into 41 different
subsystems; 3000 software engineers contribute to its development and maintenance
(Sumner Jr., April 20, 1993).11
Because the products themselves are so large and complex and yet must be
produced very rapidly, these development efforts are usually highly distributed and
interdependent. Literally hundreds or even thousands of individuals whose activities
are highly related contribute aspects of the product in parallel (Tichy, 1992).
11 These figures include product, not support or test code, and technical employees, not staff or
contingent workers, respectively.
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One way of conceptualizing this process is as a series of implementation steps
with iterative relationships between successive phases: system requirements, software
requirements, analysis, program design, coding, testing, operations, and maultenance
(Royce, August 1970). This waterfall-like approach, which tries to simplify the process
by "freezing" a product specification early and then integrating and testing the system at
the end, was common in the 1970's and 1980's and remains popular in many industries
(Cusumano & Selby, 1995).
Recently, some researchers have begun to explore alternative development
models such as "iterative enhancement" (Boehm & Papaccio, October 1988), "spiral"
(Boehm, January 1984), "concurrent development" (Pimmler & Eppinger, 1994), "synch
and stabilizeU(Cusumano & Selby, 1995), and "interpretive" (Piore, Lester, & Malek,
March 25, 1997). These authors argue that in many industries user needs and desires
are so difficult to understand and evolve so rapidly that tasks are much more
overlapping artd inter-related than commonly supposed. As a result, it is impossible
and unwise to design the system completely in advance. Instead, projects should
"iterate" as well as concurrently manage as many activities as possible while they move
forward to completing the project (Cusumano & Selby, 1995). Iteration has the added
benefit of reducing the likelihood of unpleasant surprises as the product is assembled
where, for instance, different physical parts overlap or fail to work together (Sabbagh,
1995).
An alternative conceptualization of product development is, therefore, repeated
occurrences of a sequence consisting of a development phase and a coordination phase
(Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Hauptman, 1986; Koushik & Mookerjee, 1995). According to
this interpretation, coordination of tasks is a key requirement for project success, and
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managers must decide how best to coordinate different activities while still meeting the
project goals, schedule, and budget.
One component of coordination is the continuous day-to-day integration of
individual work with the activities of other team members. For example, people
working on parts in the same subsystem need to coordinate with respect to their design
and testing. They also need to inte~actwith people working on other subsystems that
interface or interact with some of these components, with representatives from oth~r
functional areas such as marketing or customer support, and potentially with people on
other projects within the firm (Koushik & Mookerjee, 1995).
The two participating organizations in this study were Microsoft, a leadirlg
producer of personal computer (PC) software, and Lucent Technologies (formerly part
of AT&T), a maker of telecommunications. switching system software and har,jware
products. Although in different industries, these companies exhibit high levels of
product and process complexity. Both firms primarily produce large scale software
products in competitive, rapidly evolvirlg markets.12 They also perform a variety of
tasks in the production process.
Key informants helped select three projects to study at each firm with the goal of
capturing many different types of interdependency. Specific project selection factors
were based on past research (Boehm, January 1984; Cusumano & Kemerer, November
1990; Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Kemerer, 1997) and discussions with experienced
managers in the field. Actual project names were disguised.
12 One significant difference between the two finns is that Microsoft develops products for a mass
market, while Lucent's products usually re,present more customized forms of development.
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For example, the projects were large in terms of both the nurnber of lines of code
being developed and team size, ranging from 50,000 to 5 million lines of code and 75 to
200 people. The projects within each firrn varied in terms of the level of innovation
required; three were first-time releases, \tvhile the others represented updates of a past
product.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarize the companies and projects, respectively.
TABLE 3.1
COMPANY COMPARISON
L..UCENT MICROSOFT
CORPORATE 110 years old 20 years old
HISTORY 1885-1995: regulated monopoly
1997: broken apart from AT&T
POPULAND 120,000 total employees 17,000 total employees
CULTURE primarily engineers primarily comp scientists
avg. age: 45 years avg. age: 30 years
avg. experience: 15 years avg. experience: 5 years
PRODUCTS real-time switching systems that operating systems that control the
route calls through a telecom primary operations of a
network; features that perform computer; applications that
specific call processing perform specific word processing
operations and graphical operations
Flagship Product ESS Switch Windows Operating System
- 5-10 M NeSL; 40 subsystems - 10M NCSL
- avg. downtime: 1 minlyr
mOPUCT
MARKEl:
Customers Local and long-distance telecoms, Individual and corporate
gov't agencies in US and abroad customers in US and abroad
Requirements High reliability High compatibility
Delivery Annual - > Incremental Incremental -> Annual
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TABLE 3.2
SAMPLE PROJECTS
FIRM PRODUCT DESC PRODUCT TEAM ARCH VERS
SCALE SCALE LAYER NO.
_.
LUCENT "Handphone" an application providing SO,OOONCSL
wireless communication on a code -100 people app 1.0
in the Far East base of to
million
''Tollphone'' an application providing I-2M NCSL
operator services, toll on a code -100people app 7.0
and directory assistance base of to
million
"Autophone" a switching system for I-2M NCSL - 200 people app/OS 1.0/2.0
mobile phones
MICROSOFT "Desk" an integrated -2~fNCSL - 200 people app 5.0
application suite for pes
"Data" an entry level database
-lMNCSL -75people app 1.0
application for pes
tiNetwork" a network operating
-S.6MNCSL - 250 people OS 3.0
system for pes
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The data consisted of a total of 71 interviews with team members across the two
firms. The interviews were balanced across the six projects with the exception of one
case at Lucent (Autophone), wInch was under-represented. The interview subjects
varied in terms of tlleir functional area and level of experience. For example, the
researcher spoke with designers, system engineers, developers, testers, documenters,
and upper-level managers. Due to time constraints, marketing and field representatives
were not included in the interview sample.
The interviews began by asking the subject for facts, opinions and insights
regarding interdependency in their work as well as basic background about their
project and job. A key aspect of the interview technique was to ask people for stories or
specific examples of the interdependencies tIley faced on the project. This approach is
similar to the technique of collecting data that tell stories about organizational processes
and then looking for patterns in that data (Daft, 1983a). In line with Glaser and Strauss'
suggestion, interviewing ended when the results (stories and examples of
interdependency) became highly consistent (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). All of the
interviews were recorded on audio tape and transcribed.
The companies also granted access to various forms of documentation and
archival records such as design documents, product scllematics, and organizatiorlal
charts. As in Eisenhardt and Tabrizi's research, attempts were made to reconcile
interview data with other sources of information such as documents and reports
(Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). For example, if a subject described an interdependency
which involved a technical relationship between two product subsystems, it was
verified via architectural design documents.
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3.2.3 Specific Analytical Technique: Language Processing Methods & Affinity
Diagramming
The methodology employed here to collect and classify interdependencies is
adapted from a techrrique known as Affinity Diagramming or the KJ Method and
widely used in marketing research (Griffin & Hauser, Winter 1993; Juguilon, 1996;
Kawakita, 1977; Kawakita, 1991a; Kawakita, 1991b; Shiba, Graham, & Walden, 1993;
Ulrich & Eppinger, 1995).13 This technique emphasizes collecting and analyzing real
cases and personal experiences within their context of use, reflecting the premise that
those with direct experience (in using a product or coordinating tasks, for example) are
uniquely positioned to provide information about such. The method is well suited to
the present inductive analysis in that it (1) begins with a broad exploration of a situation
that attempts to suppress preconcei,'ed ideas and hypotheses and (2) employs tools to
gradually structure and focus the data toward specific patterns without being overly
rigid (Shiba, et al., 1993).
Appendix C outlines the steps used to cluster the intcr(~ependencyexamples and
construct affinity diagrams.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 An Overview of The Taxonomy
Table 3.3 presents an overvie\4l of the three dimensional taxonomy. The data
revealed four archetypal categories of interdependency commonly encountered in large
scale product development projects, each of which can be further broken down into
secondary and tertiary categories: Product Definition and Architecture
Interdependencies, System of Use Interdependencies, Technology Sharing
Interdependencies, and Resource Sharing Interdependencies. These clusters sort
13 KJ stands for Jiro Kawakita who originated the methodology during the 1950's.
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interdependencies on the basis of the content or primary driver of the task relationship
(product technology, external product environment, work unit environment, and
organizational structures and pOlicies, respectively). Figure 3.1 is the resulting affinity
diagram; only the cluster titles are shown for ease of presentation.
The analysis also suggested that interdependencies can be further categorized
along two additional (orthogonal) dimensions. The first is tllat of the structure of the
task relationship. Certain binary task structures were clearly evident in the data (e.g.,
sequential, pooled, reciprocal), but the examples also suggested two possible additions
to this basic categorization scheme. First, it is sometimes useful to refine these
relationships (e.g., sequential can be differentiated into sequential interdependencies
between a base and higher level component and sequential interdependencies between
two components interfacing at the same level).
Even more strongly s~lpportedby the data in this study, however, is the need to
go beyond binary classes of task structure and look for frequently occurring patterns of
task relationships. Possible patterns suggested here are cascade (core), chain, and
indirect. Cascade patterns exist when one central or core task is related to many other
tasks in a fan-like manner (alternatively, it can be viewed as many sequential
interdependency relations f!manating from a core task). Chain interdependencies reflect
the fact that some tasks require the performance of sequences of tasks in rapid or
immediate succession. Indirect interdependence is a structure in which one bilateral
relationship indirectly impacts other tasks.
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TABLE 3.3
KEY DIMENSIONS OF THE TAXONOMY
Classification Dimension #2: Iask Structure
Bilateral Stntctures Patterned Structures
~~-
Sequential Sequential Pooled Reciprocal Cascade Chain Indirect
(Mutual) (Core)
Base Interface
Product
Technology
External predictable
Product
Environment hidden
Work Unit predictable predictable
Envirordllent &
~~~tegy hidden hidden
Organizational
Structure &
Resource Policies
Classification iDimension #3: Task Predictability
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fIGURE 3.1: KJ DIAGR-A.M OF INTERDEPENDENCIES
What types of ir:~~erdependenciesexist in l~rge scale product development projects?
Component Interdependencies
PRODl.JCf DEFINITION & ARCHITECTURE INTERDEPENDENCIESi ,
Translation Interdependencies
SYSTEM OF USE INTERDEPENDENCIES
Technical Compatibility Interdependencies
software system architechtre
(hMdware compatibility] (software compatibility)
(backward compatibility)
User Compatibility Interdependencies
( testing compatibility )
( documentatiollIassistance I
(geographic compatibility]
(!>ackward compatibility I
Shared Capital Interdependencies
[ (spate) §uipment) ]
Shared Time & Attention Interdependencies
across In~lviduals ] (across teams/departments I
(within an individual)
(across time )
'\ +
~ SHARED RESOURCE INTERDEPENDENCIES
customer requirements product bugs into
into physical and logical physical and logical
technology solutions
SHARED TECHNOLOGY INTERDEPENDENCIES
,
Binary Patterns
( interfacing components ) ~orelcascade components-
(base components ) (chained components )
Icircular c~m~one~t5] Ihidden components I
..J
Direct Sharing Interdependencies
(shared component access/use )
[shared component design/development ]
(dedicated component team )
--
Indirect Sharing Interdependencies
r l testing and documenting ]
[product rele.Jsing I
The third dimension shown in the table is that of the predictability of the
interdependency. Some task relationships are relatively predictable in advance
(anticipatable, stable, visualizable) while others are more hidden alld thus emergent
over time.
The next section describes each primaI]' category in more detail as well as its
linkage to existing literature. References are also made to supporting KJ diagrams for
each type (Figures 3.2a - 3.2d), which display both tIle cluster titles and representative
examples from the data, and to Table 3.4, which shows the distribution of the examples
across the four major categories.
3.3,,2 Interdependency Typea Discovered
Product Definition andArcbitecture Interdependencies
Overoiew
Technical products can be thought of in terms of both functional and pilysical
elements (Ulrich & Eppinger, 1995). Functional elements are the operation.c; and
transformations that contribute to the overall definition and performance of the
prodl1ct. They correspond, at a high level, to customer needs and requirements-- what
users Vlant a product to actually do. Examples include drawing a box, calculating a
mean, or di~tributingmemory in a PC product, or making and billing different kinds of
phone calls in a telecommunications product.
After gatherLT\g and defining the customer's functional requirements, the process
of engineering design involves first mapping the functional elements to physical
implementation-level entities and then clustering the pllysical elements into SODle sort
of hierarchy or grouping. Physical elements are the parts that ultimately implement
such features and functions. In software products, physical elements usually take the
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form of files, modules Of, more generally, components and subsystems. This process of
trallSlating customer requirements into a technical product consisting of physical parts
and logical parts and connections and then breaking the physical parts down into
components and subsystems creates a set of interdependent tasks labeled here, Product
Definition and Architecture Interdependencies. Thirty-three percent (33%) of the
examples fell into this primary category (Table 3.4).
Each of the four primary interdependency types could be further characterized
into a set of secondary types. In some cases, the secondary types are further broken
down into clusters of tertiary types as lvell. Product Definition and Architecture
Interdependencies had two distinct secondary types: translation interdependencies and
component interdependencies. These clusters and their corresponding sub-clusters are
depicted in a detailed KJ diagram (Figure 3.2a) and described below.
Secondary and Tertiary Types
-Translation Interdependencies. Product Definition and Architecture
Interdependencies were labeled translation when they involved converting customer
requirements in the form of statements of need into tIle logic of software. For example,
at Lucent customer representatives and systems engineers work with a
telecommunications service provider (the customer) to identify what kind of switching
product the customer needs. Systems engineers then take that information and, as one
teanl member described it, "translate it into engineering and [telecommunications
software] terms" in the form of a functional specification document (FSD). The purpose
of the FSD is to ;:understand and document what we are building ... to reach an
understanding with the customer." The specification then forms the basis for a set of
designs, which layout the implementation solutions not only for the product but also
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for requirements tests, which verify that the product operates as the customer requires it
to. Finally, each of the designs is implemented in the form of a software produ.ct or test.
Team members at Microsoft follow a similar translation process, although in this
setting the specification task is much more fluid and iterative, and detailed design
stages are often skipped entirely. Nor is the translation process limited to the beginning
of the development cycle. Engineers also need to translate problems into coded
solutions, as indicated in the following statement by a tester at Microsoft:
Failure conditions often occur far away from where the real problem
actually is in the code. It can take months to pin down.
The examples revealed several significant characteristics of translation
interdependencies. First, the output of each task is usually some form of documentation
in either a written format (design documents, which are written in English or pseudo
code), diagram format (product schematics), or a product artifact (software code or
tests), and these outputs form the basis for subsequent tasks. Yet tIle relationships are
not strict hand-offs; one task does not necessarily end before another starts.
For example, at Microsoft, writing the functional specification depends on
information about the Cl1stomer in the product vision, "which is a variable over time."
Similarly, as things progress during coding, developers often discover many issues not
considered in the original design. Designs, therefore, continue to evolve witll the actual
coded product. As a Lucent developer described it:
We need to define the components and interfaces in the design
documents. Defining things clearly doesn't mean we are not going to
change it, because you always change it. But it has to be clear j"'-)W so we
know it changes.
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customer requirements into physical and logical technology
Translation Interdependencies
FIGURE3.2a
DETAILED KJ DIAGRAM: Product Definition & Architecture Interdependencies
~
Droelopers depend on marketing
for the product vision [in order to
t~'Tite the spec]
evelopers depend on system engineers
or customer requirements. We also
rovide"feedback on their technical
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We take requirements and specs and
start to identify component and
subsystem areas in high l~'el design ...
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design into the actual C logic and
functions [in 10lv level design]
Testing depends on
development to tell them
how code should behave
... so they can specify and
turite requiretttetits tests
..J
problems into solutions
Failures often occurfar away
[tram where the problem
actually is in tlte code
~eveloping fixes depends onrst testing the code to. entify problems and bugs
'""
..J
Component Interaependencies
~
circular components
Changing one line ofcode in the cache
manager impacts all parts of the system
Certain pieces are used by everyone
such as authentification of the
handset. If that piece changes,
(every piece] will be impacted
Patterns
chained components
core components
One developer who writes sloppy code
can break the product and impact the rest
of the team... Nobody can get any lvark
done
There are [component] tools for checking
the integrity of the product that must be
done early and reliably
Binary -----..,
intterfacing components base components
Components communicate through There is an innate dependency between
onnali:~d interfaces. There's a give the diagram engine antI the schema and
and take with modification going in query designers because the fonner is the
both di1'ections because bugs oftett base
occur aJ' the interaction point and
because interfaces grow and change
over nnre
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lLJith the originating component due to
(he natl. Tal progress ofcall sequencing
Printing and sehlp have a circular dependency.
Printing can't lie done until setup is c011zpleted,
but the whole point ofsetup is to have afinal
t'frsion ofall tire files
My software depends on another piece
of SOftrl.1Cl.~. That code may be dependent on
yet anotlrer piece, and that chain goes on and
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The X component depends on functionality
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use each other's technolo01l~ ~ 0 ..7
l "----- ,."
hidden components
The real problems occur lvith the hidden
interdependencies- the ones that 110 one
thought about that pop up at the last minute,
\ .like C2 certification )))
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Thus, interdependent translation tasks overlap and co:\tinue in parallel, to some
degree, and documents and diagrams are as much outputs of the overall translation
process as inputs to subsequent tasks.
A second point revealed in the examples is that translation tasks often depend
not just on previous activities but also on subsequent ones. For example, a Lucent team
member described how "design and development depend upon system engineers for
the customer requirements, but developers [who perform design and development] also
provide feedback on th~ technical feasibility of requirements with respect to cost and
maintenance." Here, writing requirements is not only an input to subsequent design
and development tasks but also depends on the knowledge of people performing those
tasks.
Finally, depending on the complexity of the technology, translation tasks D\ay be
refined into interdependent sub-tasks. For example, at Lucent the design task is broken
down into two sub-tasks, called high-level design and low-level design.
Component Interdependencies. As noted earlier, complex technical products
exhibit what is known as a hierarchical or "parts within parts" structure (Simon,
December 1962). The product is composed of inter-related components and
subsystems, each of which is in turn hierarchical down to some lowest level of
elementarity.14 Because the product functionality and features are allocated across
these pieces, the end result is a large number of technical parts that can interact in often
non-trivial ways. Dividing the product up into multiple components also necessitates
14 Note that where we leave off partitioning and what constitutes an elementary element are both
somewhat arbitrary. For example, if we \vere to apply a telescope to a particular component it would
reveal yet more levels of complexity. In other words, each component of a subsystem can also be viewed
as r~ system, which comprises sub components whose relation to each other is defined by a system-like
architec:ture ~
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new tasks, namely the components need to be re-integrated into one working product.
Interdependencies created by allocating product functionality among components were
classified as component interdependencies.
As shown in Figure 3.2a, dividing functionality among components creates six
tertiary types of component relationships. Some components simply share an interface,
meaning that one piece is adjacent to another. A variation of this type is a base
interdependency where one component forms the base of the product and must be
developed first. IS In the case of software products, software tools (pieces of software
needed to write software) fall in the base category. Circular component relationships
(also referred to as two-way or cross interdependencies by the interview subjects) arise
when two or more components share functionality in a reciprocal fashion.
For example, the setup component performs the in3tallation of all the files in a
product. It determines what files get requested and how and where they end up and is
a vehicle for pulling different components together. As numerous people on the Desk
team described it, "Setup is one of the biggest interdependencies for other components.
No one can test without setup or integrate without setup, yet it is very difficult to
develop setup when the [other] underlying files and feature sets are changing." Data
team members described a similar type of "chicken-and-egg" relationship between the
shell component (a harness other components plug into and gain value from; it
provides certain unifying technology such as menus, toolbars, common error
messaging, etc.) and other feature components:
15 Interfacing and base component dependencies are both fonns of sequential interdependence
(Thompson, 1967). I make this connection later on but argue that it is useful to distinguish the two insofar
as base dependencies may imply a level of reliability not (necessarily) needed in the oUter case.
Furthermore, interfacing components can often be developed irt parallel whereas base components must
be completed in sequence.
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The components depend on the shell component so the shell should come
first. But there is calling back and forth between the shell and
components, and we need to get new features into the shell, so the shell
should also come last.
The data also suggested that component interdependencies are not merely binary
relationships; some of the most complicated scenarios arose when technical
interdependencies existed across three or more components. For exanlple, on Network,
three components shared a set of circular interdependencies that "ran very deep,"
according to the interview subjects. One component supplied a structured storage
space for another; it in turn depended on the other for some of its interfaces, as did a
third. As a result of this complicated relationship, people working on these pieces met
twice a week to go over the interdependencies and resolve blocking issues.
Another multiple component pattern observed irl the data involved a core
component, such as the cache manager, that interacted ,,vith many other parts of the
product. Changing the design or code in that core piece', therefore, set off a "ripple" or
"cascadelt of changes elsewhere.16 Developers also talke~i about how certain compiling
and testing tasks depended upon chains of integrated components being functional.
Not all component inteldependellcies were easily identifiable by looking at the
product architecture diagram, however. A final class of component relationships,
labeled "hidden" by the interview subjects, referred to interdependencies that cut across
the physical structure and/or were more emergent as designs and technical
relationshjps changed during implementation.
16 Note th~l\tJjis interdependency can be viewed as a collection of sequential relationships. Later I
diSCtlSS why it is useful and important to sometimes take a more collective viewpoint.
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In summary, Product Definition and Architecture Interdependencies can be
broken down into two sub-types: translation interdependencies and component
interdependencies. Translation interdependencies arise due to the need to translate
betwf?en the world of the customer and the world of software engineering. Breaking the
product down into a set of components necessitates a refinement of certalll translation
tasks (e.g., 'develop product code' becomes 'develop code for component one,' 'deveiop
code for component hVo,' etc.) as well as new tasks (e.g., component integration), each
of which must be re-integrated with the existing task set. These types were further
shown to vary in terms of their structure (one-way, two-way, and patterned relations)
and predictability.
Linkage to the Literature
Product Definition and Architecture Interdependencies most resemble the types
of task relationships described in information processing and resource-based theories of
product development. Adherents to the information processing viewpoint argue that
the nature of the technology (task)17 dictates different degrees of contingency among
tasks and hence creates the need for information processing (Allen, 1977; Galbraith,
1973; Thompson, 1967; Tushman, 1978). Resource-based interpretations focus on the
flows of skill and knowledge necessary to perform complex activities (Iansiti & Clark,
1994; Piore, et al., March 25, 1997; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992).
For example, Woodward focused on technical complexity, defined as the extent
of mechanization and predictability in a manufacturiIlg process, arid found that mass
production companies tended to be highly differentiated, with extensive formalization
and little delegation of authority, whereas small batch and continuous process firms
17 Defined broadly as the actions, knowledge, and techniques organizations E:mploy to produce theil"
products and services (Galbraith, 1973).
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were structured more loosely (Woodward, 1965). Perrow examined technology along
two dimensioIlS, task variability and problem solving analyzability, and argued that
organizational control and coordination efforts should be based on the degree of
routineness created by the interaction of these two variables (Perrow, 1967). Thompson
developed a typology based on the type of tasks performed in an organization
(mediating, long-linking, and intensive) and proposed that each technology creates a
type of interdependency (pooled, sequential, reciprocal), which in turn requires a
certain kind of coordination and struclural arrangement (Thompson, 1967).
New product development research builds upon this early work. For example,
Dougherty found that one of the biggest barriers to making commercially viable new
products is the linking or integrating of technical and market knowledge across
disparate thought worlds (Dougherty, May 1992). Distributed information and
knowledge therefore create interdependencies based on the need for people to
cOlnmunicate during product design (Smith & Eppinger, December 1994; Wagerman,
1995). Visual representations such as design sketches and product schematics (which
played a prominent role in many of the interdependency examples described under the
translation heading) act as a means of organizing the design process by facilitatulg
discussion and consultation among people at various stages (Henderson, Autumn
1991).
Communication and interaction patterns also arise from the product architecture
(Allen, November 1986; Henderson & Clark, 19IJO). Complex interfaces among the
different product parts necessitate continuous communication among developers
because interfaces can evolve during implementation of the design (Cusumano & Selb}",
1995). Ulrich and Eppinger distinguish between those interactions that correspond to
lines connecting physical parts on a product schematic and those that arise incidentally
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due to a particular physical allocation and structure, concepts similar to the hidden
tertiary cluster uncovered in this analysis (Ulrich & Eppinger, 1995).
Breaking the product into components also leads to interdependencies of actions
such that team members must perform certain acts in order for other members to do
their work (Wagerman, 1995). For example, changing functionality in on~ component
often requires making corresponding changes in other parta of the system; certain tests
cannot be run until all of the components are integrated together.
System of Use Interdependencies
Overview
Products must eventually operate in a heterogeneous real world envirorunent,
which consists of both other technologies and product users with distinct preferences
and habitual ways of behaving. For example, in order to function effectively, software
products need to be compatible with other hardware and software layered above and
below titem as well as with peripheral hardware such as printers, device drivers,
phones, and circuit boards. Such relationships are partly due to the larger technical
system architecture in which products reside but can also be an important source of
strategic advantage due to network externalities (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995;
Cusumano, Mylonadis, & Rosenbloom, 1997).
System of Use Interdependencies arise in the form of more refined testing tasks such as
stress: user interface: and performance testing and in the need to develop product
documentation and customized products. The fact that products exist in technical and
user environments which evolve over time also creates a set of interdependencies \vith
past product versions and necessitates tasks such as maintenance and configuration
management. Figure 3.2b is a detailed KJ diagram depicting examples of the secondary
/'
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and tertiary types uncovered within this category. System of Use Interdependencies
accounted for 20% of the examples (Table 3.4)
Secondary and Tertiary Types
Technical COf.tlpatibility Interdependencies. System of Use Interdependencies
created because the software product exists in a larger system architecture of other
hardware and software products were labeled technical compatibility. Figures 3.3 and
3.4 show the technical architecture of a PC software and telecommunications system,
respectively. Note the inherent "nested" nature of such systerns (Christensen &
Rosenbloom, 1995). Products that were previously shown to have a complex internal
definition and structure also act like components in systems at higher and lower levels.
Thus, an operating system like Network must be compatible with the hardware
platform below it and with PC applications like Desk or Data, which call functions in
the operating system layer. Telecommunications products, likewise, exist within a
layered architecture of call processing software, operating software, and hard'ware.
These technical relationships have implications at the task level.
FIGURE 3.3
PC SOFIWARE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
FEAlURE, FUNCTION, & CAPABILITY LAYER Application products
(software used to perform particular tasks or
activities)
SYSTEM OPERATIONS LAYER Operating System products
(software that controls operations of the technical
system)
KERNEL OR BASE LAYER Operating System and Networking
(software that interfaces between other software and products
hardware)
HARDWARE LAYER Intel, MIPS, Alpha, and Power PC
Chips
Printers and Peripheral Devices
95
FIGURE 3.4
TELECOMMUNICAnONS SYSTEM ARCHITEcruRE
FEATURE, FUNCI10N, & CAPABILITY LAYER Call Processing Products
(software used to perform particular tasks or
activities)
SYS·fEM OPERAnONS LAYER System Maintenance and Integrit)·
(software that controls operations of the technical Products
system)
KERNEL OR BASE LAYER Operating System for Distributed
(software that interfaces between other software and Switching
hardware)
HARDWARE LAYEK 3B20,3B21 processors
Wireless phones and periphals
For example, Network runs on four hardware platforms (Intel, Mips, Alpha and
Power PC) and supports hundreds of applications. This creates the need to test
multiple interfaces:
The testing matrix is just horrendous. To do a full test run of Tier 1
applications on one platform alone can take two weeks. And each
platform may have its own issues and require its own changes.
One Network team member described how a single code change could easily
t'
expand into many tasks due to these interdependencies:
Changing one line of code may require hundreds of tests on different
machines and applications. Maybe 100 applications across 4 platforms.
So delivery is gated by the need to test and be compatible with [all those
combinations].
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:FIGURE 3.2b
DETAILED KJ DIAGRAM: System of Use Interdependencies
Technical Compatibility Interdependencies ~
software system architect-dIe
/ If!ft~T~".ft .,..nft'lft~";hilitv
Desk has a dependency on the base operating "
'ystem. As the operating system changes, it can
ttToduce new bugs or change the status offixedugs. That adds cycles to ourfix and regressrocesses
A key to Network's success in the market is
getting applications to run well on Network.
That means tlrat we need to tell apps how to
test on Network and work with them to resolve
issues
"""
hardware compatibility ~
~
Network runs on 4 hardware platforms, so the tesH1g
matrix is just horrendous. Changing one line ofco~e 71Ja~
require hundreds of tests on different on different
machines and applications. To do afull test run of Jfierl1
apps on one platform can take 2 weeks
The software program continually accesses
the database to see u'hat it should be
doing... Changes in code lead to changes in
data, sort of like a tail
bat!1cward .. ,t1hilitv
'Testing the code depends Ort having access to
the actual hardware mobile phone unit
~
..J
The Bac1crvard Compatibility-Rule says that
who ever is out the door first gets supported
byfollowers. 50 if'wefind a bug in a product
that has already shipped, we have to work
around it. That can cause some hair raising
issues!
\.., .. f' ~
User Compatibility Interdependencies
testing compatibility
CUbiomers require the phone system to be extreriU!lyfault tolerant, so we
hae to perform stability tests :hich are basically 12-15 hours of testing
under heavy calling conditions
User interface testin,'l is responsible for the look and feel of the product. It
depends on khou,ing ~ model or spec in which the code will 1Je used. If
someone changes the spec at the last minute, we need to know about it
One set7Jfftiis m~y get distributed to [20
translators in different countries], so you can
get cascading changes. Each change is
multiplied by 20 and ali will lutve unique
problems
A
backward compatibility
Ifwe ddd functionality in patches
we end up rvifh 'this only ",ns on
release 3.0 with patch #7'
tihilitv'I •I-'!"I"~ r-d I.JI II 11.- ..
~
""'"
When the development schedule slips or they make
schedule swaps ... certain he!p topics may not get eione
Creating docum~tatzon depends on :he development
0,,(certain authoring and database tools
e,0cu71umtation depends on knowing the product spec
~ . -
V documentation/assistance
eve!opment ofa document is a very linear process.
e aTe a series ofspecialized tasks like write, edit,
oafetc. that aTe performed by inditiduals who ail
.ark on the same piece along the way to its finished
fate
. en developers change code it means that changes
beed to be made in all forms of the documentation. but
he CD can usually accept changes after the book goes
a print
ISimilarly, telecommunications software needs to operate with certain hardware
peripherals. III the case of Handphone, a key piece of interfacing hardware was the
mobile phone:
Development and testing depend on having access to the mobile phone.
Writing code is not the big deal. [Coordinating development and] testing
with equipment is the gating factor.... It takes a long time to run through
all the cases... and you can end up taking multiple ste.ps backward .u when
code changes.
Code changes can also break functionality in other related products due to
calling relationships between system layers. For example, two Desk team members
recalled the impact of a Network code change:
One directory in the Network registry that stored a lot of stt~ffVJasn't
protected. When Network protected it, the applications broke because we
were assuming we had access to it.
It introduced new bugs and changed the status of fixed bugs, which
added cycles to the bug fixing and regression testing processes.
Although product teams usually try to specify such interfaces in advance, the
implementation process inevitable reveals errors of both commission and omission, as
noted by one developer at Microsoft:
[Interfaces with applications] are sometimes not discovered until during
implementation. For example, the developer working on backup will
realize that in order to backup structured storage in a linear format, he has
to provide an interface.
Two interesting aspects of technical compatibility interdependencies are evident
in many of the examples. First, interdependency among products (and therefore tasks)
was not strictly driven by the existence of a technical interfac~; product strategy also
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played a role. For example, Network has a technical interface with hard\'lare below it,
but the decision to be compatible "vith four different hardware platforms was a strategic
choice made by the team leaders. Similarly, Network can operate without Desk, and
bugs in Desk code will (usually) not break Network functionality, yet Network is
strategically dependent on Desk, as explained by one team member:
Strategically, it is really important for Network to support Desk. A key to
Network's success in the market is getting applications to run well on
Network. That means that [we] need to tell [people in Desk] how to test
on Network, motivate them to do so, and work with them to resolve
issues.
Second, there is a strong temporal theme running through many of the examples,
suggesting that technical compatibility interdependencies evolve over time. Earlier we
saw instances in which mid-cycle implementation changes altered the system of use
environment. Products also enter the market at different times, cre.ating precedents that
extend longimdinally:
The 'backward compatibility rule' says that who ever is out the door first
gets supported by followers. So if Desk finds a bug in Network after
Network has shipped, we have to work around it. That can create some
hair-raising issues!
User Compatibility InterdependencieSt Products also need to be compatible with
particular aspects of their l\Se environment. For example, customers or users may
require a certain quality or performance level or a particular user interface. This
necessitates performing more refined testing tasks such as stress and user interface
testing, as in the following example:
One feature of Desk is an etcher that provides the means to draw free
forms on the screen. User interface testing depends on the specification
because we are responsible for the look and feel of that feature. User
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interface testers also donlt write code, so we depend on other testers [to
write the tests].
Most customers also require some level of assistance or documentation about
how to use a product.18 In PC software products, documentation takes the form of
printed or compact disc (CD) manuals or on-line help features. Thus, an additional set
of tasks arises related to developing those documentation and assistance artifacts.
Many of these tasks are themselves interdependent, and each must be integrated with
existing tasks such as specification, development, and testing.
Producing documentation can be broken down into a series of sub-tasks which
are sequentially interdependent. For example, one starts by sketching out a design of
the document (what types of information will be provided and how it will be organized
into chapters and sections, what figures and diagrams will be used, the font, etc.),
followed by the actual writing, editing, and proofing tasks. Eventually, the document is
printed as a paper manual or copied onto CDs.
Yet because the documentation artifacts must reflect the software code, there is
also an interdependency between the specification and writing of code and the
specification and writing of the documentation:
Documentation depends on program managers, developers, and testers
for change reporting of [the specification and] software files.
Development is very problematic for us. When their schedule slips, we
are usually not taken into consideration. When they make schedule
swaps, it can affect us. For example, certain help topics may not get done.
18 Customer service and support activities such as field representatives and telephone help lines might
also be included in the user compatibility category. They do not playa prominent role here primarily
because the interview sample did not include people perfonning such tasks.
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Writing documentation also requires the development of certain authoring and
database tools, pieces of software that are usually written by developers.
The examples suggested several reasons why coordinating the development-
documentation interdependency is often problematic. First, as was also the case in
hardware testing, each code change necessitates making many changes to different
forms of documentation (e.g., manuals, CDs, on-line features). This can lead to
inconsistencies, as in the following example:
The Desk manual had already gone to print. ""e had to pull a topic from
the manual because a feature didn't work the way it was described, but
the people working on the CD version were able to respond and correct
the change.
Second, documentation tasks usually face certain constraints imposed by
downstream activities that are less of a factor in code development. For example, it is
usually necessary to fix certain things in the documentation like index formatting, page
numbers, and page breaks relatively early in the process in order to coordinate with
printing and manufacturing (shrink wrapping for software products). Developers face
no such constraint, however, and often make code changes which require adjusting
these elements. Thus "a lot of changes that are significant from a documentation
perspective are considered so trivial that they donet even show up to developers. II
Finally, software code and documentation are literally written in different
languages (programming languages such as COBOL or C++ and the language of the
customer, respectively). As a result, developers and documenters tend to partition their
tasks differently, rendering their subsequent integration difficult:
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Documenters write about features from a user's perspective, how a user
sees it. Developers work on features in terms of pieces of a code module.
So a developer may partition the coding of a toolbar across severdl
milestones, meaning that it can't be documented until the very elld of the
cycle.
A final tertiary-level cluster under the user compatibility heading reflects the
need to tailor the software product for different customer or geographic markets. Like
integrating development and documentation, coordinating different versions of a
software product is complicated due to expanding (and inconsistent) change
implications across different versions, unequal downstream constraints, and different
partitioning schemes.
For example, Microsoft translates the English version of its Desk product into
approximately twenty foreign languages, a process referred to within the company as
localization. Each change to the English software code or docwnent, therefore, explodes
into a set of changes across multiple product versions:
During localization, one set of files may get distributed to twenty people
[in different countries.] So you can get cascading changes. Each change is
multiplied by twenty, and all twenty will have unique problems with
those files and changes.
The Tollphone project at Lucent likewise produces software products for
different geographic markets. Because telecommunications products are usually
customized to specific user requirements and settings, different versiorlS of the product
can end up having slightly different features and fixes, which COIIlplicates the
performance of testing tasks:
There are different streams [versions of the software for particular
customers and countries]. Each potentially has its own unique set of
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software. So you can go h"1to the lab and not be able to find a bug or not
get the reaction you expect because you're running the wrong software.
Finally, like the cluster of technical compatibility interdependencies, user
compatibility interdependencies exist within a temporal frame. Because customer lleeds
evolve over time, most companies produce a series of product version releases over
time and may need (or choose) to maintain forward compatibility (in which past
features and functions are migrated or replicated in current product versiol1S) or
backward compatibility (in which new features must be consistent with past
functionality and user routines). This is reflected at the task level in, among other
things, the addition of new tasks such as maintenailCe of products in the field,
configuration management, aIld mapping of changes forward and backward in time
(for examples of the latter from the Autophone project, see Figure 3.2b).
In summary, System of Use Interdependencies can be broken down into two
major sub-types, technical compatibility interdependencies and user compatibility
interdependencies, corresponding to the external technical and user envirOllffient,
respectively. Certain themes carry through from the results reported under the Product
Definition and Architecture heading. In particular, the examples illustrated how the
addition of new types of interdependency both refined existing tasks (e.g., testing broke
down into stress, user interface, performance, etc.) and necessitated n.ew ones (e.g.,
documentation, maintenance, configuration management). We also saw evidence of
similar interdependency task structures (e.g., sequential structures in documentation,
cascade patterns set off by changing a core component or product version) and a strong
dynamic (temporal) effect.
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Linkage to the Literature
The idea that products are systems comprised of components which relate to
each other in a designed architecture, is an established concept itl studies of innovation
(Alexander, 1964; Simon, December 1962). More recently, some scholars have pointed
out that an end-product can also be viewed as a component, which relates to other
products within an architecture defined by users and competitors. Christensen and
Rosenbloom label such nested commercial systems a value network and provide
illustrations within the context of management information systems (Christensen &
Rosenbloom, 1995). Cusumano and Selby discuss the implication') of similar networks
of prodt~cts for competition and strategy in the PC software industry (Cusumano &
SelbYJ 1995).
These authors and others point out that such networks are not static structures
but can in fact be highly dynamic. For example, the work on technological history and
the interpretive analyses of Rosenberg (Rosenberg, 1982), Clark (Clark, 1985) and
Cusumano et al. (Cusl1mano, et aI.1 1997) illustrate how technical designs tend to bllild
upon one another and influence the direction of industry evolution. The present
analysis complements this work by describing the impact of design hierarchies and path
dependency on task coordination for a given project.
Research demonstrating the importance of achieving customer compatibility, and
the role of customers and users in the innovation process,likewise has a long history.
Some authors discuss the importance of effective strategic management of a core
product and its derivative products (Clark, Chew, & Fujimoto, 1987; Clark & Fujimoto,
1991; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). Other work focuses on the interface between
development and marketing (Griffin & Hauser, Winter 1993) or manufacturing (Adler,
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March-April 1995) functions. Coordinating development with documentation has
receive{l less attention, but studies do exist (Sitkin, 1996).
Finally, the special requirements of interdependency management in high risk
industries such as nuclear power (Perrow, 1984) and navigation (Hutchins, 1990;
Perrow, 1984; Weick & Roberts, 1993) is receiving a great deal of attention.
TechnolQgy Sharins Interdependencies
Overviezv
More and more firms today are grappling with the challenge of managing
concurrent, overlapping, or consecutive project efforts in \vhich the products constitute
some type of product platform or family (Meyer & Lehnerd, 1997; Meyer & Utterback,
Spring 1993; Nobeoka & Cusumano, November 1995). One· result of this trend is that
product teams face a dual challenge. Not only must they coordinate their own project's
activities; often those activities need to collaborate and coordinate with bundles of semi-
autonomous but interdependent activities in other projects within the firm.
Technology Sharing Interdependencies arise when two or more projects are
trying to design, develop, or use common features, components or subsystems (200/0 of
the examples, see Table 3.4). Such sharing creates a complicated set of task
relationships such that the specification, design, development, testing, and
documenting of the shared piece for one project become interdependent with the same
tasks on another project. Allocating components across people and projects, therefore,
adds a work flow dimension to previous task relationships and necessitates new
activities such as project management and scheduling. As shown in the detailed KJ
diagram presented in Figure 3.2c, sharing technologies yielded two secondary clusters
of interdependency/labeled direct and indirect, and discussed below.
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FIGURE3.2c
DETAILED KJ DIAGRAM: Technology Sharing Interdependen~ies
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Secondary and Tertiary Types
Direct Technology Sharing Interdependencies. In firms which produce multiple
products, different software projects tlsually share access to certain common modules or
files such as libraries or header records. As noted by a Network developer, "This creates
a direct dependency from a coding sense. People depend on header files or libraries in
one project in order to complete a compile. Or one project needs a library built on
another project.n
This type of "common file touching" is extremely high in some projects at Lucent,
where the code has not been completely modularized into independent objects. As a
result, seemingly minor code changes on one project routinely break functionality
elsewhere, even on seemingly wuelated projects:
Another project put a brand new chunk of software in that changed a very
central file everyone was dependent on. It caused Handphone to break
disastrously and took us one week to recover.
The first time we submitted code, it immediately broke several other ...
projects. In fact, five Handphone deveiopers all broke other projects in
different places. It had a global impact and stopped everything.
A recent Tollphone product was an enhancement for automatic collect
calling ... It was originally thought to be a relatively sinlple feature with a
narrow interface ... Then we discovered that we had to add data to a file.
The file the developer touched was sequential, not modular, and a
developer working on an Australian wireless product touched the same
file ... We had a whole bunch of experts trying to break the dependency,
but we were unable to do it. That was one line of changed code, but we
had to pull in all the Australian development for the Tollphone
integration. What should have been a five subsystem product became
twenty nine subsystems.
Another cluster of examples involved two or more projects collaborating over the
design and/or development of a common feature. Sometimes the shared feature
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existed previously in one or both of the products; other times it represented a brand
new feature. For example, Network and another major operating system at Microsoft
share certain features such as the Software Development Kit, Win Help, TCP lIP (a
telecommunications protocol), and the printing interface. One team is usually primarily
responsible for specifying and designing the feature, but they incorporate comments
and feedback from developers and testers on the other team. The sharing is
complicated, however, because the quality and feature considerations for the two
products are con\pletely different. This creates conflicts between the teams and often
adds cycles to existing development tasks, as shown in the following example:
Network is porting the [other operating system's] printing interface as a
baseline, but we will add some advanced capabilities to it in order to
support extensions that Network customers demand.
Several examples showed how the existence of separate products with different
historical code bases and (perceived) users complicates the coordination of tasks (for
developing both code and documentation):
[Application 1] and [application 2] have different historical code bases,
which complicates feature sharing. For exanlple, ghosting is a feature that
takes the user to a place in the product when they perform a search. If
that place is not on the screen, [the applications] implement different
solutions.... Whose version should be the shared one?
The old Desk document consisted of 1 or 5 books [one for each
application]. The new r::odel is one [shared] manual. The document
groups therefore had to agree on goals, processes and tools. Data resisted
the less information model because their customers are power users who
can't get enough information. [Another application team] argued that a
big window with lots of information covered up the toolbar, whicll their
customers use a lot.
Sharing features can also create dual or overlapping testing responsibilities
because bugs often exist at the intersection of two or more pieces of code. In the case of
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Desk, this led to "bugs shuttling back and forth across the grol1ps ... A bug originally
reported by [one application] was assigned to [another] and then passed back to [the
first]." One Desk tester labeled that bOtmcing "a symptom of our interdependence." At
Lucent, a Handphone tester described the testing implications of shared subsystems in a
similar manner:
At the interface, it is very hard to see whose problem it is. I do as much as
I can on my side to identify if it is my problem, but then I need the other
side to do things. We work back and forth until we narrow it down and
decide who should fix it.
Teams sharing components also need to coordinate regarding the prioritization
of bug fixing.
Components can also be shared across versions of the same product. In this case,
the users tend to be the same, but the scheduling of tasks can be problematic:
[One Desk application] currently has a feature which enables users to type
words within a box~ Now [we are] replacing that drawn object code with'
[new] code. The next version of [the application] will include a new
feature to link boxes. The developer working on the linking code needs to
know 'what can I touch'?
A new feature is going into the next release of Network. It depends on
functionality that was originally not scheduled until very late in the cycle
of the current release.
The schedule coordination task at Microsoft was usually assumed by a lead
program manager. This person was also responsible for assuring design consistency
across the components being supplied by different groups:
As program manager, I need to coordinate the actual delivery of all the
tools and features or files that go in the Desk box. We need certain pieces
by a certain date ... and they all need to get to the same place at the same
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time.... There are a whole set of design interdependencies in Desk. We
need to achieve consistency, a single vision or user inteiface across all of
these components and groups.... [Application 1] might have [component]
version 1.0 but [application 2] uses 2.0. This creates a complication
because if [application 2] is installed after [application 1], [application 1]
might not work.
One solution companies frequently adopt for managing widely shared
technologies is to assign a dedicated component team.19 For example, about twenty
application products in Microsoft depend on a dedicated team fc~r the one component.
At Lucent, certain key subsystems such as Recent Change/Data and Peripheral Control
are pruduced in departments that support multiple projects simultaneously. Under
these circumstances, shared technical interdependencies involve not just two teams but
many, and the structure of the tasks is mutual or pooled, not reciprocal.
For example, Data faced the difficult situation of being both a heavy component
user and a component supplier; it depended on four external teams for critical
component technology and was a component supplier to Desk because it shipped as
part of the Desk box. The multiple task interdependencies across components and
teams rendered integrating the product a major challenge:
The X component depends on the Y component for some things and vice
versa. They use each others technology, so they need to synchronize
[integration] to get a running and testable exe. Add five components, two
shells, and six teams and watch the debates about how to make that
happen.
The Y component hosts into several prodttcts including Data, Desk, [and
two other products]. They all have conflicting client needs and schedules.
Each has a differellt set of interfaces and tends to apply different
requirements to the component because they have different end users. Or
iJ This sub-type is also discussed under the Shared Resource heading because it yields task
interdependencies created by limited time and attention on the component team.
110
one wants something now but we can't deliver because of [other]
demands to be met.
On the Desk project at Microsoft, which had about forty components being
developed elsewhere in the company, one developer defined a component supplier as
Ira dependency created because some line of code is being written by someone not
sitting in this hall. II An example was the setup component: "Every day, one guy in
[application 1] runs the setup software, notes the problems and talks in detail with the
developer supplying it."
Because components ale arranged hierarchically, developers and testers working
on one component can find themselves needing to interact with their counterparts
working on other components only indirectly related to their own, as evidenced in the
following example:
[Application 1] is dependent on X. X depends on [another component].
Therefore [application 1] is dependent on [the componellt]. We don't even
know these people but we need their help in finding bugs.
Indirect TechnQlogy Sharing Interdependencies. The abO\Te section described
how the desire to share certain technologies can create linkages among the design,
development, testing, and documentation tasks across different projects in a company_
Recall that the code design and development tasks and the documentation tasks are also
interdependent (System of Use). Sharing technologies, therefore, also has indirect
implications for the interdependence between development and documentav.on as well
as between development and product release, both of which are described below.
Contention about the design and development of shared features can result in
increased blocking and waiting times for certain d.ocumentation tasks. Writing about a
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particular feature may be delayed while designers from different projects try to resolve
their disagreements. This was most notable on the Desk project, as described by one
documenter:
Contention between [two applications] affects [us]. We wait due to the
uncertainty or end up doing needless work.
This "needless work" appeared in a variety of ways. For example, documenters
described how their tasks tended to be characterized by high degrees of rework because
feature sharing decisions were often reversed or altered mid-eycle. In other e'~(amples,
documenters faced the problem of how to write about a feature that worked differently
across the application products. Inconsistent functionality also showed up in testing as
bugs where code failed to perform as expected.
The examples also illustrated how sharing the design and development of
components can have significant implications for the shipment of the product. As
multiple products depend on one another (either directly or through their mutual
dependence on a common component team), product gridlock often occurs. The
probability of missing a shipping deadline therefore tends to increase with the level of
sharing, according to the team members interviewed. This is best illustrated by an
example from Data:
One reason Data96 doesn't exist is due to interdependencies. [What is
today Data97] was originally scheduled to ship in September 1996, but no
one had any confidence this would happen because of all the components
and shared dependencies ... Some of the teams they were relying on for
components were doing work for other projects and slipping. So we
moved Data to 1997.
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In summary, Technology Sharing Interdependencies fall into two major
secondary categories. First, sharing components across projects creates sequential,
reciprocal, or mutual (in the case of a dedicated component team) interdependency
among tasks across projects in the firm. These interdependencies in turn alter the
relationship with certain existing interdependencies and downstream activities, a
second category labeled indirect interdependencies here.
Linkage to the Literature
Although studies of new product development have traditionally focused on
how to achieve speed and productivity on an individual project, the perspective of
multi- yroject management is receiving increased attention from both managers and
scholars. Researchers point out that firms gain certain strategic and productivity
advantages from having consistency across products (Meyer & Lehnerd, 1997; Meyer &
Utterback, Spring 1993). In particular, user interface commonality and COIlSistency can
be a source of strategic market advantage insofar as they increase the probability of
"locking in" customers to a particular standard of use (Cusumano & Selby, 1995)
Common or shared development can also be more efficient than having the same tasks
replicated across the company and often pennits task specialization (Hayes & Clark,
1985).
This literature tends to highlight two major multi-project strategies (Nobeoka &
Cusumano, November 1995). First, firms can use technologies from an existing product
with some modification or enhancement in a redesign of the same product. Firms can
also share the technology across product lines that target different market segments,
commonly referred to as an economy of scope or leverage strategy (Clark & Fujimoto,
1989).
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Empirical research that systematically explores how firms can actually achieve
such sharing is only now emerging. For example, Nobeoka and Cusumano disCllSS
ways of managing evolutionary linkages among products (Nobeoka & Cusumano,
November 1995). Their survey results indicated that projects using a rapid design
transfer strategy are the most efficient in terms of engineering hours. Earlier,
Cusumano argued that reusing existing designs in new software development without
appropriate planning may have a negative impact on development productivity and
quality (Cusumano, 1991). Sanderson demonstrated how Sony used product families to
manage change across product generations (Sanderson & Uzumeri, 1990). Brown and
Eisenhardt suggest some remedies for leverage "traps" that projects commonly fall into
(Brown & Eisenhardt, May 1995).
March and Simon observed that interdependence is one of the conditions
necessary for inter group conflict (March & Simon, 1958).
Resource SharinG Interdependencies
Overview
The final type of interdependency identified in the examples reflects the fact that
tasks exist within a context of limited resources. The execution of various tasks can,
therefore, become mutually interdependent as people vie for access to or use of physical
resources like special equipment, laboratory testing facilities, or meeting rooms.
Similarly, human beings have a limited resource of time and attention to devote to
different tasks.
Resource Sharing Interdependencies clustered into two secondary types, capital
resource sharing and time and attention resource sharing (Figure 3.2d), and accounted
for slightly more than one quarter (26%) of the examples (Table 3.4).
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FlGURE3.2d
DETAILED KJ DIAGRAM: Resource Sharing Interdependencies
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Secondary and Tertiary Types
Shared Capital Interdependencie~. Shared capital interdependencies arise when
two or more tasks (on the same or different projects and performed by one or more
people) depend on access to a capital-intensive resource such as equipment or space.
This type of interdependency arises because firms have a limited supply of capital,
which must be allocated across multiple projects and needs. Thus, the more capital
spent on special equipment for one project, the less money exists for equipment
elsewhere in the firm; money spent on labs is not available for other types of space or
equipment.
The implications of this type of sharing were particularly prominent at Lucent,
which has experienced several rounds of down sizing and cost cutting over the last
several years. As a result, the performance of certain key tasks was often significantly
delayed or blocked on the projects.
For example, large software projects usually require special laboratory testing
facilities, which simulate the actual working envirolunent of the software product.
Because these labs are typically very expensive (approximately $2-5 million each at
Lucent), multiple projects share access to them. There are six testing labs at Lucent's
Naperville location (the site of this study), that are widely shared across the firm by
international and domestic projects as well as field support organizations. According to
the company's official development process, all regression (feature) testing and some
requirements testing must be performed in a lab. Testers schedl11e their sessions in four
to six hour blocks (twenty four llours a day, seven days a week) but are often blocked
from access by other projects or higher priority field btlg "crises."
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Gaining access is not the only problem resulting from sllaring, however. In
particular, different products require different lab "setups." Testers, therefore, spend a
large part of their valuable session time removing previous test environments and
installing the environment required for their product. If those installation procedures
fail to work (a common occurrence), testing is delayed. The lab facilities also tend to be
a disorganized and distracting work environment, perhaps an inevitable consequence of
their widespread use. These factors, plus the existence of faulty, unreliable equipment
(another consequence of sharing is that equipment tends to wear out quickly), further
complicate and often delay the performance of the testing tasks, as revealed in Figure
3.2d and the following example:
Stability testing needs a very clean system lab, a clean test bed. But it's a
lot harder to have a clean test bed than a clean [real world] system because
you'"e got people in the lab constantly changing things every day.
A more prosaic but nevertheless significant set of examples concerned gaining
access to shared meeting rooms. As task interdependency increases and extends across
people and projects, more meetings are inevitably required in order to coordinate the
work. Meetings require rooms, however, and if the room is not available, the
completion of tasks is delayed. This was a problem at both firms but particularly at
Lucent where the official development process called for extensive design and code
inspection reviews.2o
Finally, the integration of large software products consisting of multiple
components requires very fast (and expensive) computers. If those machines are not
available or are shared by too many projects, the integration task can be blocked or
significantly slowed down.
20 Many of these meetings end up being held in the cafeteria.
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Shared Time & Attention Interdependencies. Another very important limited
resource in companies is human time and attention. People can typically only perform
one task at a time and have a limited cognitive capacity to attend to multiple issues and
problems (Bluedom & Denhardt/ 1988; McGrath, 1990; McGrath, Kelly, & Machatka,
1984; Zerubavel, 1981). Like some physical resources/ time and attention also tend to
deteriorate over time if they are not occasionally replenished or renewed. The result
can be various forms of task interference, where the performance of one task occurs at
the expense or to the detriment of others.
For example, more and more firms are attempting to shorten development cycles.
But the more intensely people work on the final tasks for one product, the less energy
(immediately) available to start working on start-up tasks for the next release:
User interface testers often need API testers to stay on and find/fix bugs
in the test application code. But the Desk API testing team is usually
ramping up at that point [for the next version of Desk].
A Desk developer programmed the main engine for [a feature] in Desk95.
Later, there were bugs in it/ but the developer had started working on
1996 designs. This created a lag of 1.5 - 2 months for documentation.
Similarly, developers who are responsible for both current implementation and
maintenance can find themselves unable to focus on current tasks because of past
project demands.
The Technology Sharing section described how one popular approach to sharing
components assigns development of such to a dedicated component team. Multiple
projects then depend on the limited time and attention of these team members,
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however, as evidenced in Figure 3,2d. At Lucent, a major inter project blocking factor
was common dependence on a toc)l support organization:
The tool organization is very lean due to cutbacks. They serve a lot of
products, so we have to beat on them in order to get our tools.
Other frequent examples in the data occurred when a single individual was
assigned responsibility for more than one task. For example, on the Network project,
people working on product integration were responsible for both the daily integration
of files and components and the solving of unanticipated problems and requests from
developers. The integration lead on the team described the effect of trying to perform
thes~ hvo tasks simultaneously:
The [integration] process is very manual and hardware intensive. It
requires a certain amount of time and close attention from the [people
performing it]. Developers also depend on integrators to handle
unanticipated requests and problems like accepting bug fixes.... We found
that the [integrators] would come in at 9AM and just go crazy all day long.
We used a white board and then a pad of paper to track the backlog of
unanticipated requests, but they could never catch up ... and \vere burned
out and stressed. So they never had time to actually integrate the product
[or were careless and distracted when doing it].
Program managers were similarly overloaded; the task of scheduling multiple
components often overwhelmed their ability to perform certain design tasks. Team
leads at both companies, who must typically juggle mentoring, advising, and reviewing
responsibilities, also supplied a large number of the examples under this category.
The examples suggest several interesting characteristics of Shared Resource
Interdependencies. First, like Shared Technology relationships, sharing resources has
important affective and work satisfaction implications. In the case of Tech..,ology
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Sharing, the result was inter-group conflict. For Resource Sharing, it took the form of
frustration and apathy.
For example, highly experienced engineers and designers at Lucent often spent
the vast majority of their day trying to arrange rooms for meetings or negotiate access to
a computer queue or laboratory. At Microsoft, as the level of component and design
sharing increased, leads and program managers found themselves devoting more and
more of their time to meetings and communication with their counterparts across the
firm. Many of the people interviewed resented the amount of time spent coordinating
with others or negotiating access to limited resources. They believed it wasn't
"productive work" like writing code or documents and felt ineffective when it interfered
with their ability to accomplish those tasks.
The second interesting aspect of Shared Resource Interdependencies was the fact
that they often arose as almost art unintended consequence of incremental decisions
made at a firm-level. A series of decisions aimed at cost cutting at Lucent resulted in
minimum support staff and decentralization of tasks such as reserving rooms or
scheduling meetings. At Microsoft, experienced project members described how their
responsibilities had gradually expanded as the firm grew rapidly in size and altered its
strategy from single products to integrated ones.
Linkage to the Literature
A large body of studies adhering to the resource dependence view indicate that
frequent external communication leads to higher perfonning development projects by
increasing the resources (e.g., budget, personnel, equipment) available to the team
(Brown & Eisenhardt, April 1995). Ancona and Caldwell identified a special boundary
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spanning role, ambassador, which consisted of political activities such as lobbying for
support and resources (Ancona & Caldwell, 1990).
Salancik and Pfeffer distinguish between tangible resources (money, space) and
intangible resources (time, social currency) and discuss the implications of resource
control and interdependency for power and conflict within an organization (Salancik &
Pfeffer, 1974). More recent work by Malone and Crowston builds upon the
tangible/intangible distinction (Malone & Crowston, March 1994).
Perlow specifically addresses the work and individual effects of the "time
famine" in product development and organizations more generally (Perlow, 1995).
3.4 Quantitative Analysis of Interdependency Types
Table 3.4 sho\vs how the interdependency examples were distributed across the
four primary categories. Most examples (33%) fell into the Product Definition and
Architecture cluster, probably a reflection of the large number of developers and
designers in the interview sample. Somewhat more surprising was the frequency of
Shared Resource Interdependency examples (26%). Virtually every person interviewed
supplied examples under this heading, although the distribution of the secondary types
differed across the firms. Lucent projects tended to cite more shared capital exarrlples.
These results suggested analyzing the distribution of types along three additional
dimensions: firm, project, and functional area of the interview subject.
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TABLE 3.4
DIS1'RIBUTION OF EXAMPLES BY PRIMARY INTERDEPENDENCY TYPE
Frequency Percentage of
Counts Total
Product Definition & 175 330/0
Architecture Interdependencies
System of Use Interdependencies 103 20%
Technology Sharing 110 21%
Interdependencies
Resource Sharing 139 26%
Interdependencies
TOTAL 527 100%
Table 3.5 presents the distribution of types by company. As revealed in the
second and fourth lines of the table, the percentage of examples in the System of Use
and Resource Sharing categories are approximately the same at the two sites, at about
200/0 and 25%-28%, respectively. In contrast, the Product Definition and Architecture
and Technology Sharing categories diverge shatply. Almost one-half of the examples
from projects at Lucent were Product Definition and Architecture (48%), while only 5%
related to Technology Sharing. The two categories were more evenly divided at
Microsoft, and the Technology Sharing category led with 340/0 of the examples
Several possible factors may account for this difference in results. First, the two
categories may be confounded due to an inability to operationally distinguish them.
This explanation does not account for the different direction of the results, however.21
An alternative explanation reflects the firms' histories. At Lucent, products were
21 In order to get this pattern of results, the analyst would have to confound the two categories
inconsistently across the two firms.
122
originally designed to be sold as part of a telecommunications system ''black box. It
Shared components and subsystems are thus almost an inevitable and implicit part of
such an integral architecture. At Microsoft, the situation is reversed. Formerly
independent products are now becoming more system-like by sharing components and
features. Note that if we sum examples across Product Definition and Architecture and
Technology Sharing, the percentages at each firm are nearly the same (55% and 53%,
respectively).
TABLE 3.5
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERDEPENDENCY TYPES BY COMPANY
Microsoft Lucent
Technologies
Product Definition & Architecture 61 (21%) 114 (480/0)
Interdependencies
System of Use Interdependencies 57 (20%) 46 (19%)
Technology Sharing Interdependencies 97 (340/0) 13 (5%)
Resource Sharing Interdependencies 72 (250/0) 67 (28%)
TOTAL 287 (1000/0) 240 (1000/0)
Table 3.6 shows the same distributions by project. First, note that on Network
(column 2), Product Definition and Architecture account for the greatest percentage of
the examples (340/0). This result supports the explanation given above about the
influence of a prior architecture. Network is a system-like product and thus many of
the Technology Sharing relations will be implicit in its architecture. There are still a
sizable number of examples in the Technology Sharing category (25%) because Network
was sharing components with another operatin.g system during the time of this study.
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As indicated by a star in colttmns 2 and 3 of the table, the most frequently cited
examples in Desk and Data fell into the Technology Sharing category. On Desk, five
applications teams and a Desk team were attempting to share components and features.
The level of feature and component ~haringvias even higher on Data and is reflected in
a correspondingly higher percentage (47%).
Several cells of Table 3.6 also stand out for the surprisingly low incidence of
examples (e.g., 9% System of Use on Data, 120/0 System of Use on Handphone and 00/0
Technology Sharing on Autophone). These results are most likely an artifact of the
interview sample and process. For example, te 'ters and documenters (who are most
likely tn cite System of Use Interdependencies, as shown below) constituted a small
fraction of the interview sample on Data. The interviews were also of limited duration,
and people tended to begin with and spend the most time talking about the types of
interdependencies that were most prominent in their minds.
Table 3.7 shows the top citation category for five different functional areas.
Developers tended to focus on the implications of Product Definition and Architecture
Interdependencies. Program managers and designers, who are usually responsible for
coordinating tasks, schedules, and designs across projects, cited more examples of
Technology Sharing Interdependencies than any other category. Testers and
documenters, whose work is closest to the boundary between the produ.ct and the
external environment, yielded numerous examples of System of Use int.erdependence.
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TABLE 3.6
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERDEPENDENCY TYPES BY PROJECT
Network Desk Da!a I Handphone Tol1phone Autophone
Product Definition & 27 (34% )* 25 (170/0) 9 (160/0) I 48 (51%)* 29 (39%)* 37 (530/0)*
Architecture
Interdependencies
System of Use 14 (18%) 38 (250/0) 5 (9~/o) I 11 (12%) 16 (210/0) 19 (27%)
Interdependencies
Technology Sharing 20 (250/0) 50 (330/0)* 27(47%)* I 5 (50/0) 8 (11%) o(00/0)
Interdependencies
Resourc2 Sharing 18 (23%) 38 (250/0) 16 (280/0) I 31 (32%) 22 (290/0) 14 (200/0)
Interdependencies
TOTAL 79 (100%) 151 (1000/0) 57 (1000/0) 95 (10U% ) 75 (1000/0) 70 (1000/0)
,.. Indicates top citation category in the project (column).
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TABLE 3.7
TOP CITATION CATEGORIES BY FUNCTIONAL AREA OF THE INTERVIEW
SUBJECT
Function Top Citation Category
Designers Shared Technology Interdependencies
Developers Product Definition & Architc~tur~~
Interdependencies
Program Managers Shared Technology hu.crdependencies
Testers System of Use Interdependencies
Documenters System of Use Interdependencies
3.5 Discussion
The previous two sections contained a fairly detailed analysis of different
interdependency types within the context of a particular phenomenon, large scale
software development. This section steps back from that level of detail and makes some
observations about what the results of this analysis tell us more generally about tasks,
interdependency, and organizational structure. It begins, however, by highlighting
some of the limitations of this research.
3.5.1 Limitations of the Study
It is important to stress the limitations of the approach used in this study.
Because the analysis relies on self-reported data, the interdependency examples are not
randomly selected, but rather reflective of the projects and people interviewed. This
was particularly evident in Table 3.7, which showed llow the distribution varied by
functional area of the speaker. The reliance on self-reports also suggests possible biases
due to human cognitive limitations. For example, it is well known that more recent
events tend to be higluy salient (Cook & Campbell, 1979). This may account for the
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preponderance of examples having to do with shipping and releasing a product (most
of the projects were at or near the end of their development cycle when the data was
collected).
The classification proposed here is not intended to be exhaustive but merely
illustrative of important types of interdependency. The ireq'uencies with which
different types were observed (Tables 3.4 - 3.7) may not reflect their actual
representation in the companies or projects.22 Nor are they any indication of the
relative importance of different types. Certainly there are many viable schema but by
identifying some common types and then exploring their implications, it is possible to
begin to go beyond the previous approach of "one interdependency at a time. It
The fact that we see similar types across projects and companies, and that the
percentages are relatively stable once we account for differences in firms, strengthens
the results and supports their internal validity. Subsequent interviews with
experienced pfoduct development managers further suggested that the results have
strong face validity Oudd, Smith/ & Kidder, 1991). The extent to which the taxonomy is
externally valid (generalizable to other companies, projects, and outside the product
development domain) awaits further investigation.
Finally, although the KJ Method is an attempt to introduce some structure to
qualitative analysis, it is not a science. Throughout the extensive analysis period, effort
was made to continually challenge the results and verify that they were consistent with
the knowledge and intuition developed through many hours of interaction with team
members and study of the data. Intra rater and inter rater reliability tests support the
22 For example, representatives from marketing and sales were under-represented in the subject pool.
Although interdependencies involVing marketing tasks do appear in the examples, th~re are undoubtedly
others not captured here.
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stability of the resulthlg taxonomy categories, but there remain questions of how
reliable and repeatable the methodology is.23
This research, however, adds to the store of knowledge about the role of
interdependency in organizations. The findings bear on several issues, including the
relevant dimensions upon which we might characterize interdependencies, the
implications of multiple interdependencies for organizing, and the very relationship
between interdependency arld organizational structure. Each of these is discussed
belo\v..
3.5.2 Additions to Theory
Characterizins Interdependency
This research sought to inductively derive a taxonomy of different types of
interdependency. The analysis suggested that interdependency can be characterized
along three dimensions: the primary decision driver, task structure, and predictability.
Product Definition and Architecture Interdependencies arise due to the need to
translate customer needs into product functions and features in the form of components
and subsystems and can be traced back to the product technology. Systeril of Use
Interdependencies·are primarily driven by the external environment; the product needs
to be compatible with its technical and use environments, necessitating tasks and
interdependencies which span the firm's boundaries. Technology Sharing
Interdependencies reflect a firm's multi-project strategy and structure, in this setting
how project teams share certain components, and create work unit interdependerlcies
within the firm. Finally, Resource Sharing Interdependencies are both an outgrowth of
23 An interesting extension of the process WQuld be to have team members th~mselvesperfonn the
clustering exercise and compare their results to the ones obtained here.
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the structures aJ.ld processes used to coordinate work and influenced by firm-level
physical and human resource policies.24
This multidimensional interdependency taxonomy builds upon and integrates
prior thinking about task relationships. For example, previous researchers have focused
on the influence of technology (Henderson & Clark, 1990), work unit relations (Gresov,
1990), and the environment (Ancona & Caldwell, 1990) on tasks. The present
framework provides a more global and unified approach to interdependency
management because it explicitly considers how these different domains interact at the
task level. The analysis demonstrated how the very addition of more (different)
interdependencies alters the definition of the task set (both refining existing tasks and
necessitating new ones), in effect shifting the basic set of things that need to be
performed and coordinated, and often necessitating a reallocation of tasks. By imposing
successive types of interdependency and then examining or mapping how they get
translated and refined, we can begin to examine how tasks and task rel~.tionshipsgrow
and get more complicated.
This analysis also integrates other conceptualizations of interdependency and
verifies some untested assumptions made by previous scholars. For example, the most
ubiquitous existing interdependency framework is probably that of Thompson
(Thompson, 1967).25 Thompson explicitly wrote that the sequential, pooled, and
reciprocal interdependencies he was describing were driven by the internal technology
(Thompson, 1967). Since then scholars have applied the framework to describe task
24 Of course, in reality these distinctions are rarely so clear and simple. For example, we saw how
strategy also influenced certain System of Use relationships and how the Product Definition and
Architecture and Technology Sharing categories are often very difficult to distinguish.
25 Relative to Thompson·s typology, the present framework can be criticized for its complexity. One
could argue, however, that it is difficult if not impossible to make a parsimonious addition to Thompson's
framework in that he definitively described the ways in which two things can be logically related.
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relationships driven by the environment or strategy, but never questioned the
appropriateness of such extensions. This analysis verified that Thompson's framework
generalizes outside the technology domain but also suggested several possible future
research questions. For example, Thompson proposed that cases of mutual
interdependency are easy to coordinate (relative to more sequential and reciprocal
forms) via standardization because ther~ exists very little contingency, an assumption
schoiars following in this tradition rarely question. The results of this study suggest
otherwise, especially when mutual dependence involves work units.
The predictability dimennion integrates Thompson's work with past and more
recent thinking by other authors. Thompson implicitly assumed that interdependencies
are anticipatable in advance. For example, he defined sequential interdependency as
existing "when direct interdependence can be pinpointed between [tasks], the order of
that interdependence can be specified... and it is not symmetricalu (Thompson, 1967).
March and SimOll, in contrast, observed that:
Interdependency does not by itself cause difficulty if the pattern of
interdependencies is stable and fixed. In this case, each sub program can
be designed to take account of all the sub programs with which it
interacts. Difficulties arise only if program execution rests on
contingencies that cannot be predicted perfectly in advance... We need a
framework that recognizes that the set of activities to be performed is not
[always] given in advance... that one of the very important processes in
organizations is the elaboration of this set (March & Simon, 1958).
More recently, Karl Weick also noted that people increasingly work in a context
of "randomly occurring and unpredictable" events (Weick, 1990).
A multidimensional taxonomy allows for more fine-grained consideration of
appropriate coordination solutions. For example, are sequential interdependencies
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drivenby technology tithe same as" those that are environmentally imposed? There
may be greater lag effects or a higher proportion of the unpredictable sub-class in the
environment domain due to greater uncertainty and more distributed tasks. Where are
there opportunities (and need) to design new solutions (e.g., hidden interdependencies)
or coordinate work more efficiently (e.g., patterns of similar bilateral relations)? WIlY
and how do subjective judgments about interdependency itself vary, as suggested by
the analysis in Section 3.4 as well as previous scholars (March & Simon, 1958)?
The multiple interdependency framework and perspective position us to start
addressing such questions as well as the existence of essential organization c!esign
dilemmas within firms.
Multiple Interdependency challeoses
Under a multiple interdependency perspective, organization design becomes a
process filled with contradictions and dilemmas (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1983). Three
important dilemmas captured in this analysis are balancing the need for (1) part-whole
coordination to avoid organization design conflicts, (2) planned and unplanned
stntcture, and (3) time to coordinate and time to produce.
Looking at interdependencies unidimensionally or in isolation from one another
as previous scholars have done brings with it the risks of mis-applying coordination
solutions or failing to identify more efficient ways to arrange work activities. For
example, researchers in new product development routinely advocate tile use of multi-
functional teams and "frequent and intensive communication and feedback" as a means
of coordinating reciprocal interdependencies (Imai, Nonaka, & Takeuchi, 1985; Weick,
1990; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992). Although such approaches may appear adequate in
terms of addressing the needs of a single type of interdependency, they appear less
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ideal as the number of such interdependencies increases, and team members find
themselves devoting more and more time to coordinating and communicating and less
to production activities.
Managers need to impose organizational structures and processes in advance but
also be responsive to changing contexts and more emergent interdependencies. The
existence of i'hidden" interdependencies was a constant theme in all four primary
categories.
Finally, multiple interdependencies create coordination overload and
inefficiencies. As interdependencies grow and spread throughout an organization, the
task set expands as more tasks are added and existing tasks become more refined. More
and more people (with different perspectives, priorities, and constraints) and work
units become involved, and the associated coordination becomes more complex. The
result can be a vicious spiral in which "the cost of increased coordination is yet further
coordination" (Katz & Kahn, 1966). Or, as one interview subject observed, "the more
interdependencies, the more needs to be done in person. It creates a double bind."
Decisions, Tasks, Interdependency, and Structure
Perhaps the most interesting and provocative result of this study was the
questions it raises and insights it offers about the relationship between and among
decisions, tasks, interdependency, and organizational structure. These concepts are
both frequently confounded (e.g., equating interdependency of components with
interdependency of tasks) or presented as artificially distinct (e.g., we apply structures
to coordinate tasks) in the existing literature. The present analysis suggested that the
relationships are in fact much more complicated.
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For example, contingencies between product components mayor may not be
reflected in similar interdependent relationships at the task level (e.g., sequentially
interfacing components lead to both spquential development tasks and reciprocal
testing tasks). Assigning the components to different developers or repartitioning the
task itself can also transform one type of interdependence into another.
Traditional design literature has largely depicted structure as something
imposed on tasks. That is, given a certain task set, we can design an organization
structure to coordinate work (Galbraith, 1973). Emerging theory suggests ti1.at the two
are hard if not impossible to disentangle because the coordination solutions we impose
often create tasks and interdependencies (Ancona, Kochan, Scully, Van Maanen, &
Westney,1996). Pfhe present analysis lent strong empirical support to that claim.
How do we then distinguish a task from the structur~used to design and
coordinate work? Indeed can we? Figure 3.5 presents a possible model for making
sense of these relations. It suggests that decisions in different areas (product
technology, product environment, work unit environment and strategy, and
organization) result in task interdependencies. In the presence of resource scarcity,
organization design conflicts arise. Projects which recognize such conflicts and employ
strategic organization design principles to resolve them perform better.
3.6 Conclusion
The objective of this study was to break down the "web" of relationships among
tasks in new product development projects into different types or categories of
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interdependency.26 Note the inherent contradiction in that statement. Characterizing
the relationship among tasks as "web-like" suggests a convoluted, inter-woven
structure; the notion of there being distinct, isolatable types is in many ways the direct
antithesis of a web.
Yet conceptually, this juxtaposition is quite significant. On the one hand,
researchers need to come up with more sophisticated ways of depicting task
relationships that reflect the level of complexity found in work such as large scale
product development. We also need to understand some of the larger implications of
managing multiple interdependencies simultaneously, in particular the ways in which
the overall work process becomes more chaotic and unpredictable and the relationship
with firm strategy and structuring over time. Yet in order to design solutions to
coordinate, it is necessary to somehow break apart that complexity. At its heart, this
study is about trying to Wlderstand and tease apart that duality.
26 The metaphor of a web is particularly appropriate and illustrative of some of the gaps in our current
theoretical models. For example, a web connotes the image of a spiral whose ultimate pattern no one
envisioned at the start; i.e., its structure and pattern are evolving and somewhat indeterminate. Yet most
theories of interdependency and organizational design are predicated on the notion that interdependence
is stable and can be identified in advance. Likewise, ecologists who describe rain forests as ecological
webs note that I,ve can plant trees but not forests. They make themselves.' Managers and design
theorists plant tasks and sbuctures, but interdependencies are largely an outgrowth of such decisions.
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CHAPTER IV: WEBS OF INTERDEPENDENCY: STRATEGIES FOR
MANAGING MULTIPLE INTERDEPENDENCIES IN
NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
Using a multiple interdependency perspective as a research lens, this chapter
examines interdependency management in six large scale software development
product teams in two firms. Drawing upon interviews and product and process
documentation, it identifies three strategies for managing multiple interdependencies:
systemic manipulation, constrained systemic manipulation, and local reaction. In this
stlldy, the highest performing projects adopted a systemic manipulation approach in
which they focused on the pattern of interdependencies as a design variable. These
teams made critical up front design decisions (about product technology, product
strategy, and organizational structure) in order to simplify task coordination, prioritized
interdependencies, gained leverage by efficiently perfonning central tasks, and were
aware of the path dependent nature of interdependency~The results suggest that
interdependency management can be viewed as a strategic process variable insofar as
interdependencies are manipulatable through strategy and organizational design. This
flexibility is constrained, however, due to the existence of certain technical and
organizational legacy factors, which tend to embed tasks and task relationships in a
prior history of structure.
4.1 Introduction
Research in strategic design constitutes one of the foundations of management
theory (Ancona, Kochan, Scully, Van Maanen, & Westney, 1996; Burns & Stalker, 1968;
Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Lorsch, 1977; Nadler & Tushman, 1983).
Originally labeled simply "organizational design," this body of work is increasingly
incorporated under the strategic heading as more and more scholars recognize the
importance of linking theories of strategy (what to do) and organization (how to
accomplish it). This theoretical transformation has been accompanied and perhaps
motivated by an increased emphasis within firms on issues associated with execution
and implementation. As a result, both researchers and managers are moving away
from traditional notions of design as simply a form or type of structure and instead
adopting the viewpoint that structure or "structuring" (Eccles & Nohria, 1992) can be a
powerful and malleable tool for achieving strategic advantage.
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Despite this increased emphasis, one of the key concepts underlying theories of
strategic design, interdependency, has attracted relatively little recent empirical or
theoretical attention. As a result, our understanding of design is actually quite limited
and dated. For example, we are still primarily drawing upon the notions of sequential,
pooled, and reciprocal interdependency (Thompson, 1967) and thus basing our ideas
about how to organize and coordinate work on concepts that are thirty years old. While
that early research contains some fundamental insights, our theories need to be updated
to reflect the complexity that characterizes work and organizations today.
Furthermore, prior research on the relationship between interdependency and
organizational design largely addresses the effects of single contingency factors (or
mutually consistent ones) on organizational structure and thus fails to capture the
realities and complexities associated with organizational efforts over time. Most
organization theorists today acknowledge that there does not exist one ideal form of
organizational structure (Bowditch & Buono, 1985; Daft, 1983). Rather, work needs to
be structured or designed such that it "fits" or matches the particular COiltext (Galbraith,
1973).27 Yet while theorists acknowledge heterogeneity across organizations, they have
largely failed to consider heterogeneity of context/structure within a given
organization~28 We know that work should be structured differently in different
contexts; we know little if anything about how a given organization structures itself to
deal with multiple contexts.
27 Context is usually lllterpreted here as including technology and environment (inside and outside the
firm).
28 Read closely, Thompson's typology does in fact imply intra-firm heterogeneity. He proposes that all
firms have pooled interdependency, some have pooled and sequential, and the most complex
organizations have all three. However, Thompson never considered the implications of this variance, and
subsequent authors. have largely presented each type as a firm-level variable.
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The existence of multiple interdependencies raises a series of central theoretical
and managerial challenges. Gresov notes that work units must be organized to respond
not simply to the content of their work (technology) or to their position within a work
flow (environment) but to these two (and possibly other) contingencies in cOlnbination
(Gresov, 1989; Gresov, 1990). Given a development project in which team members
must coordinate their activities to produce a complex technology, respond a:ld adapt to
an external environment, and possibly interact with other project teams in the firm, how
do team mentbers plan to meet those demands? What interdependencies do they
concentrate on, and how do they decide which coordination solutions to put in place?
In other words, how is the work structured for mliltiple interdependencies? There is a
consequent need for a research approach that examines the multiple forms of
interdependency product teams face and considers their implications for structures and
processes. While individual scholars have studied specific kinds of interdependency
and their coordination solutions, no multiple interdependency paradigm has emerged.
This research study is part of an attempt to address that gap. A prior chapter
addressed the question of why and how tasks are related in new product development
projects and yielded a taxonomy of different types. This chapter explores the strategic
and organizational structure implications of that taxonomy. After presenting an
overview of the multiple interdependency perspective taken here, it analyzes six new
produ.~1development teams. The focus is on the teams' approaches to different types of
interdependencies, how they dealt with the conflicts associated with trying to
coordinate multiple interdependencies simultaneously, and tile outcomes associated
with their divergent approaches. The epistemological perspective adopted is that of
induction and grounded theory building (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
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4.2 Theory
4.2.1 An Overview of the Multiple Interdependency Perspective
Historically, scholars have focused on three main factors which influence
decisions about organizational structure: the organization's technology, environment,
and size (Bowditch & Buono, 1985; Daft, 1983b). For example, we know a great deal
about how to structure and coordinate work for a particular type of technology (Allen,
November 1986; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Perrow, 1967; Pimmler & Eppinger, 1994;
Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965) and how certaul environmental conditions
necessitate particular designs (Ancona & Caldwell, 1990; Burns & Stalker, 1968; Gresov,
1990; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Wheelwright & Clark, 1992).
We are far from understanding, however, what it takes for a company to
effectively design and implement a comprehensive (multiple) interdependency
management strategy (Miller, 1996; Nobeoka & Cusumano, November 1995). Adopting
a multiple interdependency perspective shifts the focus from the organizing
implications of single contextual factors to one of designing organizational solutions to
a pattern of relations. It promotes a more global or unified view of organizational
design and interdependency management, which integrates and reconciles previous
understanding.
A multiple interdependency perspective also raises new research questions by
highlighting the conflict and inadequacy in current design approaches. For example,
most prior research found that lower organizational performance is related to a lack of
fit between context and organization design, but no research has addressed the question
of why such misfits occur or under what circumstances a lack of fit is likely. Notably,
most authors simply attribute a lack of fit to misperception or ignorance of context,
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incompetence, or other "departures from the norms of rationality" on the part of
managers (Thompson, 1967) btlt never explicitly examine these assumptions.
Yet designing an organization (or project) to handle several contingencies at once
may involve tradeoffs that make achieving an optimal design "fit" more difficult or even
impossible (Andres, August 25-27, 1995). Recent research suggests that misfits may in
fact occur as a functional response to the multiple contingencies faced by a work unit.
For example, scholars have documented the problems product development teams
encounter due to the need for both structure (to develop a complex technology) and
flexibility (to respond to unforeseen competitive events in their environment) (Allen,
November 1986; Brown & EiseIl&~rdt,March 1995; Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Iansiti,
1994; Imai, Nortaka, & Takeuchi, 1985). Miller found that internal and external
requirements are often incompatible, resulting in a mis-alignment of structural and
process variables (Miller, May 1992). Other researchers have explored the
circumstances under which internal and external couplings are inversely related
(Weick, March 1976).
Coordinating multiple interdependencies may also overwhelm or interfere with
a team's productive capacity, raising questions of how teams balance time to coordinate
with time to produce (Malone, February 1988; Perlow, 1995). Theories and empirical
data tend to support the hypothesis that this conflict exists. For example, the amount of
coordination on a team. depends on the number of communication links
(interdependencies) that need to be established and increases non-linearly with team
size (Allen, 1977; Brooks, 1975). Interviews with programmers and system engineers
working on software development projects suggest that as the size of the team
increases, communication overhead in the project can quickly get out of hand (Curtis,
Krasner, & Iscoe, November 1988; Perlow, 1995; Perry, Staudenmayer, & Votta, July
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1994). McCabe's data indicate that 50% of a typical programmer's time is spent
interacting with other team members (of the remaining time, 30% 1~ spent working
alone and 20% is devoted to adminislTation and travel) (McCabe, 1976). Observational
studies at one large firm revealed that people spent one-half c~f their time in meetings,
and developers attended one meeting, on average, for every line of code they wrote
(Sumner Jr., April 20, 1993).
Another telling indicator of coordination cost in pro(juct development is data on
design changes. For example, during the construction of tile Boeing 777 airplane, the
team working on a twenty piece wing flap found 251 interferences where parts
occupied the same coordinates in space. All design activity on the project had to be
suspended every few \veeks during the main design phctSe while team members looked
for problems that had arisen because of the interference~sbetween one subsystem or set
of parts and another (Sabbagh, 1995).
Design changes in software development tend to be even more frequent. On the
first version of Microsoft Windows NT, there were 150-200 component changes per day
in the weeks leading up to release (Zachary, 1994). A major telecommunications
subsystem experienced approximately 132,000 changes over its 12 year history
(averaging approximately 30 per day); as many as 35-40 different team members
"touched" parts of the subsystem on any given day (Graves, 1996).
Clearly, finding ways to coordinate more efficiently and developing a conceptual
framework to understand the multiple forms of coordination would make a substantial
contribution to both theory and practice. Although myriad research questions exist, this
study addressed three questions applied to six software development teams in two
firms. The questions were: (1) What strategies, if any, did these teams use to meet the
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demM1ds of multiple interdependencies? (2) What approaches (techniques, structures,
processes) differentiated these strategies?29 and (3) What impact did these multiple
interdependency strategies and approaches have on subsequent product team
performance?
4.3 Methods
4.3.1 The Approach of the Study
Since traditional models do not attend to the issues identified above, this study
used a comparative case study design (Yin, 1984) to explore the management of
interdependencies in an analytically inductive fashion. The sample consisted of six case
study large scale software development projects in two companies. The data consisted
of 71 interviews, extended field observations at both sites, a questionnaire, and product,
project, and process documentation. In forming hypotheses, I drew upon independent
assessments of what was going on from multiple individuals and sources, using
multiple methods, including interviews and documents. I also looked for coriSistent
patterns in the data before drawing conclusions and routinely challenged the
hypotheses as they emerged with evidence of potential threats to validity, but the
results are nevertheless subject to limitations and biases of judgment.
Yin and others point out that there often exists confusion between the case study
as a research strategy and specific methods of data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yir.,
1984). People tend to equate case studies with ethnography or participant observation,
which are perhaps better thought of as particular methods for data collection. In order
to keep this confusion to a minimum, the research strategy used here is broken down
irtto fOUf major components.. Below I provide background about the sample-- the
29 Consistent with the exploratory nature of this study, I took a very liberal definition of approach and
included both formal and informal structures (e.g., group arrangements) as well as roles, processes,
technologies, and tools.
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companies, Lucent Technologies and Microsoft, as well as the primary task, internal
team processes, and interdependency challenges in each of the case study projects. Data
collection, analytical approach, and specific analytical techniques are described in detail
in Appendix D.
4.3.2 Design and Sampling
The present study centers on six large scale software development projects in two
firms and thus adheres to the "comparative case sturl,," or "multiple case-embedded"
design (Yin, 1984). There are multiple units of analysis (six case study projects), each of
which is examined in terms of its interdependency profile, strategy, structure, and
performance. Comparative studies have been shown to be particularly useful in
helping to establish the generality of a fact or the structural boundaries of a
phenomenon (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
Yin suggests that one should consider multiple cases as one would consider
multiple experiments and thus follow a cross-experiment or replication logic in both
sampling and analysis. In terms of sampling, this translates into selecting each case so
that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) produces contrary
results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication) (Yin, 1984). The companies
and projects for this study were chosen with both of these criteria in mind.
Ihe Companies.
Despite their respective dO:i.ninate positions, Lucent Technologies and Microsoft
currently find themselves in a v~ry competitive environment undergoing significant
technical and market transition. In terms of their product development efforts, this
translates into a need to develop very large, complex software products that are reliable,
competitive in terms of their feature set, and attractive to customers. Competitive
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pressures further dictate that this be done quickly and efficiently. Although these firms
each face a very similar technical and market situation, they do so from very different
historical legacies of success.
For example, Microsoft has traditionally operated by instituting per product
loyalty and focus. This approach is being increasingly challenged, however, as its
products increase in size and become more integrated and system-like (Cusumano &
Selby, 1995). Lucent is transitioning from being a producer of bundled system products
to largely unbundled features. Thus, although the issues concerning product
development at the two sites are quite similar, each firm's response strategy in terms of
how they design and manage their teams should be quite different. This heterogeneity
ensures a wide range of management outcomes consistent with the goals of the study.
Finally, both firms had previously identified the management of interdependency as
crucial to their future success (Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Perry, et al., July 1994), which
greatly facilitated access and cooperation and also substantiates tlle importance of this
research topic for managers. Below I review the two firms in more detail.
Lucent TechnQIQgies
Lucent Technologies, formerly part of AT&T, produces telecommunications
switching system software and hardware products.3D The company's fOUf primary lines
30 In September 1995, AT&T, one of the largest companies in the world, announced that it would
voluntarily split itself into three new companies: a service provider (AT&T), an equipment provider
(Lucent), and a computer maker (NCR). This unprecedented act was viewed as both a tacit
acknowledgment that the large integrated company had become too unfocused and unwieldy to manage
and a response to recent and impending changes Ul technology and government regulation (Landler,
(September 21, 1995). In particular, AT&Ts dual role as a major equipment supplier and a giant
telephone company was creating excessive coordination costs and conflicts. AT&Ts progeny, the seven
"Baby Bells/' are prime customers for its digital switches and other networking equipment. But as
AT&Ts service division began to compete in more and more local markets, the Bells became increasingly
reluctant to buy equipment front AT&T, viewing each new order as effectively an assault on their
markets. AT&T also ran into resistance from government owned telecommunications companies abroad,
which were buyers of AT&T equipment but competitors in the global service market. These tensions
eroded AT&Ts share of the market for giant network switching systems in both the u.s. and abroad quite
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of business are systems for network operations, micro-electronics, businees
communication services, and consumer products. In 1996, Lucent's annual revenue was
$23.8 billion with profits of $1.1 billion. R&D investment was $2.55 billion, 10.70/0 of
revellue. Network systems, the focus of this study, which produces switching systems
that connect telephone calls, had sales of about $3.5 billion in a global market of $27
billion in 1996. Successive rounds of down sizing and cost cutting over the last several
years have resulted in a fairly resource constrained environment within the firm,
although Lucent appears to be rebounding recently (Schiesel, (April 13, 1996).
A telecommunications network can be viewed as a collection of interconnected
terminal equipment that provides end users (businesses, residences, and public
agencies) with different forms of telecommunications service. The basic functions
performed by switching systems are the local switclling of calls and toll connections
between switches (Sneed, Huensch, Kulzer, & Moerkerken, November/December
1994). The real source of revenue, however, resides in innovative optiorlal features,
which overlay the core infrastructure. These include things such as credit card dialing,
message waiting and notification, conference calling, and automatic number
identification, all of which are software based. Prodttct development life cycles at
Lucent average 2-5 years. Product size can vary from 10,000 to several millions lines of
code (Factor & Smith, July/ August 1988).
The importance of software development is evident in certain key statistics on
the company. Prior to the 1995 break-up, AT&T spent about $3 billion a year on
software development, and annual production was estimated to be 50 1l1illion lines of
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code in new product releases to customers.31 Top managers have also stated that
"software is the single most important capability" the company has (Sumner Jr., April
20, 1993). This technological emphasis is further reflected in recent demographic and
managerial changes in the firm. In 1988, approximately 40% of the R&D community at
AT&T devoted most of their time to the design, coding, and testing of software (Factor
& Smith, July/ August 1988). By 1995, that figure had grown to o,,"er 900/0.
Approximately 12,000 of Lucent's 121,000 total employees formerly worked at
AT&T Bell Laboratories, the R&D unit of the organization and now referred to in
Lucent as Bell Laboratories 0 The average employee is about 40 years old. Most people
have worked for AT&T in some capacity for more than ten years. Engineers primarily
have masters degrees in electrical or mechanical engineering or computer science.
Two factors characterize the culture at Lucent. First, the company has more than
one hundred years of experience installing and developing telecommunications
equipment. People, therefore, take great pride in the technical excellence of the
products, particular their reliability and robustness. Second, the culture of Lucent is
rooted in a long tradition of monopoly. Before the 1995 trivestiture, the primary
customer for products and services was AT&T itself. Although things are changing,
most Lucent engineers have little contact with or knowledge of the customers for the
products they work on. For example, few m~mbersof one case study team could name
the Far East customer for their product or provide details about a competitive product
already in the market.
dramatically and foreshadowed limited opportunities for future growth and success. Today, Lucent
Technologies is run as an independent company and is free to sell its products to a variety of customers.
AT&T accounts for approximately 100/0 of Lucent's sales.
31 Current figures for Lucent are not available, but we can assume they are comparable since most
software development went to Lucent.
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Microsoft
Microsoft produces software applications and operating systems for the personal
computer (PC) market and, increasingly, multimedia, consumer, and Internet
applications (Cusumano & Selby, 1995). In 1996, Microsoft's revenues were $8.67 billioll
with net income of $2.2 billion. R&D investment was approximately $1.43 million
(16.5% of revenue). In contrast to Lucent, Microsoft operated in more of a growth mode
during the period of this study with extensive hiring and construction of new facilities.
A PC system consists of several types of software products layered on a
hardware base. Operating systems are special programs that control the primary
operations of the computer. Application products represent the functions and services
users want to perform, examples being word processing and spreadsheet analysis.
Network operating systems enable distributed computing as well as multi-user
communications and applications (Cusumano & Selby, 1995). Microsoft competes in all
of these arenas. Product development cycles at the firm vary, ranging from several
years for large system products to one year or less for some consumer applications.
Several important trends characterize the PC software industry (Cusumano &
Selby, 1995). First, functions are increasingly migrating across layers, resulting in a
blurring of distinction between types of products. Second, products are getting larger
and more complex as companies vie to distinguish their offeri_llgs from those of
cOfilpetitors by adding new features and functions. Third, customers are increasingly
demanding commonality and consistency across products. These trends represent
important challenges in how companies develop their products and compete. In
particular, they imply greater product complexity and inter project sharing and
coordination.
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Microsoft had approximately 17,000 employees in 1995, a rapid increase from its
base of 1,000 only 10 years ago. Its culture has been described as fiercely competitive,
individualistic, entrepreneurial, and dominated by the CEO, Bill Gates (Zachary, 1994),
although these characteristics are changing as the company evolves from a start-up to a
mature firm (Cusumano & Selby, 1995). Early on, small groups of developers had
ultimate control for what and how they developed products. As products grew in size
and complexity and became more central in the business operations of customers,
Microsoft incorporated practices such as more formal testing and design and planning
methods and hired experienced people from other companies, both of which modified
the culture. Nevertheless, the firm still derives a large part of its strength from hiring
smart, motivated people and encouraging them to care deeply about customers and
competitors in a given product space (Cusumano & Selby, 1995).
The Projects
Within each company I selected software development projects of roughly
comparable size and complexity in terms of the amount of code and the number of
components in the product as well as team size. The selected projects varied, ho'wever,
in terms of their degree of innovativeness and uncertainty (represented by prodllct
version number) and position in the system architecture. The choice of selection factors
was based on past research (Boehm, J;muary 1984; Cusumano & Kemerer, Novenlber
1990; Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Kemerer, 1997) and discussions with experts in the field.
Actual project names are disguised.
Micro3oft "Network"
Tas?c
Microsoft Network is a network operating system for PCs. This product is in its
third version of release, with approximately 5.6 million non-conlmentary source lines of
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code (NeSL). At the peak of production, about 250 people worked on the product.
Typical customers include major corporations, banks, and scientific institutions,
necessitating high levels of reliability and robustness.
Internal Team Processes
The Network project was characterized by smooth internal processes with little
conflict or politics. Leadership on the team was exceptionally strong; numerous team
members described key leaders such as the head of development as being highly
technically experienced and "hands on":
[The head of development] writes a lot of code, watches check-ins, and
knows what is going on in the system. He's a very active manager, very
experienced. He can set the direction for the whole team in a 9:00 am
meeting that day.
Interview comments also suggested that people identified with the team and
product as opposed to particular functional tasks or components associated with their
particular work assignment.
Interdependency Challenges
Network represents an extremely complicated technology, with hundreds of
interacting functions. Most pieces of Network have traditionally been designed,
developed, and tested internally (to Network), but the number of externally supplied
components is rising steadily over time. For example, components such as MSN client
support, TAPI fax support, MAPI, Exchange, multimedia, and system applets are now
supplied externally. Network also shares technology (e.go, RPC, OLE, and TCP lIP)
with another major operating system product.
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.Microsoft "Desk"
Task
Microsoft Desk is an int2grated application "suite." It first came out in 1990 and
is currently in its fifth version of release, with about 2 million NCSL ancl 200
contributors. The standard version consists of four applications; a professional version,
targeted to business users, also includes "Data." Desk is produced in multiple
languages and sold around the world. The Desk use environment necessitates the
production of various forms of documentation to assist customers in the product's use
(e.g., manuals, CDs, on-line help).
Internal Team Processes
Leadership in Desk was strong, but varied. The people interviewed cited several
key people who played important roles and enjoyed high respect for their technical
skills, but no one or two individuals appeared to stand out and serve as a rallying cry
for the entire project. The functional groups also enjoyed markedly different status
levels.. Developers were generally perceived (by themselves and others) to be the
"kings" who "make it happen. II One of the applications was also seen has higher status.
There was a fairly high amount of conflict on the Desk project, although this was
tempered by high respect resulting from past working relationships.32 For example,
application team members argued over the standardization of work processes like
component integration and the very definition of key words like code complete.
Many individuals admitted experiencing a conflict between loyalty to their
primary work assignment (an application product) and Desk. This was largely a result
of Microscft·s prior application focus, which encouraged IItribal loyalty" and was further
32 In particular, most of the people in the Desk unit had previously worked in one of the applications.
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,exacerbated by different practices within the groups. Several people described an.
apparently conunon fear that applications might "lose their identity" and "get taken
over by Desk":
[The applications] development are traditionally very proud and
independent teams. There is some resentment about the role of Desk and
loss of autonomy. For example, [applications] people complain that 'we
spend all of our time supporting Desk features, so there's no time left in our
schedule to do [our] features.' There's a Desk tax.
There exist different histories and cultural practices and priorities in each
group. Different strategies and levels of rigor. Now they need to buy into
one set of criteria and get to the same place at the same time.
It's very difficult to gain agreement on one [integration] process among so
many people. It's a constant source of friction between [the applications]
and Desk.
Interdependency Challenges
Prior to 1993, Desk existed as a bundle of discounted applications with minimal
integration and sharing of components. The applications were separate products and
projects with little technology or process integration. In 1993, partly in response to
customer demands for more commonality and consistency of features, Microsoft
created the Desk product unit with responsibility for authoring, integrating, and testing
the Desk suite components (applications), although there was little formal coordination
in terrrlS of schedule or design at thi3 point. Desk shipped after each of the stand-alone
applications was released, and the Desk team was responsible for resolving
inconsistencies in product design across the applications.
Microsoft began to recognize some of the inefficiencies associated with the above
approach and radically changed its strategy accordingly in 1995. For example, the
uncoordinated application schedules meant that Desk often shipped multiple times a
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year as each application released a ne\'l version. Furthermore, since Desk was still a
mere bundle of applications, there existed considerable variation of functionality and
user interfaces across the applications at a time when customers were demanding
consistency. This inconsistency varied from the relatively trivial (e.g., should the box be
green or yellow) to major and complicated technical conflicts (e.g., single document
interface and command ids).
The new strategy is considerably more Desk-focused, reflecting the suite's
success in the market.33 Going forward, Desk will be released on a 12/24 month cycle,
alternating minor and major functionality additions. More h"llportantly, Desk will ship
first with the stand-alone applications released approximately one month later and all at
the same time. The Desk unit is also responsible for developing certain shared features
used by all of the applications as well as some stand-alone technology. For example,
features like the toolbar, menus, and status and title bars are now shared. Other
components such as OLE a.1'\d MS Query are supplied by an external team but used by
some or all of the application products.
The result of the above changes has been a dramatic rise in interdependency
among the applications. At the level of product code, the applications are now directly
dependent on Desk.34 The high degree of sharing also necessitated nlore interaction
among program managers and developers on various teams. The prior product and
organizational histories of the applications complicated the sharing and integration
process.
33 By 1995, 65-800/l# of application sales came through the sale of Desk.
34 For exampl~, everything that was required to execute an application used to be contained in one file
(the exe). Now certain key pieces of functionality have been moved into the Desk Dynamic Link Library
(OLL); when you lalmch an application, it makes a call into that code. Thus, applications effectively no
longer exist on their own- the OLL is required even to run a stand-alone version of the application.
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A primary area of concern on the team was the increased schedule risk associated
with extensive technology sharing. The applications alee nOVl directly dependent on the
ship vehicle (Desk) and indirectly dependent tlpOn the other applications in it. For
example, if one of the applications should miss the target ship date, it threatens not only
the l·elease of Desk but also the subsequent release of four other stand-alone products.
As the lead program manager noted:
As you introduce more components, there's more randomness. Take five
products and a lot of little components. Do we really think that all of these
people are going to finish on the same day? It means you have to take less
risk.
Microsoft ItData"35
Task
Microsoft Data, code named 'Sterling,' is an integrated database application.
Originally released in 1985, it currently stands at about 1 million NeSL and
approximately 75 contributors. Customers of Data are so-called "power users" and tend
to be attracted by very innovative, technical features.
Internal Team Procecses
There was little evidence of either formal or informalleadersrJp, a..T'\d little sense
of team or product unity on the Data project. Instead, people described their primary
affiliation as a particular component. Authority was likewise centered in the
components and functions, resulting in high degrees of conflict. The levels of stress and
frustration on the project were extremely high. People described feeling overburdened
by the amount of work and number of relationships they were expected to manage:
35 This version of Data was not the version of Data appearing in the Desk case study.
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I feel like Sherlock Holmes tracking this stuff down. Have I talked to the
right people? Do they understand my priorities? It's non-stop.
Interdependency Challenges
Data underwent a major architectural change in 1995, which significantly
increased its level of external interdependency. Earlier versions of the product were
primarily built on the version 1.0 code base; beginning in 1995, Data had four external
teams supplying key functionality previously developed internally. These
dependencies were in addition to Data's dependence on Desk because it ships as part of
the professional suite.
Like the Desk project, increased schedule risk was a big concern. The fact that
Data was both a heavy component user and a provider of functionality to the Desk suite
resulted in a particularly tenuous situation:
There's a burden caused by code sharing and componentization. If one
component is late, everything [goes late]. And there are gaps in the release
cycle because you can't slip continuously... Sterling could slip either zero or
twelve months, in one year increments. If you don't make the [Desk
shipping] window, you have to be picked up next year. It's an incredibly
constrained process.
Lucent "Handphone"
Task
The Handphone product, positioned for a young urban market, provides basic
code control for wireless hand-held communication m Japan. The wireless market is
extremely competitive and grO\ving rapidly. The customer demanded that the product
be developed very quickly and closely tracked its progress. Handphone represented
both new functionality and the recombination of existing technology in new ways. For
example, the platform overlays cellular network communication on an established
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ISDN architecture. A significant feature of the product is its low povler usage, which
enables longer talk time between recharging (40 hours versus 10 for comparable
products). This version 1.0 product had approximately 50,000 NeSL (on a base of 10
million) and 100 team contributors.
Internal Team Processes
The Handphone project was characterized by smooth internal processes and
remarkably high levels of cooperation:
When you asked for something from somebody, no matter how busy they
were, they would make the time for you.
Issues always had a sense of urgency and people responded. Versus on
other projects wh.2re you go with a problem and people say 'Yeah, I'll get to
it,' and two days later, nothing has happened.
Like Network, leadership was exceptionally strong and visible:
The feature engineer is extremely good- very strong technically, and he
knows this area very well.
Handphone was unique at Lucent in its use of real-time rewards to motivate
people and keep them convinced that thLngs were moving along. The typical practice at
Lucent is to recognize and reward people fonnally after the project is completed:
The feature manager gave out little trinkets to everyone at key milestones.
It made for great lunches, and I actually kind of liked it. Certain things like
that kind of help things along. There's a certain amount of psychological
tensioll that you need to deal with, working so much.
Interdependency Challenges
The Handphone project had a number of things going against it from the start.
Lucent customer representatives in Japan set the deadline before the requirements were
even gathered. The project was also severely understaffed for the first six months.
156
Many of the developers and testers were transitioning off of two recent unsuccessful
projects, creating low morale conditions. The primary challenge Handphone faced was
how to respond to customer needs and resolve technical uncertainty, given limited
resources.
Lucent "Tollphone"
Task
Tollphone is a 5E application that provides operator-assisted, toll (collect and
credit card), and pay phone services around the world. First introduced in 1987 in
Panama City, Florida, it has been under continuous development since 1984. Some
examples of typical features developed in the past are 1-800-oPERATOR and out-of-
band switching. The product is 1-2 million NeSL and in its seventh version of release.
Approximately 100 people contribute to its production.
An international version of Tollphone was split off of the u.s. product in
1988/1989, and the two products have since evolved independently. Today, they are
incompatible with very little common code. The u.s. and international products are
also produced by different groups within the Tollphone department.36
Internal Team Processes
The Tollphone project exhibited a mixed leadership pattern with strong informal
leaders (highly experienced technical people who have been working on the product
since its inception) and a few strong formal leaders (department and division
managers). The team exhibited relatively little conflict; nlost of the people had been
working together for several years and appeared to get along well.
36 International Tollphone development is further divided into one sub team responsible for India and
on-going support efforts and a second sub team responsible for Japan and tithe rest of the world."
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Interdependency Challenges
The Tollphone case is interesting for several reasons. First, up until 1995, the
department was organized as a more cross-functional team in terms of both the key
product subsystems and functional disciplines. Gradually, some of these dependencies
were centralized into other departments as the company moved towards a more
functional organization. For example, development of the Recent Change and Audit
subsystems was centralized into another department, as were component integration
and field support. As we shall see later, the remaining team members had some strong
opinions about the effect this structural change had on their relationships with those
dependencies and ultimately their ability to get work done.
Like Desk, the Tollphone case also illustrates the considerable challenge facing a
company when technology and customer needs change in ways that contradict its
existing technical and organizational infrastructure. The product was originally
designed as a system product with annual or biannual delivery, which usually involved
incremental changes in functionality. Today, the nature of telecommunications
products and services has changed such that customers are demanding more frequent
delivery of smaller products.
Lucent ItAutophQne"
Task
Autophone is a brand new infrastructure for automobile phone customers in the
U.S. The product is approximately 1-2 million NCSL and about 200 people contributed
to its production. The project v-as geographically distributed between Illinois and New
Jersey; about two thirds of the technical work was done in Illinois, with project
management almost entirely in New Jersey.
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The cellular market constitutes one of the most tumultuous arenas in
telecommunications today. Competition is fierce, demand is high and growing
exponentially, and yet customer needs are ill-defined and nascent. The technology is
also not well understood, with a variety of protocols and standards in simultaneous
existence. Autophone was one of two major technology standards vying for market
dominance.
The Autophone project reflected this general higi' .. lc-lel of environmental
instability. Due to competitive pressures and rapid technical advances, the team
actually had three versions of the product in various stages of development during this
investigation. Autophone vI.O was in field testing, v2.0 was mid-cycle, and v3.0 was
just entering the coding stage.37
Internal Tearfl Processes
The Autophone project joined together two previously independent
departments, and twelve months into the work they had yet to establish standard
working practices. Many of the team members were new hires or transferred from
other areas of the COmpaI1Y that were down sizing. Some of the key leadership
positions were vacant or held for only a short period of time (i.e., director of
development). As a result, there was little sense of team unity on the project:
The problems we are experiencing are organizational and process
problems... There's a general lack of accountability. No one owns or is
accountable for product integration or the quality of the life cycle of
development.
37 This analysis focused on vI.D but also considered the implications of needing to coordinate with other
versions.
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The impression arising from the data is a work environment in which people are
constantly responding to "fires" and crises as they occur:
I think we kind of get stuck in that trap. We don't have time to think
through things and end up addressing them issue by issue. Which in the
end makes it seem much more frenzied and chaotic than it needs to be.
Discussions are usually on an ad hoc basis, provoked by 'there's an issue or
critical decision to be made right now.'
Not surprisingly, frustration levels were high. Team members described the
difficulty of staying "close to the heartbeat" and keeping up with work changes as well
as process turmoil. Several people complained of feeling helpless, and many appeared
to have disengaged themselves as a coping mechanism:
I honestly don't see how this can ever work, but I don't lose any sleep over
it. It's gotten to the point where I go home and say 'If it works, it works. If
not, I'll get a call tonight.' I don't care. I don't personally own it. It's way
too big for me to get my arms around, so you have to back off.
Interdependency Challenges
The Autophone project fits the classic profile of a first time development project
and illustrates interdependency' management at its most challenging. The team
struggled with the technical integration issues associated with any unproven
technology compounded by (1) a geographic barrier and (2) historically embedded
paradigms and processes, which now needed to be reconciled into one department.
This case also reveals some of the futility associated with relying on traditional
interdependency management techniques, which seek to identify and "freeze"
interdependencies in advance, when a project exists in a volatile technical and market
environment.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 General Level and Implications of Interdependency
Data from the interview transcripts and project documentation indicated that all
six teams faced a complicated set of interdependencies, a situation many team IrLembers
perceived as getting worse over time. In each case, the sheer size and complexity of the
software product resulted in complicated technical relationships among various
product components with subsequent implications for the coordination of design,
development, and testing tasks.
For example, functionality in the Handphone product was divided a.mong four
core wireless component" and twelve interfacing subsystems; the four components were
fulther subdivided into fifty two coding units and allocated among lltany eIlgineers.
Technology in the Network product at Microsoft was similarly divided among four
lar~ge subsystems and numerous people. While large system projects are hardly new,
team members at each company with prior system development experience cited
certain competitive market factors, namely shortened development cycles and increased
requirements volatility due to uncertain or heterogeneous customer demands, as
sigruficant exacerbates of technical interdependency maI\agement.
In addition, the level of external interdependency was high and perceived to be
increasing over time on all of the projects. One driver of external interdependency was
an iJrlcreased need for specialization and efficiency; more and more tasks were being
outsourced to groups internal or external to the firm in order to take advantage of
specialized skills and knowledge or efficiencies of scale and scope. For example, the
Des]( project relied on approximately forty other groups (inside and outside Microsoft)
to provide files or pieces of the product.. Desk in turn supplied technology such as
tooll,ars and components to about ten groups in Microsoft.
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The increased level of external coordination also reflected changes in product
strategy at the level of the firm, namely a movement towards product platforms with
high levels of cross-product component sharing. This type of external interdependency
proved to be a significant challenge for several of the project teams, particularly at
Microsoft where the culture has traditionally stressed team independence and
autonomy.
The high degree of task interdependency had two striking implications at the
level of work processes. First was a certain amount of randomness and
unpredictability. For example, team members cited instances where seemingly minor
or unrelated events nevertheless had large repercussions because they triggered a
cascade of task contingencies. These ripple effects often resulted in seemingly
unexplainable links across projects. At Lucent, for example, the testing and release of a
feature to make automatic collect calls in Japan became tied to an Australian wireless
product due to technical interdependencies in a globally shared file. At Microsoft, delay
in the shipment of one product impacted tasks on numerous other projects due to code
sharing interdependencies.
The second work process implication was a heightened tension between time to
coordinate and time to produce. As the level of interdependence rose, individuals
simply became overwhelmed by the number of dependencies needing to be tracked and
managed. As a result, coordination efforts started to subsume production, or team
members find themselves devoting time and attention to the '\vrong' interdependencies.
Like the random unpredictability effect described above, this emerged as a consistent
theme in multiple interviews on each case project. Team members talked about their
struggle to balance individual and interpersonal tasks within the confines of a working
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day and tight development cycle. Much of people's time (according to their statements
in the interviews anywhere from 40-75%) was devoted to cllecking and rechecking work
and responding to changes (in designs, schedules, etc.), suggesting a connection
between the level of unpredictability and randomness and coordination effort. Finally,
many of the interview subjects complained of deriving less intrinsic satisfaction from
their work as more and more of their effort and attention was absorbed by coordination
and checking, leaving less time for innovation.
The following quotations serve to illustrate the working environment on these
teams:
Technical Complexity in a Competitive Market Environment
• "Traditionally we've only had one active [release] at a given time. We followed a
waterfall model, so once it was tested and generally available, we split off and start the
next release. It worked but the cost of being end to end is a very long development
cycle. Customers have been pressuring [us] to turn products around faster, so we
started to overlap waterfalls. These processes don't lend themselves to that kind of
overlap because you're trying to split from something that isn't necessarily stable... It
just adds to the cascading. II (Autophone developer)
• "Many interdependencies were hidden before when things were done [more]
sequentially.II (Desk tester)
• "We're working in a very cODlplicated area. You're trying to get a handle on your own
stuff, much less make the time to figure out if you're synched up with everyone else...
It's just real easy to kind of be blasting through things and not have the time to step
back and think 'now wait a minute, let's look at this end to end. How is this going to
come together?'" (Autophone developer)
~ "Our customer needs proof very early on that we are going to deliver. They set up
milestones and say 'show us proof and certain external milestones can't change. This is
not the way [we] usually work. Lucent uses waterfalls, and you don't take anything out
there until it is ready to go. II (HandphlJne developer)
(Increased) External Team Interdepenf~
• "On my first project, there were five people in my life, period. Now, I couldn't even
count them all. A hundred? And the~{ are spread across the whole company. II (Desk
program manager)
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• "Managing external deliverables is one of our biggest issues. Things like compilers,
debuggers and run time libraries. These are the traditional type of project
interdependencies where we need a delivery from an internal or external group. As
Network encompasses more and more features, it involves more and more of these
outside interdependencies. II (Network program manager)
• "We depend on a lot of other teams for stuff! In order to do wireless call processing,
you need pieces from Recent Change, Audits, Packet Switch, Peripheral Control and
Routing [subsystems]. Nobody could really survive individually. We all need to talk to
other people. 1I (Handphone developer)
• "This version of Data is going through a major architectural change. It's built on the
same code base as Data 1.0, but now four critical components are being supplied by
external teams... Plus our dependency on Desk has increased substantially; there's a lot
more functionality delivered from Desk that we are dependent on." (Data program
manager)
• "Microsoft's culture is such that it is a collection of product fiefdoms. Power [and
rewards] come from having smart, motivated people who care deeply about customers
and competitors in a given product space. Who cares about what's going on in the rest
of the company? The [shared component] view flies in the face of this inbred
philosophy." (Data developer)
Heightened Sense of Unpredictabilityv Randomness and Contingency
• "The real problenlS occur with hidden interdependencies-- the ones no one thought
about in advance that pop up at the last minute. Or that just sort of materialize out of
thin air because of some [new] need. Sometimes a solution to one interdependency
creates problems for a third party." (Network pragrarr! manager)
• "As you introduce more [shared] components, there's more randomness. I don't know
where to focus my energies, where the weak spots are. Five things depend on one
thing. What's the risk of that one thing?" (Desk developer)
(I "[Some new code from another project] went in recently, which impacted a little bit
how things work. We couldn't anticipate it because it is in a completely different area.
The changes seemed innocuous but ended up breaking our code disastrously. We
couldn't even imagine or think ihow could that impact this?' It was a complete
nonlinear effect:' (Handphone developer)
Tension Between Time to Coordinate and Time to Produce
• "Before we simply wrote the topic. Now 75% of my time is maintenance and behind
the scenes work. Checking and rechecking, keeping up Witll changes. Maybe 25% is
actually inventing and writing topics, which is the most rewarding." (Desk
documenter)
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,• "The tension between production and coordination is huge. We definitely have a hard
time getting work done." (Data developer)
• "Probably 20% of my time is spent actually coding; 80% is coordinating. For example,
every morning I face at least thirty email messages. That's two hours worth of
processing right there. II (Autophone developer)
• "My life is one big interdependency these days. Everything I do, J am either a
dependency or dealing with a dependency. It (Desk program manager)
4.4.2 Team Strategies
The analysis of the six teams suggested three different strategies toward multiple
interdependency management. The strategy of systemic manipulation involved pro-
actively manipulating interdependencies via decisions at the level of product
technology, strategy, and organizational structures. Teams applying this approach
effectively simplified task interdependency through certain up-front design decisions.
As a result, the subsequent coordination of tasks was greatly simplified. The teams also
minimized external interdependencies, prioritized t..ltose that did exist, and sought to
make "hidden" interdependencies visible to team members. For example, they took
efforts to prioritize and standardize their external product environment and replicated
that environment internally. They also used coordination mechanisms that lllcreased
people's awareness of other's dependence on them.
Systemic manipulation was also characterized by the use of techniques to
increase coordination efficiency, thus enabling work to proceed forward at a relatively
rapid pace. These teams centralized duplicate coordination in special team-level roles
and batched integration efforts in time in orcier to trim coordination overhead. Finally,
systemic teams were unique in their awareness of the implications of choices over time.
They explicitly avoided certain strategies and structures in recognition of future
complicated task coordination scenarios.
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ISometimes teams were unable to alter the design of their product or project
structure due to legacy factors, yielding a second strategy called constrailled systemic
mani,pulation. These teams were, therefore, forced to adopt additional structures,
processes, and roles to coordinate work. For example, they used special forms of
meetings, sub teams, and communication mechanisms to compellSate for complicated
task relationships dictated by their structure.
The third strategy, local reaction, consisted of more piece meal and ad hoc
management responses, often triggered by coordination crises. These teams had
multiple task forces and evolving processes. They used living documents and email as
decision-making and coordinating mechanisms and often resorted to forms of slack.
Furthermore, teams in this last categoty primarily limited their approach to
interdependency management to internal roles, tools, and processes. They rarely
considered aspects of structure or design (even though they did not face the same
legacy as the constrained tealns) and never prioritized their environment. Nor did they
exhibit an appreciation for the link between technical, strategic, and organization design
and task coordination.
4.4.3 Interdependency Management Approaches
The last section identified the team strategies and generalized their approaches to
interdependency management. This section reports on the actual techniques teams
used for managing multiple interdependencies. It distinguishes between two categories
of techniques. First are up front design decisions-- at the level of the technical product,
strategy, or organizational structure-- that had implications for task coordination.
Second are the roles and processes used for coordinating. Product component
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integration is examined in detail in Appendix E, given its centrality in terms of
interdependency management.
The Network and Handphone Teams: A Strateu of Systemic Manipulation
Data on the Network and Handphone teams consisted of six and sixteen
interviews, respectively, a questionnaire, and numerous project memos, marketing
brochures, and product schematics. These data, plus extended observations and
discussions with other internal and external organizational members, indicated that
these teams drew upon a variety of levers to simplify and coordinate task relationsllips.
Up Front Design Decisions
Figures 4.1a and 4.1b show the product and project architecture of Network and
Handpholle, respectively. As indicated in the diagrams, both had a simple, layered,
modular38 product design and parallel product and project architecture. The Network
product consisted of four subsystems (Base, Network, Graphical User Interface (GUI),
and OLE/RPC), which were allocated to four sub-teams. Handphone was divided into
fout components and sub teams (Location/Registration, which broadcasts or pages
from the calling unit switch when a call is placed; Originating processor, which
establishes the first half of the phone call frorJl the caller to the switch; Terminating
processor, which establishes the second half of the phone call to the called party; and
Hand Over, which performs location/registration and new call processing as the
conversation toll path roams across cells).
38 A modular architecture is one in which each of the physical parts implements one or a few functional
elements in their entirety; an integral architecture, in COIl~ast, is one in which functional elements are
implemented using more than one physical chunk (i.e., functions are distributed across physical
elements) (Ulrich & Eppinger, 1995).
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A modular structure with well defined interfaces enabled work to proceed
relatively independently. The pieces of the product could be developed, tested, and
integrated in parallel as opposed to sequentially. Layering made it easier to enhance
and test the product since each layer can theoretically be replaced without affecting
others.
Of course, some interaction occurred across component sub teams, but tile
interfaces between components were fairly well-defined with strict ownership
understandings. As one Handphone developer put it:
We try to define an interface that is as clear and simple as possible-- this is
where and how we are going to touch. Defining this clearly doesn't mean
we are not going to change it, because you always change it. But it has to be
clear now so we can work in parallel and know what changes and avoid
major architectural problems later on.
In those cases where product pieces drew upon or "came on top of' more core
level functions and features, team members tried to "fake" certain functions and bypass
blockages:
In order for us to actually perform certain Hand Over functions, the
originating and terminating components both have to work at a fairly stable
level. But we couldn't wait until they worked; everything had to be done in
parallel [due to schedule deadlines]. We did an excellent job of faking
certain things during the first couple of weeks. For example, we simulated
the data we had to create and manipulated things to make it look like the
originating piece worked.
On Network, the parallel product-project design structure extended to the testing
team. Testers were primarily organized by the four product compOllents such that, for
example, a developer-tester pair in the Base component would work closely and very
interactively to find and solve bugs.
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On Handphone, in contrast, the structure of the testing group did not parallel
that of either the development group or the product. Although the two functions were
in one department, developers were organized by the four components, but testers were
organized by task (i.e., feature tester, deliverable tester, stress tester, etc.). This non-
parallel structure was accompanied by more formal rules about the hand-off between
development and testing. In particular, a tester who located a potential bug had to get
it "approved l1 by a developer, meaning the developer had to agree it actually was a bug
and assume responsibility for fixing it. The non-parallel organizational structure also
resulted in more stilted interaction and often made it difficult for testers to locate the
responsible developer:
When there are problems, feature testers must provide feedback to where
ever it should go. Finding where it should go is not always straightforward,
and some developers need to be convinced that it is their problem.
Minimized External Interdependencies
Both teams sought to keep the number of externally supplied components to a
minimum and utilized techniques to promote close collaboration when this was not
possible. They deliberately avoided externally sourcing their four core components.
Network and Handphone also assigned central contact points with primary
responsibility for communicating with and maintaining each external relationship and
often temporarily collocated the liaison. They used fairly structured communication
processes with, for example, weekly pre-scheduled phone calls.
For example, the Handphone data engineer, while formally a member of the
wireless department, was collocated for the duration of the project with tIle department
supplying software from the aDA and Recent Change subsystems. As he explained it:
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I knelv early on that my problem was not going to be interfacing with the
Handphone developers; it was going to be with aDA and RC. I have to go
beg them to do stuff because we are always behind. It's easier to do that
down the hall than across another building.
The Network liaison for multi-media described the techniques he used to keep in
touch with the external partner as follows:
Every Wednesday morning we ha\'e a conference call with the multi-media
group in the U.K. Even if there's nothing to talk about [in the sense of issues
or decisions to be made], we talk to provide [them with] a general sense of
where things are in the project.
Relations with other partners were sometimes governed by a "lift and modify"
strategy. Network "lifted" certain features or functions from another operating system,
for example/ such as setup, shell, and help, and then modified them slightly in order to
accolnmodate Network customer needs for higher reliability and robustness. Similarly,
Handphone used established ISDN protocols and designs from previous wireless
products.39
~ted Up Front Product Design
Up front product design has several disadvantages. Namely, it takes time and
can result in a loss of flexibility or the ability to respond to unexpected changes. Both
Network and Handphone exhibited a targeted approach to product design in terms of
both the amount of effort and techniques they applied to it. For example, they varied
tt..e amount of time and effort devoted to up front design depending on the complexity
of the product component interactions. Network team members developed detailed
designs in complicated product areas but "produced relatively few documents for
39 Note one important difference in these two cases. Network was lifting from a concurrent
development project while Handphone was reusing technology from past products.
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things that have been around for a long time or are just being enhanced." While
Handphone produced more design documentation than Netw()rk and spent longer
doing it, a reflection of the L'ucent process and culture, the data suggest some amount of
discretion was applied based on the level of cOlnplexity.
Another way these two teams targeted design was through the use of botll fixed
and living specification documents. Some aspects of the products were specified in
advance and allowed minimal subsequent change while others were developed using
"living" specification documents in which designs were allowed to evolve over the
course of the development cycle. In general, more core level functionality was "fixed"
early on in order to facilitate progress and prevent "ripple or cascading" changes. lJser
interface features and functions and peripheral functions (e.g., data on Handphone)
were allowed to vary as information was gathered over the course of development.
These teams also targeted their control of design changes by only rigorously
enforcing strict change policies at the very end of the development cycle (except in
highly complex areas, as noted above). In other words, they targeted change in time.
For example, in the weeks before product release, Network had daily 9:00 am meetings
of the key functional leads, all of whom reviewed and discussed any proposed design
and code changes.
Prioritized and Standardized External (Product) Environment
Although Network and Handphone sought to minimize external
interdependencies and brought core work inside the team's boundaries as much as
possible, some external interdependencies were inevitable. For example, both products
existed in a complicated, heterogeneous use environment, and the teams needed to
manage relatioIlShips with interfacing products and users. Network runs on four
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hardware platforms (Intel, MIPS, Alpha and Power PC) and needs to be compatible
with hundreds of application products and peripheral devices. l"ikewise, a wireless
software product such as Handphone interfaces with a hardware mobile phone unit as
well as other software (for maintenance, billirlg, connecting to emergency services, etc.).
Network and Handphone relied on standarnization and took efforts to prioritize their
environment in order to manage these relations.
Standardization of interfaces was again an important technique, which enabled
work to proceed relatively independently.40 Network relied on Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs), published points of entry between different layers of
PC software products, which list procedure names, what parameters each layer will
accept, etc. Handphone took advantage of global telecommunications standards, \vhich
govern how phone messages and data get translated and transported from one location
to another.
The Network team took further steps to prioritize interfacing products by, for
example, identifying the top one hundred appiications (in. terms of sales) and devoting
testing resources to them first. Although Handphone interfaced with a narrower range
of products, it needed to perform reliably under a vast number of calling scenarios. The
team distinguished between "rainy day scenarios" (hard to reach conditions that were
relatively rare) and "sunny day scenarios" (more common and easily recreated call
conditions). Because approximately 80% of the real world cases fall in the latter
category, the team made them the higher testing priority.
40 The earlier description of standardization was across components within a product. This refers to
standardization of interfaces across products.
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~lcate External Environment Internally
Another technique the teams used to manage external interdependencies was to
repli(~ate the customer environment on site. In effect, they transformed some external
interd1.ependencies into internal ones. For example, Network placed multiple hardware
machines in tester's offices. Handphone brought the hardware mobile phone
equip~nentto the Lucent location and relied on simulators and labs to mimic user
conditilons. These techniques enabled the teams to begin testing relatively early in the
develoF~mentcycle and thus reduce the likelihood of surprises later on. They could also
use mul\tiple testing methods in parallel to discover "hidden" interdependencies:
Our goal is to test the software as it is being developed. We want the test to
start the same time the software starts. Not 'Oh, now that we have [the
code], we can start to write the test.'
In the past we would deliver the software to the site, but nothing worked.
The simulator indicated everything worked fine, but the first time we used
the real hardware mobile unit, it didn't work. It's because in the protocol,
typically you have options and the simulator doesn't duplicate all those
options very well... Those failures are easy to debug [early] but very hard
once on [the customer] site.
We performed [simulator], lab, and hardware equipment testing and
integration in parallel. We tried to maintain the same progress on all three
fronts so there weren't any surplises later on. No method is perfect. So
when certain stuff was working on the simulator, we would go and try it
out on the lab. Usually we found new issues there.
Centralized Coordination Tasks in Special Roles
Tile Network and Handphone teams centralized certain coordination tasks to
trim the administrative overhead and enable team members to concentrate on
production tasks. Supervisors also assumed personal responsibility for managing key
resources in such a way as to minimize frustration levels and blocking on the projects.
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On Handphone, responsibility for tasks such as scheduljng meetings, reserving
rooms, and setting up and maintaining labs had been delegated down to the engineer
level as a result of corporate down sizing. As a result, engineers with fifteen or more
years of technical experience often found themselves "running around, trying to find
people, or trying to identify a meeting date and room." Lab facilities, in. particular,
represented a time d.rain for many team members:
Lab time is scheduled in four or six hour blocks, so first there's contention
for a spot. Then you need to get the lab in the right state for testing your
particular product, which means loading and reloading differellt system
releases. It can take two hours just to get it into the right state. If you don't
get it right or nm into problems, you can end up having no time left to
actually run your tests.
In an attempt to solve these problems, one person on the Handphone team was
assigned the role of "Wild Card.1I The Wild Card had no specific coding responsibilities
but instead moved around and helped out as needed. Along with the feature engineer
and feature manager, he effectively acted as a consultant to the team and assumed
responsibility for scheduling all design and code inspection meetings. He also went
into the lab in advance of developers and testers to ensure that the test facilities were in
the proper working state. According to the people interviewed, this advance
preparation made an enormous difference in their productivity:
Usually, in order to do 10% of the tests, I have to know 100% of the lab. I
have to know 'this machine does this, that machine does that.' [The Wild
Card] became a lab expert, so me lab was always up and working when I
went into test.
Network used a similar "Umbrella Support" person to handle unanticipated
problems and requests in their product component integration sub group. On an earlier
version of the product, two builders were responsible for integrating the components on
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a daily basis. The build manager reflected on the coordination process under this
arrangement:
The builders would come in at 9:00 am and just go crazy all day long
[handling unanticipated problems and requests from developers]. They
used a white board and then a pad of paper to track the backlog of requests
a.nd people waiting to check their code in. It got to be reams and reams of
paper, and they eouid never catch up. They were burned out and highly
stressed. Plus, they often didn't have time to actually perform the
integration, which just added to the backlog of problems and requests.
He decided to split the builders into two overlapping shifts. One person was
responsible for the more routine parts of the job, namely performing the integration,
while the second person was designated "umbrella support. II According to the manager
and others on the team, the result was a complete transformation of the work process.
The first builder was able to work uninterrupted and, therefore, got the integration
done on a regular basis.41 A regular, predictable product integration in turn resulted in
fewer change requests, and the umbrella support person was easily able to cover those
that did occur.
Increase Visibility of Hidden Interdependencies
Managers and team leads on Network and Handphone were very aware of
"hidden" interdependencies42, and took active steps to unearth them early. For
example, certain areas of the product were recognized to have "deep
interdependencies." People working in those spots met frequently to try and discover
them. A daily product component integratIon (described below) also helped both teams
41 Product component integration is also quite manual and hardware intensive and, therefore, prone to
error. The absence of distractions significantly decreased the probability of such errors.
42 These included some "near neighbor" or first order relationships as well as second anti third order
ones.
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identify interdependencies and code conflicts, as did using multiple testing methods in
parallel (described above).
Product Component Integration
People on both teams were passionate about the importance of product
compOIlent integration. They believed it was key to coordinating interdependencies
and devoted a great deal of thought and attention to its management. They also
invested resources in it by, for example, purchasing special, fast computers and placing
their best technical people on it. (In both cases, gaining these resources required some
degree of negotiation and persuasion of upper management.) Refer to Appendix E for a
detailed description of how Network and Handphone designed this process.
Controlling Interdependencies Over Time
Finally, products exist in a use environment which evolves over tUne. This
creates a set of interdependencies with past product versions currently in the field and
necessitates tasks such as maintenance and configuration management. Network
adopted specific strategies to minimize and manage these task relationships
(Handphone was a version 1.0 product). In particular, they altered t.lteir product
strategy.
Network deliberately chose to avoid or minimize "patching" bug fixes or new
functionality on past releases. This minimized complications associated with
configuration management such that "this only runs on version 3.5 with patch #'i'.11
Rather, the team's strategy was to add functionality via more frequent product releases.
lhe team further chose to not have a separate dedicated maintenance department
or group. Instead, they adopted a Quick Fix Engineering (QFE) program, which was
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the responsibility of current developers. Any customer reporting a problem deemed
"mission critical" (blocking usage) was guaranteed that the problem would be
diagnosed and solved within twenty four hO~lIS, if possible. Altll0Ugh this solution
meant that maintenance and current deve' ""'prnent tasks were interdependent, Network
management saw benefits in this conflict:
Twenty engineers dedicated to maintenance assumes you have a lousy
product. HI have a bug out in the field, most likely I have" the same bug
somewhere in the code I am working on. So it would behoove me to fix that
bug in the code I am working on and then figure out how to fix it out in the
field..w The other good thing about doing maintenance this way is that the
developer that writes buggy code will have to spend all of his time doing
maintenance, which means he will be less effective. Which means... he
won't get to write as much code on the current release.. But that's OK-- it's a
self-fulfilling fix for us.
Network also recognized the need to manage their resource interdependencies
over time. Prior bad experiences had raised management's awareness of this factor:
It took forever to get the first versjon of Network out. When it finally
shipped, everyone was tired and burned Qut. Although they felt a degree of
satisfaction, most didn't want to do it again. Once in a lifetime is enough!
So we sat down and realized that if we did releases every year people
wouldn't feel so bad. We could manage the attrition better.
Now Network encour~gespeople to use the time between releases for rest and
renewal. Many team members take extended vacations during this period. Others
write project postmortem documents and reflect on what they learned or how things
should be done differently in the future.
The Desk and Tollphone Teams: A Strategy of Constrained Systemic Manipulation
Data on the Desk and Tollphone tearns consisted of seventeen and eight
interviews, respectively, as well as project memos, presentation view graphs, product
179
schematics, and a questionnaire. While both teams endeavored to manage
interdependencies proactively and systematically, Desk and Tollphone were
constrained in their use of certain up front design techniques due to product and
organizational legacies. These teams drew upon techniques such as prioritization,
standardization, and slack, as well as special organizational stru.ctures, to counteract the
problems presented by their legacy. They also used aspects of past working
relationships derived from prior structures (e.g., friendship, respect) to overcome
certain limitations imposed by their current design.
Up Front Design Decisions
Desk and Tollphone are what is known as "legacy products." They are currently
in an n+1 version of release, and much of the product is original with the design intent
of the version 1.0 product. New product features and functions often cut across this
original design, creating a set of technical interdependencies that need to be
coordinated. Yet the teams have limited ability to redesign the product architecture in
order to simplify task coordination because the technology is embedded in multiple use
environments around the world. To significantly alter the product would represent an
unacceptable disruption in service to existing customers.
Likewise, prior organizational structures on each of the projects resulted in
embedded task relations and ways of working. 1ne teams' ability to coordinate in new
ways was sometimes aided but often inhibited by these past designs and required them
to adopt special forms of integrating mechanisms.
For example, product schematics indicate that the software code in Tollphone
was organized into one major subsystem, Operator Administration (OA), which vIas
further broken down into four main components: a position terminal processor (PTP),
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which handled software at the customer site, an originator terminal processor (OTP),
whiclt handled interactions between the operator and caller's phone site, an automatic
terminul processor (ATP), whim included an announcement unit, and a Query
processor, which performed maintenance and validation. The OA subsystem interfaced
with approximately 50 other subsystems in the switch; the precise number varied
depending on the particular type of product functionality being developed (Figure
4.1c), The product architecture was, therefore, not modular, nor was its design aligned
with the current market. The interviews suggest tltat developers and designers were
very aware of these architectural problems:
Products cut across the =lesign stntcture of the system. Everything is very
divided up. In order to implement a product, you need to make changes in
a lot of different places... Some connections [between subsystems] are
obvious by reading the code, but many are not.
The Tollphone project exhibited a similar functionally distributed structure. A
core group of developers and testers work in the OA department; they team up with
people in other subsystem departments to produce a particular product. The
development manager in Tollphone explained how this structure complicated the
coordination of project start-up and development tasks:
I'm thinking of the process we use for committing to a product...
Particularly with larger products, you may have people from a half dozen
organizations who are contributing parts of that product. The process says
trat once the project is authorized, you must submit a development plan
and staffing profile, \vhich you gt!t from each of the other managers
involved. So you have to go to them and say 'product so and so has been
committed for release on this date. We need six head counts worth of w'ork
froln your group. Give me the staffing profile that commits those people to
that interval to make that delivery.' ~~d there's nothing in the process that
says you socialize this well in advance... Those people may not know the
business dealings that caused this to happen, and it's bound to come as
something of a surprise every time... They have a bunch of priorities which
may conflict... The negotiation of all of this ... can be difficuli.
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IIf you have one developer who's working in the call processing part [in OA]
and another developer working in the Recent Change/Data subsy~stem,
their work interacts fairly closely. So it's important to be able to talk. 'When
is your code going to be ready? When should we schedule a design review
meeting? OOPS, I forgot that piece of data. What can we do abollt it?' Just
those day-ta-day interactions that make it easy... The problem you get into
with these large functional organizations is that communication doesn't
happen, or it happens in a very stilted and formal way. It makes it harder to
get things dane.
Ironically, this same manager pointed out that relationships developed in a prior
more integrated (cross functional, customer-focused team) organizational structure
helped the team members overcome these coordination barriers:
It's clear that cross functional, customer-focused teams are the most
effective. Tollphone had that type or organization, but now we are all
broken up. Field support people moved to a different Vice President area,
customer documentation-- who knows wllere they are. Recent
Change/Data moved to another department... However, because they had
been working so closely with our folks and are sitting in our aisle [in the
case of Recent Change/Data], we are effectively still working as one
department. There is an informal network that is going on there that is
extremely helpful for our work.
We kind of have a zombie organization. It's dead, but it doesn't know it
because of these personal relations. If that ever changed-- people were
moved physically or a whole new set of management came in-- our
efficiency would drop drarnatically.
182
FIGURE4.1c
TOLLPHONE PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE
Wireless
Subsystem
Recent Change
& Data
Subsystem
183
Administrative
Services
Software
The architecture of the Desk project was similarly influenced by the past. The
current organizational structure is one large Desk department, which is further broken
down into separate teams of program managers, product managers, developers, and
testers for each application. When asked why they maintained the application divisions
rather than creating one Desk team, the lead program manager explained the choice as
follows:
Merging [the application teams] into one Desk team is in many ways the
right thing to do, and we filay eventually do it. But for now, knowledge of
the code is important. There are millions and millions of lines of code in
each of these applications, and it would be hard for people in Desk to be a
super specialist in all of them.... We need to keep some amount of product
focus vis a vis Lotus and WordPerfect... Plus, it would just be too big and
unwieldy as one team.
Because the application developers were organized into separate sub groups, it
was initially not clear who should design and develop the shared components. At first,
Desk tried having people representing different applications collaborate on design, but,
as one team member noted:
Design is very subjective, and everyone has their own different priorities.
Once you have multiple people working on design, the people here are too
smart. What you end up with is three correct answers. What we really
need is one correct answer.
Centralizing design within Desk proved equally problematic:
Previously when we wanted to change how a Desk feature worked ... we
llad to go to all of the product teams with a list of things we wanted to do.
One team would say 'we like 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10,' and another team would say
'we like 1,3, 5, 7 and 9.' Each group thinks they're [cooperating] because
they're making five out of ten chc.mges. But then you get in an awful
situation where each group wants a different five, and we l"1(lve to reconcile
them.
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The current solution was, therefore, to have a small integration team on each
application sub group with a fixed amount of time in the schedule for integrating
shared components. The lead program manager and lead developer in Desk described
the solution as follows:
Our solution is to declare a firm boundary of how much product definition
the Desk group can take over. [The applications] donate one feature team
worth of their group whose job it is to integrate all the shared teclmology
and maintain an effective boundary.
All of those problems go away now. For example, toolbars are written by
Desk developers. We're back to the fun situation of a small group of people
designing and developing it, not arguing in meetings or asking for
pennission. And we asked each application group to givt! Desk a fixed
budget of integration time for the shared code. If you don't actually own
that time, it's almost impossible when you're dealing with so many different
groups to change things.
So Desk can only do features that create integration time to fit into that
budget. If they want to do something else, they work directly with tIle
integration tealY\S to take back some work and give them new stuff. It's
more successful, and we can do bigger things.
The structure of the Desk documentation group did not parallel that of the rest of
the team. The documenters, who perform tasks such as writing, editing, and producing
the documentation, were organized into one sub team (i.e., no application product
subdivision) within the Desk department. Like on Handphone, the non-parallel
structure meant that a documenter trying to describe a feature had to talk with up to
five different developers. The tasks within the two functions were also partitioned
along different paradigms:
(Documenters] writes about features from a user's perspective, as a user
sees it. Developers work on features in terms of pieces of a module. So a
developer may ""ork on one aspect of a toolbar in milestone one and
anothi:r aspect in milestone four. But we need to write about the wllole
toolbar-- the partitioning of the work isn't equal, and it creates a certain
tension.
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Minimized Number of Externallnterdependencies
The Desk team used aspects of organizational structure and process to control
the large number of externally supplied components. For example, three external
groups producing three interdependent components were temporarily reorganized into
a 'cubed' team in order to minimize the number of group interfaces the Desk program
managers had to keep track of.
Tollphone could not elimL,ate its external relationships with other subsystem
department bllt cultivated certain external relationships carefully. For example, the
Tollphone lead development manager noted:
I personally have made a strong effort to work with the manager in
RC/Data so we can have a special relationship. I make a point of
maintaining and cultivating that relationship.
Targeted Up Front Product Design
Like Network, Desk targeted product design changes in time, instituting strict
change control policies prior to product release. Near the end of the development cycle,
the functional leads in the applications and Desk met every day in 5:00pm "war
meetings" where they reviewed the status of bugs, considered proposed changes, and
discussed new crises and events.
Standardized and Prioritized External (Project) Interdependencies
The Desk team drew upon several techniques to facilitate external sharing and
coordination with other projects. One technique was process standardization in the
form of a common development platform, tools, and schedule. The lead Desk
developer was a particularly strong proponent of this, arguing that "if 'Ne can get
enough things between. the groups to be the same, getting everything done on time kind
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of falls out of that." Other team members questioned its feasibility, given tIle strong
established cultures and practices in each of the application groups.
A temporary transition solution was the use of a tiered approach. Tier 1
applications were tightly coupled in terms of their schedule and tools whereas Tier 2
were less so. Some of the shared components were also assigned a primary client or
application who had slightly more leverage in terms of its design.
Desk used a similar tiered approach to control interdependencies between its
core English product and foreign language versions. The English version of Desk was
developed first in the U.S. and then immediately converted into German, French,
Spanish, and Portuguese by the same team (or a team in Ireland)~ The team
simultaneously developed a localization kit, which detailed exactly how the u.s.
version was produced and what needed to be done d1 ring translation. Then vendors Lq
countries around the world served as translation houses that replIcated the product into
other languages. Higher priority Tier 1 and 2 languages received constant file updates
while Tiers 3 and 4 received final versions of the U.S. files only.43
Furthermore, the Desk team instituted a very systematic communication set-up
between the U.S. and its Tier 1 and 2 translation partners. The two groups spent time
visiting each other's sites and held weekly conference calls where the change
information and materials were exchanged. One participant ill the process described it
as follows:
It's very methodical. Always the same people delivering and receiving,
using the same format, and posted on the same server. The consistency
43 The former strategy represented a competitive market advantage because it meant that foreign and
U.S. language products could be released simultaneously, but it necessitated extensive coordination with
foreign development.
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really helps. In any body's life, the more consistency you can get, the more
confident you can feel.
Other Desk team members maintained active status lists with issues to be
resolved for each external partner and "touchable" metrics so they could track their
progress over time.
Replicate External Enyironment Intemall~
Like Handphone, Tollphone took steps to replic'ate the Cllstomer calling
environment on site so they could rigorously test the software code before it went into
the field. For example, the software was placed in an actual working network "test bed"
maintained by Lucent where it "soaked" for several days. Technicians monitored its
performance there under various stress conditions such as high calling volumes.
Slack in Schedule and Feature Set
The Desk team dealt with high degrees of sharing by instituting more slack in the
schedule in the form of increased buffer time. They also made sure that the set of
shared features varied in terms of risk (i.e., it included both well understood and
completely new features and functions).
Special Meetings
Most design decisions in Desk were reached by informal negotiation and
brokering but "blessed" in meetings "like a marriage ceremony." Thus, meetings were
used not for decision making, but to announce and reconfirm decisions already made in
more informal settings.
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The documentation subgroup in Desk instituted "4:00 pm stand-up" meetings.
The theory was that without the comfort of chairs, people would stay focused on the
issues, and the meetings would be shorter.44
Special Roles
In order to have the flexibility to respond to unforeseen development changes,
the Desk documentation group designated a Ufloater" role. When developers changed
their schedule or design, this person rotated to the area of the work most affected by the
change.
Email
Both teams used email extensively, but it was viewed as a complement to, not a
substitute for, face-ta-face discussions. There was a general "reluctance to speak for
third parties," and people seemed to feel that large group discussions were difficult to
conduct over email. The nature of the discussions also often dictated more personal
forms of interaction, as suggested in the following quote:
Many things [having to do with shared components] need to be resolved in
person, not email. The issues are so complex and involve technical and
personal things.
Ihe Data and Autopbone Projects: A Strateuof Local Reaction
Information on the Data and Autophone projects consisted of five and six
interviews, respectively, as well as product schematics, marketing and promotional
material, observations, and a questionnaire. These data, coupled with additional
conversations with managers at each firm, show these projects as the least pro-active
and most chaotic in terms of the interdependency management. The teams failed to
44 Note that Ford Motor Company is reportedly using "no chair meetings" on certain of its design teams
ijaroff, September 4, 1995).
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make critical up front design decisions to simplify task coordination. Nor was there any
indication that they prioritized different types of interdependencies. Instead, the teams
relied on more traditional forms of coordination such as task forces, committees, and
slack.
up Front Design Decisions
Schematics indicate that the Data and Autophone products had a highly
integrative architecture in the sense that functionality was distributed across key
components. Changes in the software code in one component, therefore, depended on
changes in oUler components. Both projects were structured as small sub-teams of
peers with little if any integrating mechanisms across them. As a result, team members
tended to either identify with their component or feel like they were simultaneously a
member of multiple teams:
I feel like there are six or eight teams I am a part of.
The product architecture of Dat,l consisted of a shell and four key components:
an underlying database engine, an embedded language compiler, which enables users
to manipulate objects, Forms and Reports functionality, and visual designer tools such
as Schema, Table, and Query. Two peopl,~described the cross-component inter-
relationships as follows:
We can't do a daily integration because of the way the interdependencies
are distributed. Say you have six components and you try to smash them
all together one day a week. Then component one, which depends on
component two, which deF~ndsor~. component three... llever has a chance to
react to the changes the others lnad,~. The interdependencies are one-to-
one-to-one, not one-to-one. It's integration hell.
The shell sits on top, so it should roll IIp last. But there also exists calling
back and forth between the shell and v'arious components due to
interactions. So if the shell wants to ad,i new interfaces, they need to go
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early so the components can test it. So the shell should uniquely go both
early and late... It's never going to work perfectly.
The project architecture the team imposed only served to complicate the
coordination process. The four core components were designed, developed, and tested
by teams with different organizational affiliations and geographic locations. One team
supplied the database engine, a second group supplied the language component, a third
team was responsible for developing the Forms and Reports component, and a fourth
team developed the visual designer tools. One member of the fourth team described the
resulting situation as follows:
It's hard to get six teams to coordinate coherently. They tend to say 'Yes, it's
true you depend on me, but I have three other groups depending on nle,
and they are higher priority from my perspective.'
The problem did not appear to be that the team members did not like or respect
one another or get along; several people described good working relationships at the
individual level. Rather, the sheer number and complexity of the inter component and
inter team relationships tended to pull people in multiple diverse directions:
If you read any of the software literature, they advocate avoiding
interdependencies, and you feel and know why that is true [on a project like
this]. Every time you depend on someone, you have to communicate with
them, deal with them. You ha\J·e to bend in some direction or they have to
bend. And it's rare that two parties involved in a pairwise interdependency
come together because tiley are being tugged by different things.
The Autophone project was similarly characterized by big blocks of product
functionality connected by deep technical interdependencies and an organizational
structure in which key components were implemented in differer\t departments and
locations. The 5ES5-2000 switch handled switcllillg and links to other
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telecommunications systems and was developed by another business unit in Illinois; the
Executive Cell Processor (ECP) consisted of hardware and software necessary to set up
and process calls and negotiate internal communi~ationand was developed by a team
in Illinois; development of the hardware and software for the Series 2 Cell Site, which
performs actual call processing, was sub divided into an RCC and CCS component and
distributed across Illinois and New Jersey.
A further complication was that the RCC and CCS code were partitioned using
different paradigms. RCC code was partitioned and assigned on a per feature basis
whereas ecs (which is closer to the hardware) was organized more functionally. A
developer working on the RCC component described the problems she encountered
integrating her code with that in CCS:
Traditionally, an RCC person would have one point of contact [in CCS].
Each person would agree, 'OK, my changes are ready, yours are ready.
Let's submit.' But now that [eeS] person may have dependencies such that
there are a few other functional areas that have to come together to make it
all click with RCC. Somehow, it comes up after the fact, 'Oh, so and so's
code has to be there tao.'
The need for smaller components slices with fewer interactions was
particularly apparent given the intensely competitive and rapidly changing market
environment of the Autophone project. For example, tean1 members were unable to
respond to customers demanding "late in the game adjustments to delivery" because the
software was designed to be delivered in its entirety, not as particular features or
functions: 45
45 Note the similarity with the Tollphone case here. The delivery paradigm in each project is changing
more rapidly than the design of the software. In Autophone's case, the change is within a development
cycle.
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We've each got our pieces. They're done and tested and ready to bring
together, but now we want to bring them together piece meal. CCS wants
to bring some of their functional areas, not others, but RCC is all wrapped
up together. We thought we had talked it through- you've got the right
functionality to come togetl:\er with my feature-- but when we went to do it,
an official integration load effectively blew up... The problem is \ve're
trying to change delivery after the code was developed. You don't have the
flexibility at that point to break functional dependencies because you are
not designing the code to deliver in that manner. You designed it to deliver
all at once.
Core Components and Tasks Performed Externally
On botll projects, core components-- features and functions that interacted with
many other parts of the product-- were designed and developed externally by teams in
other departments. On Data, four core components were distributed across four teams
and two departments. Examples of outsourced core components on Autophone were
Recent Change/Data and ODA.
Because these teams lacked a common departmel1tal affiliation (they reported
to different managers and were often governed by different incentive schemes),
coordination across teams "vas difficult. Furthermore, there was little sense of product
rI
team unity, and people tended to be distracted by other demands within their own
organizalion.
Collaboratiye Product Design, "Liying" Specifications, and Strict Change Control
Throughout the Development Cycle
The Data and Autophone projects exhibited other similarities in their
approaches to interdependency management. Both teams tried to write very detailed
design documents and specifications in large groups. The Data program manager
described Ius recent experience in one such meeting as follows:
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Just trying to coordinate and print specifications from all of these teams is
horrendous. It's hard to anticipate the size of the spec until you actually
bring people together. Then you find out that each team's spec is 25-100
pages long, the entire thing is equal to two Manhattan phone books, and
everyone has categorized things differently... My hot issue is someone else's
ho hum that they don't care about at all. The program managers will leave
the room saying 'Yes, we will all do X, , and nothing will happen.
Both projects also relied upon flexible or "living" specification documents
almost exclusively and experienced problems keeping the documents current and
ensuring that people were working off of the same versions. Inevitably, developing
code took precedence over maintaining documents, and documents were done after th~
product sllipped, if then. Ironically, given the flexible specification approach, change
control policies in each case were extensive but largely ignored. They existed
throughout the development cycle and were de~entralizedinto multiple committees:
There are a bunch of [change] review boards! I can't even begin to name
them all, and that's part of the problem ~very time someone sees a crises,
the micro organizational solution is to say '~/e need someone to review this. r
... They're a bunch of spinning wheels. r don't think anyone has a global
view.
~) Standardization or Prioritization of External Interdependencies
There was little interface or process standardization on the Data and
Autophone projects. Nor did the teams appear to assign a primary client or prioritize
component use. For example, one team on the Data project adopted a completely
different schedule than the other teams in terms of internal milestones and integration
frequency. The Data lead program manager questioned the value of trying to define
interfaces and processes across teams:
There is value in. letting each team define and have its own development
process because believing in the commitments you make will make you a
little 111 ore committed. It's a classic compromise and something that
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everyone is just a little uncomfortable with, but also something everyone
thinks will work.
Instead of standardization or prioritization, people used informal rules and
heuristics to decide which product had priority in terms of component design and
integration. Two popular decision criteria were "likelihood of shipment" and "technical
challenge":
The people working on [Data components] are very interested and
challenged by the requirements of [another product]. Data has more of an
end user focus, so the tools don't have high visibility. [The other product] is
more of a developer focus- it's more technically challenging because the
tools are front and center and visible to the customer.
We keep a running list of [host products] that depend on us, and once a
quarter we reorder them in terms of priority. We use criteria like: do we
believe they will actually ship when they say they will, which will ship
first... And then there are 'jazz factors' like whether it's cool technology.
The Autophone project also had little success with interface or process
standardization. The ECP and Cell code were developed on different platforms and
used different header files, names, and change management systems. All sub teams
followed a slightly different component integration process (See Appendix E).
Slack in Schedule, Feature Set, and Human Resources
The Data team put factors in their schedule to reflect the increased amount of
time people spent coordinating (e.g., all senior people were 0% loaded, other people
were 50-70% loaded).
Data also instituted some slack in the feature set. For example, the project
sacrificed functionality in order to meet delivery deadlines on numerous occasions (they
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Itried and failed to share components at least five times). As the Data lead program
manager noted:
If there are two products with competing solutions and you are trying to
find the be all and end all solution, sometimes it's easier and better to say
'let's just have two.'
Both projects utilized forms of lluman slack by increasing the ratio of
coordinators to developers on the project.
Email
While all of the projects relied on electronic forms of communication such as
email, the Atltophone and Data projects tended to use these tools as a decision making
forum. For example, an Autophone team member described an on-going technical
dialogue about timing issues on the switch where, in more than twenty exchanges over
two months, the team members debated different solutions. In Network and
Handphone, in contrast, email was viewed as an arena for "small dialogues. It
Increase Visibility of Hidden Interdependencies
Data relied on newsletters in an attempt to make interdependencies "public. II
But by the time the newsletter came out, the status of interdependencies had often
changed.. There was also no real incentive for people to either read or submit
information to the p'ublication, and no penalty for ignoring it.
Coordinating Interdependencies Across Time
Some of the most complicated interdependencies on the Autophone project
involved managing task relationships across successive product versions. The team's
strategy of overlapping product generations resulted in products and task relationships
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Ithat were complex and yielded unpredictable change effects. In particular, versions 2.0
and 3.0 of the product were each "split off' the prior release before it was completely
stable, which necessitated some amount of mapping of code features and bug fixes
forward and backward. One team member explained the situation as follows:
Splitting the second release from the first was not pretty. Problems
occurred because whenever you split, it's never late enough for tile prior
generic to have all the code there or early enough for the next release to
have a base to do development on... Depending on when you split, you're
going to have more or less mapping or more or less instability in the next
release. When we split, we still had some late features being delivered to
1.0 plus a lot of bug fixes from testing at the customer site.
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TABLE 4.1
MANAGEMENT APPROACHES BY INTERDEPENDENCY TYPE
ManaGement Al2l2roaches
Type of Systemic Manipulation ConstraiD~g Local Reaction
... --
~ -.2 ManipJ1latioDy
Product • simple, layered, modular • product design cuts • integral product design
Technology product design across interacting • project structured as
(coordinating • parallel product and subsystems small Sltb teams of peers
tasks related to projectstnuctures (t project design cuts with different
the design, • common functional task across illteracting organizational affiliations
development, partitions departments and geographic locations
and testing of • well-defined • non-parallel functional • different task
product) component interfaces; structures partitioning schemes
strict component • different task within a function
ownership partitioning schemes • very detailed design
• target up front product across functions documents written in
design effort and • integration sub teams in large groups of peers
approach to product each department with e almost exclusive use of
complexity and stage of fixed budget of flexible spec documents
development eycle( fixed integration time • strict decentralized
designs for core • "War meetings" change control
components, flex specs for • draw upon prior • infrequent product
user interface and working relationships component integration,
peripheral functions, • "floater" role decentralized into sub
minimal changes at end) teams
• daily product • email as decision
component integration making forum
performed internally by
experienced technical
people
External Product • prioritize and • replicate product
Environment standardize external environment on site (test
(coordinating product environment bed)
tasks related to • replicate product
the product's use environment on site
environment) (hardware on site, labs,
simulators)
External Projeet • develop core • temporarily redraw arg'l a core components
Environment components internally boundaries (make 3 developed externally
(coordinating • minimize number of external partners into 1) • little process or interface
tasks across externally supplied • cultivate relationships standardization
project team components and tasks with key partners • slack in schedule and
boundaries) • assign central contact • process standardization feature set
point to each external (common development • resolve conflicts across
partner; frequent pre- platform, tools, and teams via informal rules
scheduled conversations schedule); tiered and heuristics
• temporary collocation • "marriage meetings" • newsletters
• "lift and modify" • slack in schedule and
sharing feature set
• active status lists and
touchable metrics
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Resource • supervisors assume • "4pm stand-up • slack in human
Sharing responsibility for meetings" resources (increase ratio of
(coordinating minimi2;ing resource coordinators to
tasks that share blocking developers)
resources) • ''Wild Card" and
''Umbrellau support roles
Tasks Across • avoid "patching" • map functionality and
Time functionality on products fixes across successive
via more frequent releases product releases
• assign maintenance
tasks to current developers
• build in time for
renewal between projects
4.4.4 Mapping Management Approaches to Interdependency Type
The coordination teclmiques described above were effective at managing
different types of interdependencies. Table 4.1 maps the techniques to the type of
interdependency they primarily addressed.
4.4.5 Mapping Approaches and Interdependency to Project Performance
Although the data on project performance are incomplete and subject to error, it
is possible to draw some tentative conclusions by looking across the three data sources.
Qualitative and Quantitative Data
Table 4.2 presents evidence of positive and negative performance outcomes for
each project along four dimensions (schedule, software integration, quality, and team
functioning). The data in the table represent extractions from the interview transcripts
as well as project documents and tracking databases. It is, tllerefore, sparse, largely
uncontrolled, and of questionable validity, although I took steps to verify it and only
present evidence coming from more than one source. Nevertheless, certain preliminary
results do emerge. The final column of the display captures the initial Qutcorne
assessment given this data.
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TABLE 4.2
QUALITATIVE & QUANTITATIVE OUTCOME META-MATRIX: Product & Project Performance Outcomes
IDaDENCEOFPOSDaVE EVIDENCE OF NEGATIVE RESEARCHER'S OVERALL
OUTCOMES & PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES 8; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
DESK Schedule: RlM date slipped from 6/30 Schedule: Data slipped for several Some major problems but can largely
to 7/15 months, thus delaying Pro version be attributed to new product and org'l
Software Integration: Software Integration: Ult sometimes models: "Many interdependencies
Duality: took us days to figure out what's were hidden before when [products
Team Functioning: some tension betw wrong with the buildu; "Data is the were produced] sequentially."
apps and Desk (loss of autonomy; outlier in terms of wanting to do stuff'
conflicting reqs) but balanced by high Dualily: "Majority of bugs were due to Primarily localized problems (i.e.,
respect; pro-active, problem solving setup, which was very unstable" setup)
attitude Tham Functioning:
Strong evidence that team members
are aware of problems and have plans
to address them in next release
DATA Schedule: Schedule: product originally Tea.~members think in terms of
scheduled for shipment in 1996 but components, not one product
Software Integration: delayed to 1997
Software Integration: Yet to achieve a Major, on-going software integration
Qyality: full product integration of all major problems
components on an on-going basis
Team Functioning: Qyality: sacrificed functionality from On-going design and delivery issues
original product concept with 4 external component teams
Team Functioning: little evidence of
cohesiveness or cooperation; no clear
leadership; Itpromises but no action"
NETWORK Schedule: product shipped on time Schedule: Few major problems for a product of
Software Integration: daily and weekly Software Integration: this size and complexity
builds very early in cycle Oualit~:
Quality: 5 months after 3.51 release, 6 Team Functioning: Functioned effectively as a large team
high priority repairs on Cyst sites
Team Functioning: very strong team Some blocked component delivery
spirit and identity; proud due to higller priority project
andconfident attitude
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~
HAND-
PHONE
TOLLPHONE
AUTO-
PHONE
EVIDENCE OF POSITIVE
OUTCOMES_&; PERFORMANCE
Schedule: available on schedule when
customer wanted it; 6 ma coding
interval vs. avg 13 ma on comparable
projects
Software Integration: some problems
at beginning, but quickly corrected
after change to new process
Quality: handover interval in 1/100
sec vs. requirement of <=1 sec; 17
common site scenarios passed first
time; predicted total faults =500 vs.
actual 296
Team Functioning: "best working
experience of my life"
Schedule:
Sofrn'are Integration:
Ouality:
Team Funct1ontn~.
Schedule:
Software Integration;
Duality:
Team Functioning:
EVIDENCE OF NEGATIVE
OUTCOMES_~PERFO~MAN_CE
Schedule:
Software IntelPBtion:
Ouality:
Team Functioning:
Schedule:
Software Integration;,
Quality:
Team ~unt"tf"1lnnn"lln-.
Schedule: "trouble delivering features
to customer on time"; three releases in
progress while V1.0 delivered to
customer 'on trial basis'; avg delivery
interval 30+ rno and cOWlting
Software Integration: never able to
consistently achieve integration of
major components
Duality: continually 'losing'
functionality (intentionally and not)
Team Functioning: "frenzied and
chaotic"; "I feel I am part of 6-8
different teams"
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________________~1MI
RESEARCHER'S OVERALL
ASSESSMENT
A highly successful project along a
number of dimensions both
objectively and in light of some major
obstacles at the beginning (i.e.,
unassigrled personnel, very aggressive
schedule set by sales force)
A legacy product (in U.S.) that has had
to adapt to changes in technology and
market
No clear leader, ownership or
accountability
Major software integration and
customer delivery problems
Clear evidence of a project out of
control
Network and Handphone both shipped on time and experienced few significant
software integration problems. Data on product quality (as represented by the number
of post release bugs) was extremely limited, but neither project appeared to have
significant field problems. On Handphone, the number of pre-release bugs (all severity
levels) exceeded estimates, but the testitlg on customer site was very rapid and problem
free. The evidence on both projects is also very strong that team members found it to be
a very positive working environment. This was particularly true of Handphone, which
more than one person interviewed described as "the best working experience of my
life."
The data likewise suggest a clustering of results for the Data and Autophone
projects, which exhibited the local reaction strategy. There was little if any evidence of
positive outcomes, but strong and consistent evidence of poor performance. Both
projects experienced significant shipping problems; the Data schedule slipped aile year
while Autophone was still slipping at the last data collection point. Neither team was
able to consistently achieve integration of product components and used similar
adjectives to describe the process (i.e., "very unreliable," "integration hell," Ita
We've got some work to do to try and clean up the process and get
integration off to a good start rather than having to cllurn through problems
early on... Every time we do an integration, we seem to spend a week or two
hacking at some critical problem before we can get things stable enough to
perform testing.
We've had to intentionally drop functiona!ity between integration loads.
And it's not at all uncommon to unintentionally drop things. Features and
functions that used to work fine just don't anymore.
Finally, the data suggest irregular and chaotic team functioning on both projects
with little member satisfaction in either the process or outcome.
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For the Desk and Tollphone projects, the outcome and performance data are less
readily interpretable. The Desk release date slipped approximately fifteen days (less
than 5% of the total schedule), but this was largely attributed to the fact that another
major product was going through manufacturing at the same time. Desk had a large
number of very severe bugs before and after release, most of which were concentrated
in the setup component. Data on the Tollphone schedule and bugs was not available.
Both teams had problems performing software component integration. On Desk,
the application teams were ~lorking through issues of how to combine their processes.
Tollphone experienced some integration problems early onJ but these were largely
resolved once the team converted to a new process. There appeared to be a moderate
amount of conflict and chaos on each project, particularly Desk, but this was largely
tempered by high experience levels, respect, and a problem solving attitude among the
team leads.
We can tentatively concluded that, although Desk and Tollphone did experience
some negative performance outcomes, it is not entirely appropriate to classify them as
poor performers along with Data and Autophone, for two reasons. First, the interviews
suggested that team members and managers were quite aware of the sources of the
problems and often had plans in place to rectify them in the future. For example, the
Desk group was already working on how to reorganize the development of the setup
component in the next release. Second, as noted earlier, both projects were undergoing
significant transition in their product architecture and product market, which required
them to change their processes. The Desk project was tI}"ing to integrate five pre\Tiously
independent applications and converting from an unintegrated, asynchronous product
release to annual integrated shipment. The Tollphone project was almost moving in the
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opposite direction- from annual or biannual system release to continuous streams of
smaller functionality. Table 4.3 documents these transitions.
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TABLE 4.3
TIME-ORDERED DISPLAY: Longitudinal Changes in Product Design & Release and Project & Process Design
.cME PERIOD ONE PERIOD TWO
PROPUCT DESIGN & PROJECT & PRl)~ PRODUCT DESIGN & PRQJECT & PROCESS KEY FACTORS KEY ISSUES AND
RELEASE DESIGN RELEASE DESIGN DRIVING CHANGE IMPLICATIONS
DESK product specific indep cross-functional about 50% shared Desk product team with Market: -70% of app Loss of Autonomy: "I
components and app teams; Desk components; one cross functional sales come thru Desk spend all my time
manuals integration team common Desk manual; application subteams; supporting Desk not
large number of dedicated integration Customers: demand app features"; the ttDesk
app-driven release; indep processes with externally supplied tearns on each app; one commonality and tax"; fear that Desk ttwill
apps ship separately "varying degrees of components documentation team consistency across apps take over"
followed by Desk rigor"
annual Desk-driven common scheduling Technology: new tools Increased Overhead:
emphasis on "per release; simulanteous and integration like OLE enable "takes more people to
product loyalty and app shipment; releases processes;connmon component sharing do same amount of
focus" alternate minor/major definitions and criteria \-York"; more time
functionality additions at milestone points Efficiency: less checking and "stone
redundancy of effort; turning"
Desk focus "implement a feature
once, maybe 1.5 times, Clash of application
and everything over group practices,
that is gravy" priQrities and cultures:
"a set of conflicting
Specialization: focused forces pulling you in
expertise for component different directions"
development
Inc;reased Schedule Risk
TOLL- system organized into "large org implemented 90% of features "smaller org Competition: increased Feature delivery Qut of
PHONE 50 functional large features with delivered as customized implementing smaller time to market synch with the base
subsystenls; fairly developers working in products features with pressures in long project
localized features small number of developers working in distance service
modules" new features larger number of Multiple (increasingly
biannual shipment introduced as patches modulesH Customers: calling divergent) product
releases (1000/0 of multi-functional or bug fixes needs/reqs differ by versions running
subsystems released at department functional depts (field country (e.g., Sri Lanke around the world
same time, customers continuous streams of support, doc, load autom ends int'l calls>
get all of them); ''big product integration functiollali ty building, project 10 mins)
bangs" of functionality performed internally planning, RC/Data in
different departInents)
product integration
performed by external
support organization
Reported Product and Process Problems
As described in the methods section (Appendix D), the projects were also
classified according to the type and severity of their self-reported problems. The project
clusters derived from this analysis largely support the conclusions drawrl above (Table
4.4).
Like most large projects, Handphone and Network experienced some minor
problems (coded M on Table 4.4), which affected small numbers of people. Handphone
also experienced significant blocking early on due to architecture uncertainty and their
inability to gain hiring approval from upper management, but these were eventually
resolved (coded L). t~ajor ongoing problems were limited to two areas (coded X).
Handphone shipment was almost delayed at the very end when another project sharing
a common header file broke their code. Network under \vent several temporary delays
because it was sharing certain features with another product or depended on a common
component team also serving that product.
Autophone and Data, in contrast, are shown to have had major on-going
problems in three to five areas (coded X). Product component integration was the most
severe, but others included gaining consensus on a common development process,
product delivery planning, and component sharing. Finally, the data on Tollphone and
Desk are again mixed. Both projects experienced minor and major problems in several
categories (coded X and M). Desk, in particular, appeared to have plans in place for
resolving some of these.
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Questionnaire
Appendix F describes the project performance survey. The response rate from
internal and upper level managers was too small for reliable estimates (less than 5%).46
However, the project rankings by internal experts rnatched those found from the other
two data sources.
4.5 Discussion
Interdependency Management and Project Performance
The first goal of this research was to document teams' strategies toward multiple
interdependencies. I was able to differentiate three different approaches and to m.onitor
the actual techniques associated with those strategies. Table 4.5 presents a summary of
the strategies and performance outcomes.
TABLE 4.5
TEAM DIFFERENCES IN STRATEGIES AND PERFORM~l\NCE
Strategies Teams Performance
Systemic Manipulation Nenvork High
Handphone High
Constrained Systemic Desk Medium
Manipulation Tollphone Medium
Local Reaction Data Low
Autophone Low
The study's key proposition is this: new product development teams which
adopt a systemic manipulator approach to interdependency management experience
fewer problems and achieve better project outcomes because they manage
interdependencies within and across types and across time. Like spiders weaving a
46 The response rate is low because some team members had transitioned to a new project. The delivery
format of the questionnaire (email) also turned out to be inconvenient for many people (readability
problems). Finally, one of my c,ontacts failed to deliver some of the questionnaires.
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web, such teams create their own "web of interdependeIlcies" by the up front choices
and decisions they make. Similar to the finding by Brown and Eisenhardt, an important
distinguishing factor of these projects was therefore "not how they reacted, but how
they acted... [how they] anticipated, built options, and changed the game, rather than
just playing along" (p. 32) (Brown & Eisenhardt, March 1995).
The systemic manipulator teams, Network and Handphone, effectively created
their own interdependency landscape through key up front design decisions. They
coordinated tasks not merely via people and processes but also by the decisions they
made at the level of the product (e.g., Network and Handphone used a modt ~r
product architecture with well-defined inter-eomponent interfaces), the environment
(e.g., Network prioritized interfacing products in its environment), the product strategy
(e.g., Network decided to not perform extensive maintenance or configuration
management), and the organization (e.g., Network and Handphone chose to invest in
key physical and human resources). The stntctures and processes these teams used
tended to promote a system view of both the product and the team and facilitated
product component integration and team member cooperation.
Handphone and r~etworkalso prioritized interdependencies and gained
leverage off of central tasks such as product component integration. They made heavy
use of incentives to increase people's awareness of the effect their work had on others,
most notably via a product component integration process. They sought and applied
solutions for coordinating systems of multiple interdependencies in a relatively efficient
manner. For example, they replaced duplicate individual coordination mechanisms
with more centralized team solutions (e.g., Handphone "Wild Card;" Network and
Handphone product component integration process) and thus freed up people's time
and attention for production activities. Finally, both teams demonstrated some
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awareness of the future task coordination implications of decisions and structures made
today.
Yet systemic manipulation can be constrained by legacies of prior product and
organizational structure. A further proposition emerging from this research is that
interdependencies can easily become technically and organizationally embedded.
Other researchers have observed that technological and organizational designs and
strategic decisions often evolve over time in a relatively uncoupled fashion (Gulati &
Eppinger, May 28, 1996). As a result, projects face constraints and task situations
created by past structures and strategies which can be very difficult to dismantle. The
problems Desk and Tollphone experienced were as much a reflection of their past
decisions and coordination structures as their present. In effect, interdependencies in
time one became formalized at time two in the form of organization and product
structures, which in turn dictated new interdependencies at time three. Viewed this
way, the process of organization design becomes one of managing within and across
interdependency types as well as interdependencies across time.
In the case of Tollphone, all embedded technological product architecture created
a complicated set of task relationships during project start-up, development, and
testing. Although team members were clearly aware of the problems and knew how
the product architecture should be re-aligned, they were prevented from doing so due
to prior customer relations. In effect, Tollphone under leveraged by allowing
excessively wide gaps to occur between major re-architectures of the product (Brown. &
Eisenhardt, May 1995). Ironically, the past was also the source of a solution in this case.
Friendship networks created in prior organizational structures enabled the team to
work despite functional and divisional barrierb.
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01\ Desk, the legacy was more one of organi~ation. Prior project structures were
designed to promote an application product focus. As the level of integration in Desk
increased, it created a set of interdependencies across the applications, which required
formerly independent team members to work together. Desk instituted special project
structures, most notably a "fixed budget" integration team on each of the application
groups, but also, like Tollphone, relied upon aspects of past working relatio.nships,
namely high mutual respect, to temper the level of conflict across the teams.
A final proposition emerging from this research is that teams that approach
interdependency man.agement in a localized, reactive way will perform poorly. Data
and Autopllone failed to prioritize either interdependencies or solutions and
implemented coordination techniques in a relatively piece meal fashion. These local
reactors rarely made the link between, say, the design of their product architecture or
their product strategy, and task coordination. Instead, they resorted to yet more
meetings, task forces, people, or redesigned processes. The result was a multitude of
conflicting structures, all of which absorbed coordination time and effort. Like flies
trapped in a web; these projects found themselves thrashing around in a tangled set of
task relationships.
Both teams tried to integrate different components developed by different teams
into one working product. The result was a bunch of "spinning wheels,lf uncoordinated
tasks, and conflicting as well as duplicated coordination mechanisms. They used few if
any mechanisms to increase the visibility of interdependencies beyond a "near
neighbor" level.47 Instead, they relied on broadcast mechanisms such as newsletters but
47 In fact, none of the projects studied had good techniques for visualizing the complete "web" of
interdependencies and thus was unable to completely describe the near and far neigl\bor relationships.
The systemic manipulator cases appeared to worry more about the web problem-tlley wanted and
actively sought tools to manage it from research.
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failed to design incentives for paying attention to such sources. Nor did they design
mechanisms for raising people's awareness of others dependence on them. Individuals,
therefore, felt little if any pain when they changed their work and impacted others. The
amount of time and effort people on Data and Autophone devoted to coordination was
overwhelming in both a psychologicai (tended to produce feelings of frustration or
apathy) and productive sense. Finally, similar to findings by Brown and Eisenhardt,
Autophone over leveraged successive product generations over time, resulting in an
"increasingly complex and steadily n\ore incomprehensible product" (Brown &
Eisenhardt, May 1995).48
Techniques
Design researchers have long argued that by configuring the product architecture
in such a way as to minimize the interaction among subsystems, task coordination will
be simplified (Alexander, 1964; Allen, November 1986; Clark, 1985; McCord &
Eppinger, August 1993; Simon, December 1962; Ulrich & Eppinger, 1995). The cases
presented here substantiate the importance of that technique. By focusing on critical up
front product design decisions, systemic manipulator teams were able to simplify task
coordination.
But these cases also suggest an important complication. Namely, the relevant
unit of modularity (in terms of what the market values) can change over time,
llighlighting the importance of regularly rearchitecturing the product (Brown &
Eisenhardt, May 1995). Originally, Lucent modularized its telecommunications systems
in terms of functional subsystems. This made sense when the market bought system
products, but now the relevant unit of modularity is a piece that cuts across subsystems.
48 Note the contrast with Tollphone, which under leveraged across generations.
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Project structure has likewise been shown to be a powerful means of
coordinating work (Bowditch & Buono, 1985), and scholars today are increasingly
advocating ever new (and more complicated) forms. The results of this research go
against that prevailing trend. They suggest that a relative!}' simple structure is best.
More important than any particular form, however, is the existence of a certain
parallelism of structure (between product and project as well as across functional group
structures). In the cases, we saw how complicated coordination becomes when this is
not done because people don't know who to talk to (e.g., Desk developers and
documenters, Handphone developers and testers).
Likewise, tasks within a given structure should be partitioned along a common
paradigm (Von Hippel, 1990). This is relatively easy to do within functions (alth.ough
Autopr.one didn't) but can be very difficult to achieve across functions (i.e.,
development and documentation). This research, therefore, supports literature which
has identified task partitioning as a powerful coordinating mechanism but also
highlights a fundamental assumption and complication obscured in that previous work-
- that there exists a single partitioning scheme. McCord & Eppinger likewise found that
partitions are not neat. They required overlap due to multiple dimensions of
interdependency (McCord & Eppinger, August 1993).
If there was one "silver bullet" for managing multiple interdependencies that
emerged from the study it was product component integration. A key proposition is,
therefore, that projects can derive leverage off of designing this central process
correctly. While other authors have previously written about the importance of
component integration in product development (Cusumano & Selby, 1995; Iansiti, 1994;
McCord & Eppinger, August 1993; Ulrich & Eppinger, 1995), the emphasis in this prior
work has primarily been on integration frequency. The earlier and more frequently
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components are integrated, the better in terms of project performance. The present
study supports that conclusion but also offers an extension to theory by suggesting
other benefits and key process design decisions (i.e., increased cooperation and easier
bug fixing lvhen process is perfonned internally by highly experienced technical
people; cooperation incentives targeted to team). An interesting question for future
research is whether integration frequency alone is sufficient to coordinate
interdependencies or whether these other design factors also make a difference.
Finally, Dougherty and Bowman describe how firm down sizing (defined as
restructuring and/or elimination of staff) affects a firm's ability to develop new
products by breaking informal networks aIlLd increasing risk aversion (Dougherty &
Bowman, Summer 1995). The cases descril)ed here substantiate that firm-project
linkage but also suggest an additional vari;able, namely resource investment and
allocation decisions.
Contributions
This research presents a more realistic view of interdependency and provides
some evidence of where it comes from and why and how it can get more complicated
over titlle. As such, it can be viewed as a response to Brown and Eisenhardt's recent call
for more approaches that open up the ''black box" ot product development by providing
depth and rich understanding of how finns actually develop products (Brown &
Eisenhardt, April 1995).
The study shows how a complex technical product and a complex organizational
system of actors performing tasks necessary to produce that product interact. It
supports prior empirical work but also clarifies the linkage between coordination
problems and project outcomes by showirlg the implications at the task level. As a
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result, we are better positioned to design organizational solutions for improved
performance.
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CHAPTER V: Summary and Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the dissertation and discusses the implications of the
research for theory and practice. It also reviews the major limitations of the
methodology and suggests some directions for future research on this topic.
5.1 Summary of Approach and Findings
This dissertation focused on the concept of interdependency in organizations.
The primary research questions were: what types of interdependency exist in
complicated production environments, and what are the consequences of multiple types
for the organization of work? The investigation took place in the context of large scale
sofh.vare product development, which is characterized by very high levels of task
contingency. The analytical approach was that of induction and grounded theory
building (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) using case study projects. The key contribution to
theory is the identification of a need for a multiple interdependency perspective in
organizational design.
The dissertation began by reviewing past empirical and theoretical research on
interdependency across three theoretical paradigms. This review served to motivate the
subsequent empirical investigation. In particular, it illustrated both the breadth of the
concept (interrlependency appears as a constant theme across time and disciplines) but
also a lack of integration across paradigms and even studies within a single paradigm.
A multi-dimensional framework was proposed, which attempted to make sense of this
diversity.
The empirical part of the dissertation was broken down into two studies. The
first used examples of interdependency from large scale software development to
inductively derive a taxonomy of different types. Four primary types emerged, which
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can be traced back to the product technology, external product enviromnent, internal
work unit environment, and firm-level structure and resource policies.
Interdependencies were also shown to vary in terms of their predictability and task
structure.
The second empirical study examined irlterdependency management in six large
scale software development projects in two firms. Drawing upon a rich set of
qualitative data at multiple levels of analysis, it sought to identify the strategi~sand
techniques teams use for coordinating different types of interdependencies and form
hypotheses about their normative implications. The study documented three different
strategies, systemic manipulation, constrained systemic manipulation, and local
reaction. It further proposed that a systemic manipulation strategy will produce the
highest project perfonnance and isolated a small set of coordination techniques that
seem to be highly influential and effective (i.e., up front design decisions, parallel
structures with tasks partitioned along a common paradigm, minimal external
interdependencies, product component integration etc.).
5.2 Research Limitations
All research is characterized by limitations and biases (Cook & Campbell, 1979),
and this study was no exception. First, aspects of the sample may limit the
generalizability of the findings. The dominance of the two firms in their respective
industries creates the possibility of idiosyncratic results where, for example, Microsoft
or Lucent is better able to alter aspects of the product architecture because they control
certain standards. Also of concern is the comparability of the results across the two
settings. Features and functions in the telecommunications industry are typically
developed as customized products to unique specification and requirements. PC
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softwarf' products, in contrast, are more of a mass market product. Some of the
strategic solution differences may reflect this distinction.
It is also important to note that the participating projects were limited to software
technology. This was deliberate and reflective of the goals of the study.49 At the same
time, the types and frequencies of interdependency observed as well as the solution
strategies may be limited to similar types of settings. It remains for future research to
examine how much of the results apply to hardware projects or even outside the
product development setting.50 On the other hand, the fact that more and more
hardware products are starting to resemble and incorporate software suggests that the
results may be very applicable and even indicative of problems likely to be encountered
more generally in the future.
A second limitation of this research arises from the nature of the analytical
process. The interdependency types, solutions, and approaches identified here were not
randomly selected nor rigorously measured. Rather, they emerged from the analysis as
part of an inductive conceptualization process. Although attempts were made to apply
rigor to the analysis, by, for example, displaying the data in a variety of formats and
routinely challenging developing hypotheses, the results are subject to many limitations
and some biases. Future research will have to test the propositions.
Finally, it is possible that a project could manage interdependency very
effectively and yet still exhibit poor performance outcomes due to the existence of other
49 In particular, the primary research question (what types of interdependency exist in large scale
development?) dictated choosing a relatively small, highly variable set of projects. This sample size and
high variance, however, presented problems in tenns of draWing conclusions about the relative
effectiveness of different interdependency management solution strategies.
50 Infonnal conversations with researchers working in other domains suggest that the results may be
quite gerleralizable (e.g., lean aircraft initiative, drug delivery process).
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factors. Project outcomes may also influence as well as be influenced by
interdependency processes, an issue associated with the ambiguity of causal ordering
(Cook & Campbell, 1979). Thus, performance outcomes may :r:ot be reflective of
interdependency management at all.
For example, although the Handphone project appeared to manage
interdependency very well, it was also the smallest project in terms of amount of new
code developed. How much of the success can be attributed to the reduced complexity?
Similarly, were the chaos and inefficiency observed in the Autophone project indicative
of poor interdependency management or Inerely a reflection of working in an emerging
highly competitive arena?
The above factors argue for modeling performance at the interdependency level
of analysis rather than the overall project performance level, as was done here. Such a
modeling would provide a tighter link between interdependency process and outcome.
Unfortunately, this study was unable to make that connection due to data
unavailability.
Instead, attempts were made to control for project variance and external factors
ex post, but again this was complicated by differences across companies and projects.
For example, the two firms use different code counting conventions, making it difficult
to control for product size and complexity. Staffing and work hour norms also differ, as
do accounting practices. I compared evidence across data sources and, in particularl
relied on the rich contextual qualitative data I had access to in an attempt to elucidate
such factors. Consistent with the overall inductive approach, the results of the analysis
are hypotheses about the effectiveness of different interdependency management
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techniques and their implications for project performance, but the verification of these
hypotheses awaits future research.
5.3 IDlplications
This study has both managerial and theoretical implications.
Implications for New Product Development Manasers
For managers, this research presents interdependency as an element of project
strategy that needs to be managed over time. Key questions managers need to think
about are: (1) What interdependencies really mattel' right now, given the need to meet
the multiple goals of speed, quality, and leverage? and (2) How may today's choices and
decisions create a future 'web' of complex task relationships?
The multiple interdependency framework encourages marlagers to differentiate
between different types of interdependencies and, therefore, facilitates targeting of
approaches. The strategic taxonomy- both the identification of key organization design
deci£ions and the listing of alternative approaches- should enable managers to actively
create their own set of interdependencies. The taxonomy can further assist managers in
problem diagnosis, assessment of change, and setting of project priorities before and
during project execution.
Many firms are experimenting with distributed, multi-functional teams as a
possible way to achieve multiple goals in new product development. The results of this
research study do not bode well for that trend insofar as the two distributed projects
studied (Data and Autophone) found it to be very, very difficult to manage. Yet this
research also identified some techniques managers can use to potentially facilitate task
coordination across distances. For example, jf the Data and Autophone teams had been
able to standardize their processes and development environment across locations and
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had parallel product-project architectures with aligned task scherrles and a gaud
product component integration process, would the results have beell different?
Implications for Iheo~
A paradigm of multiple interdependencies makes several C011tributiol1S to
organization theory. First, it explicitly recognizes the multivariate nature of work by
taking into account the pattem of interdependencies as a whole. The result is a more
sopllisticated and complex view of what interdependence can mean (Pennings, 1975).
An llldirect benefit of having a thorough, concrete description of interdependency
patte'.rns in product development projects is that it 'will stem the counterproductive
tende.ncy to say that "the number of interdependencies is infinite" or "everything
depends on everything else." If we can be precise in defining and drawing boundaries
aroun(:! relationships, then the number is likely to be much less than are imagined
(Eppinger, Whitney, Smith, & Gebala, 1994; Weick, March 1976).
,,~ second important contribution of this research agenda is that it treats
interdependency as a variable (in terms of both tinle and dimensionality) rather than a
constant (Weick, 1974). It explores the multifaceted nature of interdependence as well
as how various types of interdependence may be related or unrelated to one another ill
complicated ways.
Other researchers have described organizational design as "a process filled witll
contradictions and dilemmas" (Pfeffer & Salan.cik, 1983). The model presented here
contributes to our understanding by making the conflicts between and among
interdependencies explicit. This study, therefore, suggests an alternative
conceptualization of the organization design process, one that is more strategic and
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explicitly acknowledges the inherent tradeoffs and conflicts created by multiple
interdependencies as well as the link between decisions and tasks.
The act of organiz~tiondesign is not limited to simply imposing or "matching"
structures, processes, and mecharli~inson different interdependencies in isolation from
one another. Doing so can create duplication of effort and cc~rdinationconflicts such
that the design solution imposed to manage one type of interdependency has negative
repercussions or conflicts with other design solutions needed to manage other types of
interdependencies. Rather, tasks can be designed to highly interdependent (by, for
example, requiting the input of several people) or work can be structured to be highly
independent (if it is partitioned and assigned as such) (Eccles & Nohria, 1992;
Wagennan, 1995).
The skill of orga l tlzation design is one of coming up with sophisticated yet
relatively efficient ways of designing to an overall pattern, attempting to minimize
misfit in that pattern (as opposed to achieve fit in a single element of it), and
maintaining some degree of flexibility in structures and interdependencies. When an
organization (or project) can do this, it becomes a source of strategic advantage.
5.4 Future Research Directions
If nothing ~lse, this research will hopefully motivate other research on
interdependency and encourage scholars to think more critically about their use of this
variable. Several opportunities for future work are also worth noting.
First, there is a need for further investigation of the multiple interdependency
concept in other settings. Are multiple interdependencies an issue in other
223
technological environments? In other types and sizes of firms? Are the solutions
identified here generalizable to those settings?
Second, the implications of interdependency management over time need to be
explored. This study supplied evidence of the impottance and difficulty of managing
interdependencies over time, but the study was cross sectional in nature. We need to
conduct longih.1dinal studies of interdependency management, which track the
interaction between tasks and stnlcture.
Third, this research focused primarily on the stnlctures and processes used to
coordinate multiple interdependencies. We also need to understand the affective and
behavioral processes elicited when working in highly contingent settings. Armed with
knowledge of structure and affect, we will be better positioned to design coordination
solutions to manage work relationships.
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APPENDIX A
Social Science Citation Index Analysis51
One question the literature survey in chapter 2 does not address is the relative
relationship among the three theoretical perspectives on interdependency. For
example, can they be traced back to a common source article or do later perspectives
represent branches off of an earlier line of research? How has the relative balance and
influence of research within and across different perspectives varied across time? Such
questions are beyond the scope of this research, but I present some preliminary
evidence and suggest ways we might address tllem here.
Informal analysis and conversations with scholars suggested that people most
often associate Thompson's 1967 article with th~ concept of interdependency. This
conjecture is supported by data from this survey. I reviewed 93 interdependency
references in total (54 information processing, 26 resource-based theories, and 13 sense-
making theories).52 Eighty-six of these were published after 1967 (49, 24, and 13,
respectively), of which 31 (36%) referenced Thompson.
Next I conducted a forward search of references to Thompson using data from an
electronic bibliographical index. The Social Science Citation Index (SSeI) is an
electronic database of citations in journals across a broad span of the social sciences
(e.g., business, management, political science, sociology, etc.). Source articles are
available since 1972.53 An electronic search of the tJatabase in March 1997 for all
references to Thompson (1967) revealed 3145 'hits: Figure A.I shows how these citation
51 Thanks to MIT Sloan School Senior Associate Reference "Librarian Kate Pittsley for valuable h~lp in
performing this search.
52 Because the articles were not randomly selected, we cannot draw any conclusions or generalizations
from this distribution.
53 In a confusing bit of nomenclature, 'source article' refer:; to the journal publication that contains a
reference to the target article, in this case (Thompson, 1967).
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references were distributed across the years 1972 (the year the database began) through
1996 (the last full year at the time of this study).
As seen in the histogram, the rate of citations has remained fairly steady since
1978, averaging about 130 per year during that interim. Figure A.2 shows how the 3145
references are distributed by journal subject category. Not too surprisingly, business
and management journals account for the vast majority of the references (79%), but
Thompson's work has also influenced other fields as diverse as sociology (9%), finance
(4°/£,), and computers (2%).
It is important to note some potential problems with this analysis. First, the
database itself is far from perfect. Source articles only include original journal
publications, not reprints. Nor can we be sure exactly how or why the reference is
made, other than by going back to the original articles (the database only contains the
reference citation and occasionally a brief abstract). In particular, Thompson's book
contained a number of other ideas that have been highly influential in management
theory.
A more significant problem is the lack of a standard reference format. Some
authors use two initials (J.D.) while others use only one cr.). The year (1967) is usually
included but occasionally not, and misspellings are rampant. Thus, a single search may
not reveal the full universe of source articles. Recognizing this, I performed the search
on four major variants: Thompson-JD-1967-Org*, Thompson-J-1967-Qrg*, Thompson-
1967-Qrg* and Thompson-Drg*.
Another potential source of bias is the fact that the set of source journals in the
database has not remained constant over the years (nor is it the full universe of poten~ial
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journals). This bias would be reflected in Figure A.l in the form of artificially high (low)
peaks (valleys) as source journals enter (exit) the database. In Figure A.2 certain subject
areas are likely to be under-represented due to the social science orientation of the
database. For example, searching a scientific citation index like Applied Science and
Technology (AST) would likely reveal many more computer science source references
to Thompson (1967) than what was found here simply because AST accesses more
computer science journals.
Despite these somewhat significant limitations, this citation analysis is useful in
that it substantiates the fundamental impact of this key reference and, therefore, the
centrality of the concept of interdependency.54 It is also interesting that the reference
rate has remained fairly constant over the years, suggesting that this is not some 'fad'
but rather more of a perennial concept in organization theory.
One future approach would be to take the 3145 (or perhaps the subset of 2487
from business and management journals) and analyze tile content of their abstracts or
titles for key words. Such data could be used to confirm the existence of the three
paradigms proposed here, analyze their distribution and evolution over time, or
suggest alternative categorization schemes.55
54 The librarian who helped me perfonn this search, who has had extensive experience in this area, has
never encountered anything close to this high of a hit rate.
55 Unfortunately, this was not possible in this study. The SSCI is extremely expensive to use for
anything more than simple keyed-in requests; downloading all 3000+ articles would have been
prohibitive. Instead, I collected a variety of references over several years and analyzed their content as
described in chapter 2.
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APPENDIXB
DIMENSIONS OF THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
The following are the dimensions used to compare the three theoretical
perspectives in chapter 2.
THEORETICAL STRUCTURE:
What are the basic underlying assumptions ofthis perspective in terms of the nature of
technology, organizations, etc.?
• Ontology- is reality objective and external to the individual or the product of
individual consciousness? Can we make sense of an organization by measuring it or is
it necessary to consider the way people experience it by studying their perceptions and
interaction with the world (realism - nominalism)
• Epistemology- is knowledge real/hard or subjective/soft? (positivism-
antipositivism)
• Human Nature- do people respond mechanistically to their environment/are they
conditioned by external circumstances or are people depicted as active, creative, free
willed entities? (determinism-voluntarism)
• Methodology- is the theory searching for universal laws or trying to explain and
understand by getting close to the phenomenon? (nomothetic-ideographic)
• Model- does the model primarily focus on conditions/identify factors responsible for
a particular outcome or does it focus on dynamics and the how and why?
(factor/ variance-process)
• Causal Agency- who or what is depicted as causing change?
technical imperative- technology is an objective, external force what has a deterministic
impact on organizations (situational control, technology is an i.v.)
organization or strategic imperative- technology is the product of on-going human
action (rational actor control, technology is a cl.v.)
sociotechnical- technology is physically constructed thru social interaction and political
choices of actors
social constructionism- shared interpretations around a technology arise and affect its
development
marxism- technology is used to further the political and economic interests of powerful
actors
technology is a social object- technology is a moderator variable between human agents
and organizations; its physical form and function may remain the same, but its meaning
is defined by its context of use
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF INTERDEPENDENCY:
HorD do authors in this perspective conceptualize interdependency? What do they conceive ofas
the sources and consequences ofinterdependency? What factors affect the level of
interdependence?
• Is interdependence an independent variable or a dependent variable?
• What are the an.tecedents and consequences of interdependence?
• What dimensions or constructs affect interdependence?
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• What are the implicit assumptions about interdependency?
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES:
What aspects ofinterdependency does this perspective emphasize or lzighlight? What does it
ignore or neglect?
OUTcor~ES OF PERSPECTIVE:
What sort ofmanagerial recommendations with respect to interdependency does this perspective
lead to? What are its implications for organizational design and team affect or behavior?
232
,APPENDIXC
AFFINITY DIAGRAM METHODOLOGY
This appendix describes the steps used to categorize the interdependency
examples and construct the affinity diagrams shown in Figures 3.2a - 3.2d of Chapter
three.
Broad Thematic and Factual Analysis
Before attempting to classify the interdependency examples, I began with a
relatively unstructured review of the data. Initially, I focused on one project at one
company and read through all of the interviews and documentation I had collected on
it. I made notes in the margins of the transcripts and documents and looked for broad
themes about interdependency.
Gradually, I expanded this analysis to include the other projects at this firm and
ultimately the other company. The result of this review was the identification of nine
general themes about interdependency in new product development (Figure e.l). Note
that the concept of multiple interdependencies first emerged at this point.
Simultaneous with the above analysis, I wrote case summaries of each company
and project which followed a fairly structured outline. The goal here was to simply get
the basic facts about each firm's technology and organization down while the
information was still relatively fresh in my mind. I was also able to identify certain
areas where my notes were confusing or inadequate (i.eo, the system technology
architecture at Lucent) and obtain supplemental information while it was still relatively
easy to do so.
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With that foundation, I was ready to focus on interdependency as a unit of
analysis. Below are the steps I followed to do so and subsequently cluster the examples.
Classification of Interdependency Examples
Step 1: Gather Raw (Qualitative) Dafa
The original data consisted of 71 interviews across six case study projects. The
data collection was described in Section 3.2.2 in the text of Chapter three. The unit of
analysis was task interdependency, so my first step was to reduce the interview
transcripts to a briefer! more manageable fann. I used several methods to accomplish
this. First, I concentrated on extracting the examples of interdependency from each
interview. Rather than adopting strict a prior definitions, I applied a very broad and
inclusive criteria at~ point, essentially searching the interviews to pinpoint examples
of contingent relationships.
Every example was assigned a three digit ID code. The first digit identified the
project, the second digit identified the functional role of the speaker, and the final place
holder was a number which uniquely identified each example in the interview text. For
instance, code 'PHdat89' referred to an example cited by a data engineer on the (Lucent)
Handphone project; it was demarked by 89 in the text margin. (Obviously, some
examples were duplicates. I describe how I dealt with these in step 3 below.)
The nature of the examples varied widely. Some were relatively simple and
straightforward. For example, "Development depends on marketing for the product
vision" (NTmgt1). More often, they were relatively extensive and detailed descriptions
encompassing the nature of the interdependency, the entities involved (activities,
people, projects), as well as affective reactions and consequences:
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We discovered that if the cache manager could adjust weights
dynamically it would be more efficient. So the cache manager developer
and the owner of the weighting part of the system negotiated an interface.
That's a dependency that just sort of materializes out of thin air because of
a need and is often tracked very informally... [That interdependency]
creutes problems for a third party because when the cache manager
weights pages, all seven file systems need to be modified to pass on some
weights... Making a global change like that really impacts a lot of people.
We therefore need to evaluate it- is it worth with? Is the performance
benefit really that important? [What are the test implications?]"
(NTmgt25)
As indicated in the above example, several interdependencies were often inter-
twined in one statement. In those cases, I broke the example down to its most basic
elements and reassigned sub codes as necessary. An example could also be quite
technical. I referred to product architecture diagrams, process information, and
supplemental interviews to both understand the technology and decipher acronyms
and phrases used uniquely in each firm.
To help preserve the literal completeness of the examples and forestall premature
closure on a model, I proceeded to condense and standardize the format of each
example in several steps. First I isolated each of the examples along with their margin
connnents and enough surrounding material to provide a context for the statement. I
then condensed the original statements down somewhat by focusing in on key
sentences or phrases and eliminating filler language (e.g., tlummtl) while nevertheless
preserving as much of the subject's original wording as possible. The result at tllis stage
was a concise list of fairly literal descriptions of what each subject said about the
respective example.
Step .~: Interpreting Raw Data in Terms ofInterdependency
Several factors complicated the next stage of the analysis. First, subjects do not
always express themselves in a manner that is convenient for theoretical analysis. In
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this case, team ID~emberstalked about interdependencies in many different ways. Some
spoke in terms of their interdependence with other people; others used the technical
language of a product design. Yet for the purposes of organization design,
interdependency should ideally be described at the task level (Malone & Crowston,
March 1994). I therefore needed to abstract the interdependency from each description
and translate (many of) the examples into a relationship among tasks.56 Furthermore,
people sometimes used emotionally charged terms (i.e., "We live in interdependency
hell!" (NTmgtX). The KJ methodology requires converting such affective language into
more fact-based statements (I kept additional notes on the affective dimensions.)
In order to facilitate the analysis and mapping to tasks, I created a core list of
product development tasks at each firn\ based on the interview's and process
documentation I had access to. For example, in the case of Microsoft I began with the
task list created by Cusumano and Selby (Cuslunano & Selby, 1995). I then used notes
and handouts from the 'Microsoft Product Development Cycle Course' and interviews I
conducted with team members and managers to expand and add a level of detail and
definition. At Lucent, I relied on the firm's on-line process methodology descriptions as
well as key informants. I also compared the task lists to some general product
development task descriptions (Hayes & Clark, 1985; Ulrich & Eppinger, 1995) in order
to ensure that the tasks were somewhat generalizable. These core task lists served
several additional functions in the analysis. In particular, they were a reference point
for understanding what a specific task was and often clarified the nature of the
interdependency.
. 56 In retrospect, I could have specified in the interviews that interdependency be described in tenns of
tasks. At the time, however, I didn't want to bias the examples by insisting that people state them as task
relationships. To be honest, I was also unconvL'lced at that point that tasks were the right way to think
about interdependency. Not providing more guidance in the interviews was probably a mistake and
certainly complicated the data analysis. On the other hand, the language of tasks may be somewhat
unnatural for managers and technical workers to use and therefore could have introduced other forms of
biases.
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Next I created a data template for each project in the form of a spreadsheet. Each
row corresponded to an example of interdependency on the project, and each column
specified specific information about that example (e.g., ID code, raw data in the form of
the subject's description of the example, interdependency restated at the task level if
necessary, key words, etc.) The above condensation process reduced the data from
several hundred pages of transcripts to approximately twenty-five pages, concise
enough to allow an overall view of the interdependellCY data yet documented and
tracked minutely enough to trace general observations back to the transcripts for
substantiation and refutation.
Although the spreadsheet formats greatly simplified and reduced the amount of
data, they were cumbersome and awkward to deal with particularly in terms of
identifying patterns across projects. To overcome this barrier I wrote a computer
program which printed the data about each interdependency example out on a 3"x5"
card in a standard format. The format is shown below:
IDCODE
KEYWORDS
Interdependency (re)stated in tenns of tasks
Raw Interdependency Example Statement
237
As I began grouping and sorting the carded examples looking for clusters, one
pattern that was immediately evident was the existence of duplicate examples both
across and within projects at a company. In other words, people on the same project
often cited the same example as did people on different projects (the latter occurred
because the projects were in concurrent development and often shared resources and
technology). Although duplicate data points are typically a problem in analysis, here
they actually serve to strengthen the results. The fact that people cited the same
examples is reassuring in that it suggests that the examples are not idiosyncratic but
actually do capture a significant underlying concept.
Examples mentioned by more than one person were reconciled and consolidated.
Examples that applied to more than one case project were counted more than once.
Thus, there were no duplicates within a project but some duplicates across projects.
Steps 1 and 2, therefore, constituted a form of data "scrubbing" in which I sought to
make the qualitative language data uniform. and suitable for analysis. Steps 3-5
described next structured the examples into hierarchical clusters and assigned labels to
those groupings.
Step 3: Form lst-Leve! Groupings and Assign Titles
The carded examples were grouped into clusters following the steps outlined in
the Language Processing Method Manual Ouguilon, 1996), a close modification of the
original KJ method (Kawakita, 1991). I began with several rounds of unconstrained
pick-up in which I marked the examples most likely for consideration; unmarked
statements were removed from initial analysis. By repeatedly inspecting the list of
statements at each round and marking them, I was gradually able to eliminate examples
that were outliers. This was followed by a second stage in which I formed first level
groupings of the cards based on the similarity of the examples.
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As noted by Glaser and Strauss and others, a m,~jor hurdle in anrllytical induction
and clustering concerns the criteria for grouping (Aldellderfer & Blashfield, 1984;
Bailey, 1994; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Kawakita, 1991). H\ow close does a "match" have to
be in order to be considered a match with others in the gt·oup? Whereas quantitative
analyses typically apply statistical tests such as mean-squc.\red distance for comparison
decisions, such "objective" criteria are not possible with language based examples. As
suggested by prior researchers using this method (Griffin & Hauser, Winter 1993;
Juguilon, 1996; McCord & Eppinger, August 1993), I formed the groupings by 'image' as
well as the similarity behveen words and the 'distance' behveen examples. In effect, I
created a mental picture of each card and then tried to find the <.~ommon thread among
the images. Images behveen cards that were "strong" (close) wer,e grouped together.
As recommended by the originators of this method, I explicitly tried to avoid
grcuping based on prior ideas or logical relations (i.e., cause and effe~tor problem
solving relationships). Thus, no attempt was made to specify the logic by which
clusters should occur a priori. For example, I could have adopted a technological
perspective and grouped all of the examples according to the physical cOlnponents of
the product or explicitly looked for support of Thompson's (1967) framewl')rk. I resisted
doing so as it would have run counter to the goal of the inductive process, "vhich was to
create a description of interdependencies which was consistent with the way new
product development participants think about their work. Kawakita does suggest
limiting the number of primary groupings to between three and seven as a way of
forcing focus on the "vital few," a recommendation I adhered to.
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I next wrote a title for each first-level grouping that conveyed the common
thread or meaning in the cluster of cards.57 As described by Kawakita, title Inaking is a
process of going "up the ladder of abstraction" so that the title captures the common
element in the underlying examples but at one higher level of analysis. For instance, a
cluster of examples having to do with relationships among functions and features in the
product was initially labeled ucomponent-to-eomponent" and later integrated with other
clusters under the general heading of "component interdependencies."
Step 4.- Form 2nd (3rdJ level groupings and assign titles
Each of the primary groupings was further characterized as a set of secondary
groupings; in the case of very complex clusters (types), the secondary groupings were
sorted into tertiary sets as well. I applied the same approach for title making as in first
level clusters.
Step 5: Layout the groups and show the inter-relationship among them
Finally, the grouped structures were laid out on a bulletin board to explore the
internal structure of the first level categories as well as the relationships among them.
At this stage, the analytical process changed from one based on intuition and image to
one based on logic and possible cause and effect relationships. The resulting
arrangement is what is referred to as a KJ Diagram.
Considerable care was taken to ensure that the categories (types) of
interdependency identified were defensible. For example, at several points I moved
back and forth between the data display (carded examples) and the original transcripts
to see whether or not full quotations supported or documented the emerging taxonomy.
To get an indication of intra rator reliability, I periodically put ~'1e sort away and later
57 This corresponds to calculating the average or standard deviation of a set of numeric data.
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repeated the clustering exercise without referring to the earlier results (Nutt, 1984).
Differences were reconciled, and I repeated this sorting/stepping away process until th~
classifications were relatively stable (McKelvey, September 1978). Inter rator reliability
was tested by having an assistant familiar with new product de,'elopment in general
but not with the specifics of these cases independently review and cluster the examples.
Disagreements (in clusters and labels) were discussed and resulted in further
refinement of the categorization. Finally, I fed the groupings back to my primary
contacts at each firm at regular intervals during the ana ..) sis process in order to
incorporate their reactions and feedback as well.
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FlGU1\l3. C.l
CASE STUDY THEMES
.. People find the level of interdependencies to be overwhelming and perceive the
situation as getting worse over time.
The subjects were nearly unanimous in their perception that the level of interdependencies was
growing over time and starting to strain individ~r.al and team level capacities.
• Most product teams participate in multiple inter project relationships and many play
different roles in each.
One implication ofcomponent and code level interdependencies is that each product team is
involved in a number ofdependency relationships and often plays different roles in each. For
example, a given team may constitute a componenj~ supplier in one scenario and a component
user in another. Or a team may be responsible for j"roviding its technology to two distinct
products at the same time. These multiple relation~;hips can create various fonns ofconflict.
• People tend to focus their attention on different dependencies.
Another implication of1nultiple irlterdependencies is that different people focus their attention on
different interdependencies (or on different aspects ofa given depende1tcy). One determinant of
this interpersonal variation is the very fact that peorJle are being tugged in different directions.
Additional factors are functional responsibility, tasA: facilitation or blocking, time pressure,
personal satisfaction and challenge and the organiza,tional reward system.
• Interdependencies are hard to make visible. ~People therefore need to continually
devote time and attention to 'discovering' depeI\dencies.
The subjects talked about WilY interdependencies are sometimes hard to make visible and the
steps they took to continually search for "hidden" deJ1endencies.
• Interdependencies often represent variables o'ver time.
Once people are able to identify agiven dependency, "'there's afeeling that as long as I
understand what the dependency is, and it won't chatlrge, it's OK." But dependencies often
resemble variables over time... the informatiol1 orfunctl~onality one depends on, who provides it
altd who potentially constitutes the blockingfactor as ivell as the overall context ofdependency
can all change over the course ofa project. Again, this has implications for hClW people approach
and mange dependencies.
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• Interdependencies extend across time.
The temporal nature ofinterdependencies- the fact that they extend over time- can lead to
conflicts, lags, interference and blocking.
• There exists a tension between time to coordinate and time to produce.
At every level and discipline of the organization, people are struggling to find the time to both
coordinate with others and accomplish their own work. The existence ofmultiple, conflicting
interdependencies can create a double bind. The more interdependencies exist, the more they
have to be managed in person (usually via face to face contact). This is due to the fact that the
issues are more complicated and people are reluctant to 'speak for' third parties.
• As the level of interdependency rises, team members experience a loss of autonomy
and independence.
Everyone (members ofteams providing co1t'ponent technology as well as teams relying on those
providers) described experiencingfeelings associated with a 1055 ofautonomy and ca1ltTol as a
result ofdependency. This has implications for team morale, motivation and inter-team
relationships.
• Interdependencies are socially, culturally and historically embedded.
Each product team has a method- a way ofdeveloping software- as well as different historical and
cultural practices which they a have developed over time. As teams start to share technology,
however, they find themselves depending on agroup of tearns all ofwhom do things completely
differently. The build process is an excellent example ofthe types oftechnical and organizational
conflicts that can result.
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APPENDIXD
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS
The case study represents but one of several ways of conducting social science
research (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 1991). Other approaches
include experiments, surveys, histories, and archival analysis. Traditionally, research
approaches were portrayed as being arrayed hierarchically, with case studies
appropriate for exploratory phases of an investigation, surveys and histories suited for
description, and experiments deemed necessary for explanatory or causal inquiries.
Such a categorization belies the reality of actual research. Experiments with an
exploratory motivation have always existed (Milgram, 1965), while some of the best
case studies have been descriptive (Whyte, 1955), and explanatory (Allison, September
1969). As a result, most researchers today agree that, although there do exist significant
differences among the research strategies, purpose is not a distinguishing factor (Yin,
1984). The present case study was primarily designed to achieve description and
explanation about the interdependency concept and its implications for task
coordination.
The firms were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality at the project and
individual levels. I also agreed to let representatives at each company review the
results prior to publication to ensure that nothing proprietary or incorrect was revealed,
although I retained final editorial control. See Figure D.1 for the actual research
agreement.
Data Sources and collection
The study draws upon a combination of qualitative and quantitative data from
five of the six major sources of evidence for case studies (Yin, 1984). The data collection
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was guided by a case study protocol, which outlined the instrumentation as well as the
general rcles and procedures used in the field. The use of such a protocol has been
advocated as a major tactic in increasing the reliability of case studies (Yin, 1984).
Field Research and Interviews
Field research consisted of 33 interviews over a two and one-half month period
on-site at Microsoft. This was complemented by comparable time (two months plus
four additional week-long visits) and 38 interviews at Lucent Technologies. At each
c~mpany,one or two key informants helped me to select projects and an initial set of
peGi'le to interview. I subsequently followed a snowball sampling technique in which I
asked each interview subject to recommend additional people I might talk with (Cook &
Campbell, 1979). Of the 82 people contacted, no one declined to be interviewed, and I
was able (given time constraints and schedules) to speak with 71 people (87% of those
contacted). The interviews were roughly distributed across projects, functional areas,
and levels of experience with the exception of the Autophone project at Lucent, which
was under-represented.
Initial interviews were open-ended (I asked the subject for facts, opinions, and
insights regarding ulterdependency on their project as well as basic background about
their project and job). For example, I began by asking subjects about their prior
education and job experience and then asked about the current project and their roles
on it. Subsequently, I asked if interdependency was an issue in their work, and how
they thought about it. I also asked what parts of product development and team
management Ylere complicated by interdependency, and how (if) interdependency
changed over time. The interviews became rnore focused and semi-structured over the
course of the investigation as I gained a feel for the projects, settings and issues (still
conversational in tone, but I followed a set of questions defined in the protocol).
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All interviews were recorded on audio tape.58 Shortly after each interview, I
transcribed the tape and noted down emerging key issues. I reviewed these notes
before subsequent interviews to remind myself of themes that resonated across people
and p~ojects. In line with Glaser and Strauss' suggestion, interviewing ended when the
results began to converge (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Ultimately, approximately 100 hours
t
of conversation were recorded and .transcribed.
At the end of the field investigation phase I thanked the subjects for their
participation. I also prepared individual project summaries, which my primary contacts
at each firm reviewed. Their comments, corrections, and suggestions were
subsequently folded into the analysis.
Secondary Sources and Other Data
At each company I was given complete freedom to roam around and directly
observe meetings, informal conversations, and the overall ambiance. I was also granted
access to various forms of documentation and archival records (e.g., copies of electronic
mail messages, project schedules, design documents, memos, company announcements,
written project reports, organizational charts, and reports off of project tracking
databases). Of particular usefulness in terms of analyzing each project's coordination
mechanisms was dOL~entationon their development process (an on-line manual at
Lucent and a four day course taught by current project team members which I attended
at Microsoft). Finally, I maintained a large notebook on each company over the two and
one-half year course of this study in which I collected other formal studies on the two
sites and relevant articles from the mass media on each company, industry, and
58 I asked each subject's permission before doing so. Only one person declined to be recorded, although
the tape was occasionally turned off during politically sensitive or proprietary parts of the conversation.
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.technology. This data enabled me to understand the larger technical, market, and
institutional context each firm operated in as well as control for the possibility of
historical effects.59
Data on Project Performance
Since measures of objective performance that are comparable across different
companies and technologies do not exist, I adopted a multi-method approach to
measuring project performance. In addition to a questionnaire administered to team
members, managers, and independent observers, I constructed various forms of
matrices based on data from interviews, project documentation and tracking databases I
had access to. This approach is similar to that taken in numerous studies of new
product development (Ancona, 1990; Ancona & Caldwelll 1992; Iansiti & Clark, 1994).
Before writing the survey, I met with the staff responsible for maintaining and
analyzing data on each of the projects. Together, we discussed the biases and
limitations of the information in variollS reporting systems and identified appropriate
candidate measures. I then obtained the subjective performance assessments along
approximately the same category dimensions by surveying upper level or division
managers, functional managers, and team members approximately one year after the
initial round of data gathering. Respondents were also encouraged to provide
explanations of why they gave particular ratings. Finally, I had an expert panel at each
firm exhaustively evaluate the projects, similar to Ancona (Ancona, 1990).60 Table D.1
displays the survey design. See Table D.2 for the performance categories and control
variables. Appendix F contains a copy of the actual survey.
5~ This proved foresightful given that AT&T voluntarily decided to split itself into three companies
midway through this study.
60 Note that whereas project managers and team members each evaluated one project (their own),
experts evaluated all three projects at their respective company.
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LTo ensure the accuracy of the assessment data, evaluations were made
independently and submitted directly to me. I also tailored the questionnaires slightly
by using language appropriate to each company and project group. The second round
of lagged data collection enabled me to test for the possibility of biases associated with
real time performance assessment.
Data Analysis
Data analysis, which consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating and
recombining evidence to address the initial questions or propositions of a study, has
been cited as one of the least developed and most difficult aspects of doing case
research (Yin, 1984). In addition, although much theory and experience and many tools
exist for collecting and analyzing numeric data, different approaches are needed for
more qualitative information.
I used an iterative, multi-method analysis approach consisting of four basic steps:
(1) a content analysis of interviews and product, project and process documentation to
identify alternative approaches to interdependency management as well as team
strategies, (2) the development of project profiles assessing the intenlal and external
contexts within which the teams operated, (3) a multi-dimensional project performance
ranking, and (4) an assessment of the proposed relationships among the key constructs.
A crucial aspect of this analysis was the ability to display the data so I could
begin forming and examining hypotheses. I used several types of data display
techniques (Miles & Huberman, 1984) to facilitate this process, as described below.
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Identifyins Interdependenta' Approaches and Deriving Team Strategies
Once the interview data \\t"ere collected, I reviewed the transcripts and listed the
techniques individuals and teams used to manage interdependency. I adopted a vef1J
broad initial definition of technique. For example, I included both structural solutions
such as drawmg particular team or sub-team boundaries as well as more process
oriented approaches such as special forms of meetings. Some of the tec~ques
represented individual coping mechanisms, an example being the use of status lists or
heuristics for dealing with the overload associated with multiple interdependencies.
Others were at the team level and took the fonn of particular roles or processes. I also
recorded techniques at the level C'f product architecture or strategy because these too
were often ways for dealing with interdependency. I supplemented this list with
additional information from documentation I obtained on each company's official
development process.61 I coded each technique in terms of the type of solution it
seemed to represent. For example, IIteam design for sharing componentsll and
"prioritized partners" were eventually grouped together and coded "minilnized external
interdependencies."
I tllen developed short summaries of the key techniques used on each team
representing their different strategic approaches to interdependency management. In
developulg these, I was most interested in how the teams dealt with the challenges
associated with facing multiple interdependencies simultaneously. For example,
evidence suggesting that the team made COnsCiOllS tradeoffs between and among
different interdependencies or deliberately devoted resources to certain
interdependencies in a discretionary manner was noted as "prioritized
interdependencies.~' For another team whose members unanimously decried their lack
61 When deviations existed between official and actual software development processes, I relied on the
actual work process descriptions obtained in the interviews.
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of tinle and frustration due to the number of contingent task relationships, I wrote
"team members trying to deal with all interdependencies at once with little sense of
discrimination or hierarchy."
Deyelopina Project Profiles
Interdependency management occurs within a specific context, and a team's
actions, choices, and outcomes must be understood within that context. To focus solely
on solutions and strategies without attending to context amounts to "context stripping/'
with attendant risks of misunderstanding the meaning of events. In order to avoid such
a bias, I collected information about each team along a number of contextllal
dimensions and then evaluated their approaches to interdependency management
within that larger setting.
For example, Tables D.3 and D.4 are meta-matrices or master charts assembling
descriptive context data from each of the projects in a standard format (Miles &
Huberman, 1984). Sltch descriptive context charts ~iisplay the key factors that make up
the context of team behavior and performance, including technical and strategic factors
(such as the product complexity and competitive market environment), people and
cultural factors (such as leadership, power, conflict and the level of experience,
knowledge and skill on the team), internal organizational factors (such as the physical
environment and resource availability), and historical factors in terms of past product
and project events.
A major limitation of the design of this study was its cross-sectional nature; I was
observing and trying to understand interdependency management at a single point in
time. During the course of the analysis, it became readily apparent that one also needs
to understand the course of events, rather than simple snap shots, in order to grasp,
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understand, and explain why certain teams adopted particular solutions. In order to
overcome the deficiencies associated with the cross-sectional design, I developed time
ordered matrices (Table 4.3 in chapter 4) (Miles & Huberman, 1984). This enabled me to
compare changes in product, project, and process chronologically.
Outcome Assessment
Organizational performance in general is very difficult to specify, measure, and
interpret. This is particularly true in the case of new product development projects due
to (1) the large number of extraneous lllte:nal and external factors that can potentially
affect performance and (2) the inherent multi-dimensionality of the performance
concept (Cusumano & Nobeoka, 1992).
For example, performance has been shown to be a function of, among other
things, the newness of the technology (both in absolute terms and to the team or
company), the complexity of the technology, the volatility of the market (as manifested
in the amount of change in the requirements), the size of the product and team, the level
of experience of the team members, and group tenure. Studies have also focused on
different aspects of performance (i.e., input, output, financial) and explored the inherent
tradeoff among different dimensions: flexibility versus efficiency, speed versus quality,
etc. (Ancona, 1990; Clark, Chew, & Fujimoto, 1987; Clark & Fujimoto, 1989; Cusumano
& Kemerer, November 1990; Cusumano & Nobeoka, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989; Van de Yen
& Ferry, 1980). As a result of both of the above considerations, it can be difficult to get a
valid and reliable measure of project performance. Masc studies resort to multiple
measures in order to increase the reliability of the comparison (Ancona, 1990;
Cusumano & Kemerer, November 1990; Cusumano & Nobeoka, 1992).62
62 This multiplicity refers to both the dimensions of performance (schedule, budget and quality, for
example), as well as the nature of the measures (subjective aIld objective formats) (Cook & Campbell,
1979).
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In addition to subjective performance ratings from the questionnaire, I
constructed two forms of matrices based on the objective data I had access to. The first
was an unordered effects matrix in which I sought evidence of positive and negative
performance outcomes along the dimensions of schedule, product component
integration, product quality, and team functioning (Table 4.2 in chapter 4) (Miles &
Huberman, 1984). Explanations for particular outcome effects were also noted all the
display~
The second form of outcome display was a case-ordered summed display of
team mem.ber reported problems (Table 4.4 in chapter 4) (Miles & Huberman, 1~184).
This form of display orders projects according to a main variable of interest, in this case
the type and severity of certain problems, so that one can begin to see the pattelTI of
differences and identify high, medium, and low projects. In order to form this 'Drdering
I first extracted all problem reports from the interviews and classified them un(ier
different problem headings. I tht'.n put them in a rough conceptual order from minimal,
trivial, and short term in nature to substantial, long term or unresolved.
For example, a problem such as fixing a bug was coded as a minor incolnvenience
affecting one or a small number of people (if mentioned infrequently). Other problems
which threatened shipment, caused a delay in the schedule of more than one month, or
were cited by a large percentage of the team members interviewed were coded as major
ongoing problems. Examples are product architecture uncertainty, inadequ.ate staffing,
or frequent mention of a major bug. To order the projects I began with a rottgh
estimated ordering, entered the data, then re-arranged the rows (and sometimes the
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columns) until a systematic order appeared with highly effective management at the top
(minimal problems cited) to least effective at the bottom (many reported problems).63
Assessiugltelationships
The above three analysis steps, therefore, yielded data on team strategies,
interdependency management approaches and project performance. Finally, I analyzed
how existing patterns of interdependency and management strategies and approaches
were related to evaluations of performance in order to propose relationships among
these sets of variables.
The above sections present a fairly sanitized description of the data collection
and analysis processes- suggesting a linear progression from study design through
data collection and on to conclusions. In reality, the process was much more iterative
and highly idiosyncratic. I developed a conceptual grasp of the questions being
investigated as the study progressed, and the data was integrally involved in the
conceptualization process itself (Bailyn, 1977; Van Maanen, 1997). The analytical
process was highly non mechanistic a.1'\d involved intuition, creativity, serendipity and
speculation combined with analytical discipline (Weick, 1989).
63 Note one potential problem associated with this method. It attributes greater problem awareness to
inferior management \vhen, in fact, better performing teams may be more cognizant of their problems
than poor performers. (Thanks to Kathy Sutcliffe at University of Michigan for suggesting this.) Given
that the high problem projects were associated with poor performance in the other data sources, I do not
think this effect is working in my data.
254
FIGURED.l
SAMPLE RESEARCH AGREEMENT
Nancy Staudenmayer is a doctoral candidate and research associate in the Management
of Technological Innovation program at the MIT Sloan School of Management. She
worked at AT&T Bell Laboratories for six years prior to attending MIT and attained a
Masters Degree in Statistics from the University of California, Berkeley.
Staudenmayer's dissertation focuses 011 the processes companies use to coordinate and
control interdependencies in large scale software development projects. AT&T and
Microsoft are the sources of empirical data for the investigation. This document
outlines the nature of the research relationship between [company name] and Nancy
Staudenmayer.
Reciprocity
Staudenmayer will be granted access to [company name] to study the thesis topic as she
defines it and will maintain final editorial control. How~ver, all publications will be
forwarded to [company name] prior to publication to correct errors of fact and to ensure
that no commercially sensitive information is revealed. Staudenmayer agrees to give a
presentation of the results, if desired, and will meet individually with interested parties
at any time during the project.
Anonymity
The dissertation will maintain complete anonymity at the project and individual levels
of analysis.
a. Project
The specific name and proprietary technical characteristics of the projects and features
sampled in the study will be disguised (e.g., "the XYZ switch", "the ABC operating
system"). Some teclmical details (e.g., size, high level functionality) will be revealed but
may be re-scaled if commercially sensitive.
b. Individual
All individuals participating in the study will remain completely anonymous. They will
be identified in data documents with an 10 number known only to the principle
researcher (N. Staudenmayer).
Confidentiality
All data gathered during the course of the study will remain completely confidential.
Access to the information, without the prior consent of [coIrtpany name], will be
restricted to N. Staudenmayer and her MIT thesis committee. Off site, all data will be
stored in a locked office on the MIT campus.
Informed Consent
This agreement establishes informed consent at the corporate level. In addition, all
individuals within [company name] maintain the right to not participate or withdraw
from the study at any time. A subject may also request that certain interview or
observational data not be recorded.
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TEAM LEAD
RESIDNDENTS
DevMger
Test Mger
TABLED.1
SURVEY DESIGN
LLJ£ENT
HANDPHONE I TOLLPHONE I AUTOPHONE ImSK
MICROSOFT
I2ATA I NETWORK
Project tvIger
Document Mger
TEA1)J
RESPONUElfiS.
UPPER LEVEL
MGL
RESPONDENTS
EXPERT
RESPONDENTS
n.a. n4a. n.a.
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n.a.
TABLED.2
SURVEY CATEGORIES AND VARIABLES
CONTROL VARIABLES DEFINmON DATA SOURCE
Indiyidual
Prior System Project Experience number of major system survey item #1
projects respondent has
worked on
Product
Product Size and Complexity number of non-eommentary two key project
source lines of code.• broken informants
down into executable vs. non-
executable categories
Requirements Volatility degree of change in two key project
requirements after initial informants and
definition survey item #2
Proiect
Cross-Project Sharing and level of externally delivered two key project
Dependency components informants and
survey item #3
Team Size number of full-time two key project
contributors by function informants
OUTCOME YARIABLE5 DEFINITION PATASQURCE
Interdependenc;y Mgt
Effectiyeness
Rework amount of actual and elapsed survey item #4
time spent reworking due to
adjustments in requirements
or changes ill code
Wait Time amount of blocking or waiting survey item #5
time (broken down by
blocking factors)
Ratings of Effectiveness of 5 effectiveness of task survey item #6
Types coordination in 5
interdependency categories
Ratings of Workhlg Relationships effectiveness of working survey item #7
Within & Across Subsystems relationships within and
across product subsystems
Outcome Satisfaction Level level of satisfaction with survey item #8
eventual product outcome
T'll .UJULL & Proiect r- I'
Adherence to Schedule meet or exceed initial schedule survey item #9
estimate
Adherence to Budget meet or exceed initial budget survey item #10
estimate
Adherence to Functional meet or exceed functional survey item #11
Requirements requirements
Defect Rate (Year 1) number of system-level crash survey item #12
bugs during first year of
product release
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TABLE D.3
MICROSOFT PROJECT CONTEXT
CONIEXT DIMENSION ImSK PATA NE]WORK
CATEGORY
Technical & product an integrated application an entry level database a network operating
Strategic description suite for PC products; management program for system for PC products
Factors available in Standard and PC products; sold as both
Pro versions a product and an
application in Desk suite
product - 2 M LOC; 1440 files; 600 -lMLOC - 5.6 lvl source LOC in
dimensions page manual; 360 release product; 3+fvf LOC for
formats -75THC tests; 6000-8000 files; 18
-200THC hours to do a clean build
- 250THC
customers mass market; mass market; mass market; individuals
traditionally individuals, sophisticated individual and corporations needing
but increasingly "power users" highly reliable as
corporations
competitors Lotus, Word Perfect UNIX, IBM AS400, VAX
schedule - 12 month cycle - 12 month cycle (goal) ~~ 9-12 months
key technical Integrating user interface, Four key functional AchieVing rapid
and strategic features and schedules of components provided by development cycles and
challenges formerly independent ~added high reliability given
SlI!plicatioD products huge risks" lar~ size and complexity
of product
Customer delivery model A component user and a
£banging to annual 12/24 .cpmponent provider (to Balancing flexibility and
month cycle ~ adaptiyeness with rigor
and control
Integrating code, Cross product
schedule and processes of component design and Feature sharing
fonned)' independent schedule cOI\flicts: Ita set
application teams of conflicting forces
pulling you in different
(See Longitudinal directions"
Display)
~QtiyatingcompQnent
providers: ~'little
emotional satisfaction": "a
1 iob"
People & demographics young (avg. 30 yecrrs); young (avg. 30 years); young-middle age (avg.
Cultural primarily male men and women in key 35-40 years); primarily
Factors management roles male
team culture and value ability to produce: Highly disciplined: "we
atmosphere "good people build are hard core"
things"
NOD-bureaucraru:
High respect: "apolitical";
"brother a~ainstbrother"
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level of very high company medium company very high company
experience, experience (avg. 6.3 experience (avg. 3 years); experience (avg. 5.5
knowledge and years); very high domain high domain experience years); very high domain
skill experience (experience on (in tools and databases); experience (on earlier
successive versions); very some other industry versions and large
little other industry experience, particularly system development m
experience on component teams other industries)
leadership and Developers: "everyone Developers and Testers:
power wants to be located near "developer and test peers
developers" pretty much decide what
X Team: "they are king" will happen"
Heads of DeyelQpment.
Testing and Program
Mgt
"they set the direction of
team at daily 9 am
meetin~"
~onflict "tribal" relationship among products sharing with other as team
behveen apps; some same components; regardu\g marketing
resentment in apps about component team messages, design and
"Desk tax" and "loss of memben:, Wlcertalll of delivery of shared
autonomy"; documenters their status relative to components and
perceive problematic product teams and feel scheduling.
relationship with under-appreciated
developers, but not vice
versa
Internal physical setting occupy multiple floors in occupy multiple multiple floors of one
Organ') a common building; buildings on a common building; single offices;
Factors private offices; relatively site; private offices; modern
pllJsh decoration moving to a new
buildin~
resources no major resource testers "way under- petitioned management
problems, except time staffed"; also time, for heavy investment in
(especially for leads) especially for program fastnnadhnnesfor
managers component integration
(~ranted)
Historical product history products formerly earlier versions of most product pieces have
Factors shipped as independent product were built on been developed
applications with same base as VI.D and internally, but the
separate schedules and had only 2 external number of external
code component dependencies deliverables is
increasingly significantly
over tiIne
team history formerly organized as most leads and key team
independent project members have worked
teams; Desk team formed together before
from members of app
teams
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TABLED.4
LUCENT PROJECT CONTEXT
CONlEXT DIMENSION HANDPHONE TOLLPHONE AUIOPHONE
CATEGORY
Technical & product a wireless communication an application offering an infrastructure for
Strategic description protocol for use in operator, credit card, mobile phone customers;
Factors portable handsets in third person and hardware supplied by
Japan; reusing ISDN directory assistance Qualcomm; using newer
standard; hardware services and less proven
supplied by Hitachi; technology
product - 50,000 NCSL from - 1-2 M NCSL from -1-2MLOC
dimensions wireless subsystem and operator administration - 120 THe in IL, 50 THe
12 other subsystems on subsystem and 1-50 other in NJ + support
base of 10M subsystems depending
- 45 THe (plus - 60 load on
builders, mgt, system - 100 THe + support
eng, customer support)
customers custom development for captive supplier to AT&T custom development for
a Japanese telecom (90% of features); some cellular service providers
custom development for (Cellular One,
LEes alld foreign Ameritech)
telecoms
competitors competitive product Northern Telecom, Qualcomm, Ericsson,
already in market Alcatel, Siemens ~otorola,~orthenn
Teleconl; standards war
schedule - 10 month cycle (proj small « 3THe) u.s.
committed 6/94, reqs features average 10 mos;
complete 4/95, HLD large (4-50 me) infl
8/95, full team 4/95, code features avg 20 mos
complete 11/95)
key technical Achieying yery Customer delivery model First time development
and strategic aggressive schedule set changing from biannual effort in new r unproven
challenges by sales force before reqs release to per customer technology: extremely
gathered reqyest competitive market with
uncertain requirements
Achieving functional Transitiooing from
goals to beat existing system to feature An UDIJ.[oyen technology
technolQgy OD market ~
(See Longitudinal
n1c:.nl~\1·1
People &it demographics middle age (avg. 35 older (35-50 years) middle age (avg. 35
Cultural years); very years);
Factors heterogeneous in terms of
gender, race and ethnicity
team culture and Engineers: Little team unity or
atmosphere Urgency: personal accountability
Cooperative: "Frenzied and chaotic"
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level of very high company very high company medium company
experience, experience (avg. 12.6 experience (avg 15 years); experience (avg 16.2
knowledge and years); high domain very high domain years); little prior
skill experience (on other experience (same people wireless experience
wireless products) and location for 15 years)
leadership and Feature Engineer and
power "WildCard"
conflict very little; some cross very little significant cultural
team. conflict when clashes between IL
another wireless project "processors" and NJ
submitted late change "hackers"
Internal Org'} physical setting core team on 1 floor in 1 core team on 1 floor in 1 cross-site development
Factors bldg;rnajorcornponen~ bldg; co-located with between NJ and IL
developed in separate RC/Data; shared offices
bldg on same site; 1
component developed in
UK; hardware developed
in Japan; 2-4 person
offices; utilitarian
decoration
resources significantly understaffed
initially and key roles
missing during key
periods (i.e., data eng
duringHLD)
Historical product history two earlier wireless OA subsystem design None
Factors efforts were "disasters" started in 1982; under
continuous development
since 1984; U.S. and Int'l
code split in 1988
team history "most people have u.s. and Int'l teams were None
worked together on other split but recently merged;
efforts" knowledge drain during
downsizings in 1992 and
1994; change from cross-
functional to functional
org
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APPENDIXE
APPROACHES TO PRODUCT CiOMPONENT INTEGRATION
Product component integration (known as the "build" function at Microsoft and
the "load" function at Lucent) refers to the process by which the software component
pieces get integrated or '1<nit together" to form one working product. It is a crucial
process, which many tasks depend on and therefore central to managing many types of
interdependencies.64 The following quotations from Network and Autophone team
members capture the centrality of the task in terms of team functioning and activities:
The build process by its very nature is a bottleneck. Everything developed
has to pass through the build team. Testers can't test without it, developers,
program managers, and product managers depend on it. These groups
need clear and consistent expectations about the build so they can plan their
time and work accordingly.
Regular builds act like a heartbeat on the team.
The very centrality of this process suggests that it might be a key lever for
managing multiple interdependencies. Table E.l presents a comparison of the
organizational design solutions the six teams imposed on product integration. Analysis
suggested that the approaches differed in four respects: task allocation (who performed
the integration, and how they were related, both organizationally and geographically, to
the team), resource investment (whether or not the team devoted extra resources in the
fonn of :apital for computers and highly skilled technical people to the process),
incentive structures (if or how they incented people to frequently test and integrate their
components), and timing (when and how often integration was performed, and how
dynamic the process was).
64 One indicator of its centrality is the passion that the build process seems to inspire in people. Virtually
everyone I interviewed had something to say about the role of product component integration, how it
was being performed on their project, and its impact on their work.
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Teams adopting a systemic manipulation strategy tended to manage product
cOlnponent integration as a self-regulating team process. It was performed and
managed by a dedicated, highly technically experienced group internal to the team, and
they drew upon a variety of both technical and social incentive mechanisms to ensure
that people cooperated. Integration was perfonned very frequently and regularly,
usually once a day, but also quite dynamically depending on the state of the project. In
effect, the build served as both a central work cODrdinating process (by enabling team
members to easily respond and adapt to the latest changes made by others) and a
pacing mechanism (by se!Ving as a visible signal to both managers and team members
of the current state and progress on the project).
Product Component Integration on the Network and Handphone Projects
Of all six case study projects, the Network team appeared to have devoted the
most careful thought and analysis to how product component integration should be
performed and the advantages or disadvantages associated with different approaches.
lms attention to detail grew out of some painful experiences in prior releases.
TI1e Network build was performed and. managed by a smali, dedicated group
internal to the Network team; 3-4 people were directly involved with integration and
about 9 others tested the builds and performed some miscellaneous activities. The build
manager has twenty years of experience in the software industry. He believed very
strongly that the build team should playa "policeman or motller hen role" on a project
by controlling both the number of code changes and their quality through a variety of
incentive mechanisms:
The quality of the build is inversely related to the number of check ins.
Sometimes we 'open the flood gates' and let anyone check anything in.
Other times we use a more controlled, phased in approach where we will
only allow changes in certain pieces but keep everything else stable...
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Eventually when the system gets full and buggy we go to a more restricted
check in mode where people can only make changes that fix high priority
bugs.
This manager also talked about the need to "train" developers and testers such
that they understood and appreciated the impact their work had on others and
delivered high quality, well tested code:
Product component integration is very much a social phenomenon, not just
technical. We need people to understand the impact they are having on the
rest of the team and the value of cooperating. [We use several mechanisms
to incent developers to check their code in regularly.] First we rely on
support from the development team leads. They promote quality in the
build process and emphasize the professional responsibility of submitting
clean check ins. Shame is also an incentive. Before, when the process was
more random, if it broke no one knew who was responsible. Now it is easy
to pinpoint, and that changed developers behavior. Humor helps too. We
make people wear goat horns or pay money. We actually bought a stereo
with the money we collected.
Handphone also organized the build (load) process internally. Although the
manager was less experienced than on Network, she worked very closely and
interactively with the feature engineer on the project. Like Network, Handphone team
members only came to see the importance and value of their approach after some early
bad experiences. They quickly found, however, that the use of incentive mechanisms
attuned to the particular personality profiles on the team as well as an internal structure
changed people's behavior and increased cooperation levels:
The first couple of times people were a little sloppy. They didn't have the
discipline to always compile and test their check in. So we sent a notice via
email-- 'you made a mistake. It cost the group because every time we have
to rebuild it costs a lot of time.' It embarrassed people but then they got
serious and made sure they didn't break it.
Doing the integration internally can lead towards people wanting to do
better code because it's not Joe Schmo they're hurting-- it's their team mate
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who now won't be able to make the phone call work. It brings it very close
to home if its broken... With an outsourced public load, there is a perception
that 'I never Weelt to break that.' And when you do break it, your name is
very well known because those builders will remember. But it's funny,
because even when you break it, what are you breaking? You may be
breaking something that is completely divorced from you. So you don't
have the same ownership for what you broke.
Note that Network ten.ded to use a public humiliation incentive scheme--
potentially the whole team (more than two hundred people) were informed when
someone caused the build to fail. The Handphone feature engineer, in contrast,
contacted individuals privately to point out the impact they were having. 'These
different incentive structures were appropriate, given the demographic and personality
differences in the two companies. Lucent tends to be a populatioll of older workers
who operate in a more respectful and considerate work environment. However, the
data suggest that both projects also targeted incentives to the individual. For example,
the Network build manager noted that he sometimes communicated privately with
developers \vho were more sensitive to criticism, while the Handphone manager would
sometimes resort to a public announcement if tile developer repeatedly failed to
cooperate.
Performing the build internally also enabled the teams to integrate the
components selectively and dynamically, depending on the particular needs of the
projecte This flexibility meant that they could take more risks while simultaneously
remaining "good citizens" in the sense of not breaking functionality in other projects:
When product integration is managed by people internally to your team, it
means you can build selectively-- only the pieces or times you want-- in a
more secure environment. If you have problems, you don't have to worry
about hurting other projects. It's more flexible, probably the biggest benefit,
so you can take more liberties, beneficial liberties, early on.
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Finally, this approach to integration resulted in certain benefits in terms of
testing, compiling, and task coordination among the de,Telopers. In particular, it
eliminated so-called "chain errors" and compile duplication, thus saving human an,i
computer resources:
One advantage it gives you is that you have one central place to build all the
software. For example, my software may depend on someone else's
software on the terminating team. Very close. But just to get their code
together with my code to build these two together can be a big nightmare
because they may have code that is dependent on yet another person's
code... And that stream can go on and on... You can do it individually, anti
have to deal with all the dependencies with everyone else, or you can put it
into one spot and build it all at once.
It saved a lot of people and computer resources for everyone. Say I need tc>
build my software. In order to compile my software I have to go get
somebody else's piece and bring them in to meet. That's one interaction.
But that won't necessarily work in reverse. What I built may not be
sufficient for the other person because they have other stuff that they didn't
hand me... So now you have two people who each have a chunk of the same
identical software shared between them but not symmetrically. And we're
both using computet resources to compile. [When done collectively] we do
one compile for everyone. One that is bigger. But that big one does not
equal the sum of everyone's little ones. Itts much, much Jess.
Say I make one line of code change. Tl\en I need to compile and test that
change. Fifteell or twent)r people may be making changes and compiling in
parallel. The problem is that the system starts to slow down. Also, when I
test my change I may not test it against those fifteen other chan,ges... [The
way we do it now] there's faster turnaround and increased performance
time because fewer people are using CPU time. There's also potentially a
shorter integration test interval becauf)e when I do a test, I'm not just testing
my one line of code, I'm testing it with the fifteen others.
Say you have two people modifying code at the same time. Each developer
makes changes to the code, and they take those changes and build them...
But each developer only sees his own changes. Each builds against the
approved base and not against the other's changes. So each tests out OK but
when you put them together you get breakage and it won't work.
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Product Component Integration on the Desk and T.ollphone Projects
The Desk product component integration process was undergoing a transition as
the application teams, which previously performed their builds independently, sought
to define a common process. Although the interviews suggest that people recognized
the benefits associated with a well-defin~d process- and most of the application teams
had one- they were encountering difficulties gaining consensus about how it should be
performed given the new integrated Desk product and organization. As one team
member observed "We've got the technical stuff [associated with the build) down. We
don't have a handle on the organizational part yet."
For example, there was COltflict over what time the build should be performed.
One application team preferred to check in their day's work at 5:00pm whereas another
liked to synch late in the evening (people on this team tended to come in mid-day and
work later). The alerting mechanisms also differed across the application groups.
When the build failed, some teams alerted only those people responsible for the
problem. Other groups sent out a message to the entire team when the integration was
completed successfully. The teams also used different rules for determining h·:1W to
transfer responsibility for performing the integration. Although these differences may
seem trivial, they represented "historical habits" in each of the teams, and people were
quite reluctant to give them up.
Tollphone team members likewise displayed a high knowledge of and
appreciation for the cei\trality of product integration. In this case, recent cost cutting
efforts at Lucent forced the team to make certain changes in how integration was
performed that they felt were far from ideal. For example, capital for computer
resources was generally unavailable. As a result, the integration process was quite slow
and introduced lags and delays in people's work:
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Computer expenses are quite tangible and therefore the focus of cost saving
efforts. If I sit here for a day and a half waiting for a build, well, they pay us
whether we sit here or not.
:'ollphone integration was performed by two builders in a supporting
organization. Again, a series of cost cutting measures had a negative impact on the
process when contractors with·littie skill and experience were assigned to it:
This past Spring the two loaders were moved out of the Tollphone
organization and put in the load organization. They eventually took other
jobs. The new people are ... novices who make a lot of errors and poor
decisions... It's gone to strangers and the performance and commitment
have dropped.
Other people on the project concurred that product integration was a "critical
path job," and the project therefore benefited by having skilled people perform it.
Product Component Integration on the Data and Autophooe Pro~
It is somewhat difficult to analyze the approaches Data and Autophone took to
product component integration because, quite simply, both teams lacked a well-defined
process and were never able to achieve integration on a regular basis (as of the last data
collection point). However, the various attempts they did make differed strikingly from
that on the other cases.
Most notably, in neither case did anyone on the project have primary
responsibility for the integration function. The responsibility was either shared
(diffused) across the team (Data) or outsourced (Autophone). Nor did the team seem to
recognize the centrality of the process by, for example, allocating money or experienced
people to it. The two projects sought to perform integration infrequently relative to the
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other cases (weekly or biweekly) on a fixed, pre-set schedule but rarel~' achieved this
goal without significant problems. Finally, neither team indicated that they utilized any
form of social levers to encourage cooperation.
Data, like Desk, was experiencing significant problems defining a common
integration process across the four teams contributing code to the project:
The build is a nightmare in this kind of web. Say I'm a compont~nt team. I
depend on some other components and some other components depend on
me. I want to make a drop once a week into sonleplace so I can bring
enough stuff together so I can have an exe running on my machine that I
can test. Add five components and two shells and watch the debates as to
how that's going to happen.
These teams are just not used to giving up that much control to someone
outside the tea. Yet the only way it will work is if there is someone
imposing control or some sort of penalty for breaking the build like losing
face in front of 150 people.
Rather than trying to define a common process, Data first tried a "big bang"
approach where they essentially "threw all of the software into a pot and stirred." As
one developer recalled:
It never made soup, and we had no idea why or where it was broken. Then
people had to run around through the hallways quite a bit before we could
get it to build.
At the time of the interviews, the team was experimenting with a new "roll up"
approach where components were bunched together and then integrated sequentially.
Each component team was responsible for making sure their code worked with existing
technology previously rolled up. Most team members were dubious about this
approach and indeed later interviews confirmed that it was nut successful.
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On the Autophone project, integration was performed by contractors in New
Jersey who "lacked the full depth of knowledge1l about the product. The key software
development tasks (RCC and CCS) were therefore "remote to their build function,"
which presented complications in terms of work plenning and predictability:
Geography hurt us because its very difficult to coordinate and get a good
feel for what's ready to go into a load... We never know what's going in
when so we can target fo'!' it.
The integration was scheduled to be performed every two to three weeks on a
pre-set schedule, but, like Data, the team rarely achieve this goal:
We end up doing a series of corrective builds to fix some little problem to
get over the hurdle. They just keep popping them off like popcorn.
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TABLEE.l
COMPARISON OF PRODUcr COMPONEN"' iNTEGRATION DESIGN
SYSTEMIC MANIPULATOR CONSTRAINED MANIPULATOR LOCAL REACTOR
NE'IWORK HANDPHONE DESK TOLLPHONE DATA AUTOPHONE
TASK • performed and • performed and • ownership • performed and • performed by each • performed and
ALLOCATION mcmagedby managed by transferred to app managed by two component team in managed off-site by
dedicated internal dedicated internal team responsible for dedicated people sequential rollup; no two dedicated people
team group team group latest integration outside the dept one group responsible
problem for man.agement
RESOURCE " very high hardware • invested in some • llltended to - cut hardware in -none • performed by
INVESTMENT investment for fast additional computer purchase more and company wide cost inexperienced
(capital, human) computers queues faster computers cutting measure contractors
ca placed highly a inexperienced lea • performed by
experienced technical but heavily trained inexperienced
people on build team and supported by contractors
feature engineer
INCENTIVE • appeal to • appeal to - avoid having to o personal ownership -none • none
STRUCTURE professional professional perform integration • humor (e.g., bat on
(for checking in responsibility responsibility next time your chair)
frequently and • shame/public • shame/private • humor (e.g., hat,
cleanly) humiliation humiliation door poster)
• humor (e.g., pay • personal ownership
money, wear goat
horns)
TIMING • very frequent and • very frequent and • very frequent but - infrequently (on • Intended: once a • Intended: every 2-3
predictable schedule predictable schedule unpredictable avg, once every two week; Actual- never weeks on a fixed, pre-
(on avg, twice a day, (on avg, every night, schedule (on avg, once weeks or once a consistently achieved set schedule; Actual:
five days a week) five days a week) a week, five days a month) never consistently
• dynamic check in • dynamic check in week) achieved
policy policy • dynamic check in
policy
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APPENDIXF
SAMPLE PROJECf PERFORMANCE SURVEY
INSIRUCIlONS:
This survey is part of a doctoral dissertation at the MIT Sloan School of Management on interdependency
management in large scale software development projects. The purpose of the research is to identify
what types of interdependency exist in large scale projects and the alternative ways they can be
coordinated and mallaged. The dissertation was recently awarded "Best Dissertation Proposal" in a
national competition of similar studies indicating that this is an important topic with results that have
broad applicability to both academic researchers and managers.
This particular survey focuses on the Xproject. The questions ask you to assess various aspects of task
coordination on the project. For example, what was the level of task blocking? How effectively were
tasks coordinated within and across the project? Some of the questions are directed at the level of
functional product pieces (i.e., Xl, X2, X3, and X4), while others ask you to rate the product overall.
Please answer each question honestly based on your knowledge of and experience with the project. You
need not (and should not) limit your responses to the areas representing your work assignment. For
example, if you primarily worked on Xl but also feel even somewhat informed about X2 please respond
to questions on both pieces. I am asking for your technical and subjective judgements and opinions, not
"fact."
El!eJl if you are unsure about an answer, I prefer a rough estimate to a blank. Feel free to expand upon or
qualify your answers by writing directly on the survey itaelf. Xi you have any questions or concerns about
the survey, please contact me at nstauden@mit.edu or (617) 258 - 7269.
Your answers will be strictly confidential. They will be grouped with those of other people, and no
individual will be identified in the final report. Nor will the name of the actual project be publicly
revealed.
When you are finished with the questionnaire, please put it in the enclosed envelope, seal the envelope
and sign across the back flap. Then return it via interdepartmfl.I\tal mail to
Thank you for your cooperation.
Nancy Staudenmayer
Doctoral Candidate
MIT Sloan School of Management
(617) 258 - 7269
IlStauden@mit.edu
NAME OF PROJECT BEING lVALUATED: X
YOUR NAME: _
SECTION 1; INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS
The following questions will be used for coding purposes and to control for differences across projects.
Where indicated, please provide the actual numbers or your best estimate for each functional product
pie..:e and the product overall.
1. How many large feature projects have you worked on (defined as greater than 30 technical head count)
1 -
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2. How would you describe the level of requirements chum (after requirements were initially defined) on
each functional product piece, relative to other product pieces of similar size and complexity?
(1 =Significantly below average, 2 =Somewhat below average, 3 =About average, 4 =Somewhat above
average, 5 = Significantly above average)
Originating Process: _
TemUnating Process: _
Hand Over Process: _
Location/Registration Process: _
X Overall: _
3. Please indicate the level of external dependency for each functional product piece. External
dependency includes software code, components and tools being developed in another subsystem or
functional department. When making your assessment, please consider both the number of external
providers and the percentage of code that they supplied.
(1 = Very Low, 2 =Low, 3 = Medium, 4 = High,S = Very High)
Originating Process: _
Terminating Process: _
Hand Over Process: _
Location/Registration Process: _
XOverall: _
SEc,TION 2: INTERDEPENDENCY MANAGEMENT
The following questions address issues of task coordination and interdependency management. AgaiTl,
please provide the actual nwnbers or your best estimate for each functional product piece and the
product overall.
4. Please indicate in the table below (a-b) the approximate actual (not planned) begin and end dates for
the initial design, (c) the number of additional weeks spent on rework due to adjusbnents in requirements
or changes in code, and (d) the percentage of the elapsed time actually spent reworking each functional
product piece.
Oripmting Terminating Hand Oyer Location!
Process Process Proceas Registration
Process
(a) L1'\itial Design Start Date
(MM/VY)
(b) Initial Design End Date
(MM/YY)
(c) Additional Weeks Spent on
Rework
(d) Percentage of Elapsed
Time Actually Reworking
5. Listed below are several po~siblesources of blocking or waiting time. For each blocking source, please
indicate (a) the average number of times it was a factor on the project and (b) the average iilllOunt of time
you spent waiting per episode. For example, if gaining access to a testing laboratory and waiting for
delivery of a tool were the two primary blocking factors for Hand Over, you would indicate so as follows:
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Hand Over
(a) Avg. (b) Ayg.
fuQ Wait
~
Gaining access to a laboratory 20 times 2 hours
or machine
Waiting for delivery of a two 1.5
component or tool comps weeks
H there were other important blocking factors, please indicate so (and describe) under the 'other' category.
Insert Blocking & Waiting Table Here
6. Please rate the effectiveness of task coordination on each functional product piece in each of the
following five categories. Things you may wish to consider when evaluating effectiveness are the
number of people involved, the timeliness of the coordL1'\ation and the success of the resolution.
(1 = Extremely Ineffective, 2 = Quite Ineffective, 3 = Effective, 4 =Quite Effective, 5 = Extremely Effective)
Originating Tenninating Hand Over LocatignL XOverall
Process Process Process Registration
Process
Coordination of tasks
necessary to translate product
concept into a realizable
product and design and
integrate product components
or subsystems
Coordination of tasks
necessary to achieve technical
compatibility with other
hardware and software
products in the technical or
user environment
Coordination of tasks across
projects within the firm due to
the development and use of
common technologies
Coordination of tasks
associated with releasing the
product into the marketplace
Coordination of tasks
associated with the sharing of
physical and human resources
across and within projects
7. Pleas'? evaluate the effectiveness of working relationships both within and between the functional
product pieces.
(1 =Extremely Ineffective, 2 =Quite Ineffective, 3 =Effective, 4 =Quite Effective, 5 =Extremely Effective)
Within Product Pieces:
Originating Process: _
Terminating Process: _
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Hand Over Process: _
Location/Registration Process: _
~tween Pmduct Pieces:
Between Originating Process and Terminating Process: _
Between Originating Process and Hand Over Process: _
Between Originating Process and Location/Registration: _
Between TeI1IUnating Process and Hand Over Process: _
Between Terminating Process and Location/Registration: _
Between Hand Over Process and Location/Registration: _
8. Relative to your past project experiences, how satisfied were you with the overall final outcome on
each functional product piece?
(1 =Extremely Unsatisfied, 2 = Quite Unsatisfied, 3 = Satisfied, 4 = Quite Satisfied, 5 = Extremely
Satisfied)
Originating Process: _
Terminating Process: _
Hand Over Process: _
Location/Registration Process: _
X Overall: -.._
(If information is unavailable at the level of functional product pieces for the following questions, just rate
the product overall.)
9~ To what extent did the functional piece meet or exceed its initial schedule estimate?
(1 = Exceeded schedule by more than 10%, 2 = Exceeded schedule by 10% or less, 3= Came in on
schedule, 4 = Came in 10% or less under schedule, 5 =Came in more than 10% under schedule)
Originating Process: _
Terminating Process: _
Hand Over Process: _
Location/Registration Process: _
X Overall: _
10. To what extent did the functional piece meet or exceed its initial budget estimate?
(1 = Exceeded the budget by more than 10% , 2 = Exceeded the budget by 10% or less 3= Came in on
budget, 4 = Came in 10~~ or less under budget,S = Came in more than 100/0 under budget)
Originating Process: _
Terminating Process: _
Hand Over Process: _
Location/Registration Process: _
X Overall: _
11. To what extend did tl\e functional piece meet or exceed its actual customer requirements?
(1 =Failed to meet a significant number of requirements, 2 =Failed to meet some requirements, 3 = Met
all of its requirements, 4 =Met some additional requirements, 5 = Met a significant number of additional
requirements)
Originating Process: _
T~rminating Process: _
Hand Over Process: _
Location/Registration Process: _
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X Overall: _
12. Please indicate the number of major problems in each functional piece during the first year of the
product's release. Major problems are defined as system-erash level bugs (i.e., category E or H IMRs).
Originating Process: _
Terminating PrO\:ess~ _
Hand Over Process: _
location/Registration Process: _
XOverall: _
Are there any additional comments you would like to make about task coordination and the management
of interdependencies on this project?
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